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INTRODUCTION
Despite the dramatic increase in women's labor market participation
in recent decades, women continue to perform a disproportionate share
of "family labor," or the unpaid work of caring for children and other
family members. 1 Feminists2 have long been concerned that the
gendered division of family labor reduces women's wages,S contributes to
1. For data on labor-force participation, see U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 399-413 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Statistical Abstract]. For
data on women's family labor, see Victor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality
60-61 (1988); Frances K. Goldscheider Be LindaJ. Waite, New Families, No Families? The
Transformation of the American Home 110-11 (1991); David H. Demo Be Alan C. Acock,
Family Diversity and the Division of Domestic Labor: How Much Have Things Really
Changed?, 42 Fam. ReI. 323 (1993).
2. For my working definition of this contested term, see infra text accompanying note
10.
8. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Households At Work: Beyond Labor Market Policies to
Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 Geo. LJ. 89,89 (1993).
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the high and disproportionate rate of poverty among single mothers,4
limits married women's autonomy within the marital household,5 and cir-
cumscribes women's life choices and social and economic power.6
Although many feminists agree that legal reform should address the
economic and social consequences of the gendered division of family la-
bor,7 they differ significantly in their objectives and policy prescriptions.8
Feminists may seek to increase women's autonomy, economic well-being,
power, or happiness. Feminist policy prescriptions also differ, although
they tend to pursue one of three main goals. Some feminists advocate
equal treatment, or the application of the same legal rules to men and
women, in order to eliminate legal biases that discourage women's mar-
ket work and reinforce traditional gender roles. Others favor policies
that would not only eliminate legal biases but affirmatively encourage
women's market work in order to change gender roles and enhance
women's economic self-sufficiency. A third group argues that instead of
trying to change women's behavior, public policy should provide addi-
tional income transfers and other assistance to caregivers in order to di-
rectly improve their economic security and social status.9
This Article considers what tax policy might contribute to a feminist
legal agenda that seeks to advance one or more of these goals. This
Article assumes that feminist objectives are worth pursuing in order to
focus on institutional choices-Le., how to design tax law changes in ways
that are most likely to achieve feminist goals. Although "feminism" might
be defined in many ways, I use the term here very broadly to encompass
the objectives of improving women's autonomy, economic well-being, or
power.10 This definition does not imply that feminists are not also con-
4. See Nancy Folbre, Who Pays for the Kids? 189-91, 204-206 (1994).
5. See infra text accompanYing notes 116-122.
6. See Goldscheider & Waite, supra note 1, at 10; Arlie Hochschild, The Second Shift
9-10, 196, 257-66 (1989); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of
Alimony, 82 Geo. LJ. 2227, 2242-47 (1994).
7. Scholars argue, for example, that the gendered division of labor creates barriers to
equal economic and political opportunity, fosters systematic power differences within the
family and in society, and allocates the social costs of caregiving to women. See Folbre,
supra note 4, at 104-116; Susan M. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 134-39, 174
(1989); Carole Pateman, The Patriarchal Welfare State, in Democracy and the Welfare
State 231, 235-38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988).
8. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 12-42, 58-72
(1988) .
9. For a richer description of these goals, see infra text accompanYing notes 17-25.
10. See Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender 5 (1989) (noting different
connotations of tenn and using tenn "in its most general sense" but distinguishing among
strands of feminist thought where necessary). Given the multiple and contested meanings
of "feminism," the broad definition used here would encompass arguments about
improving women's circumstances made by proponents who would not necessarily identify
themselves as "feminists." Another issue that arises in any feminist project is that legal
analyses that focus on gender alone may obscure differences among women based on class,
race, or sexual orientation. See Mary Becker et aI., Cases and Materials on Feminist
Jurisprudence: Taking Women Seriously 118-54 (1994). Although this Article focuses
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cemed about men, children, and society as a whole, or that other goals
are not important. Instead, the definition simply helps isolate, for pur-
poses of analysis, arguments about how tax policies might assist women.
This Article argues that tax policy can make an important contribu-
tion to a feminist legal agenda, but that some prior scholarship has over-
looked the normative and institutional complexity of translating feminist
goals into concrete policy prescriptions. Tax policy is a major form of
economic regulation, with a significant financial impact on many women
and families, and a number of scholars have recommended tax law
changes intended, at least in part, to improve women's lives by changing
the economic incentives and rewards for women's market work and fam-
ily labor. II The major proposals include the adoption of individual
(rather than joint) filing of income tax returns by married couples; a spe-
cial, low tax rate schedule for married women; family allowances; an ex-
panded dependent care tax credit ("DCTC"); and reforms in the Social
Security payroll tax and benefits rules. I2
This Article suggests that tax law changes, particularly in combina-
tion with other legal reforms, could improve the economic well-being of
families with children or help ease women's labor-force participation.
This Article also shows, however, that feminist arguments for these tax
proposals have overlooked important conflicts among feminist goals and
have overstated the capacity of incremental financial incentives and enti-
tlements to change gender roles and improve women's economic well-
being and power within the family. A closer analysis suggests four princi-
pal conclusions:
First, any feminist tax proposal incorporates normative judgments
about the best way to help women, and none of these norms are un-
controversial, even among feminists. This Article considers three femi-
nist goals that tax policy proposals might serve-achieving equal treat-
ment, encouraging women's market work, and assisting caregiversI3-
and shows how each proposal faces difficult but inevitable tradeoffs
among them. A better understanding of these competing goals high-
lights some striking-but often unacknowledged-tensions in conven-
tional arguments for these tax proposals. For example, feminist argu-
ments for "tax neutrality" or eliminating "biases" in taxation are really
claims about the goal of equal treatment, which is enormously contested
primarily on gender, further work exploring the policy implications of differences among
women would be extremely useful.
11. This Article uses the standard term "market work" to describe paid labor outside
the home. "Family labor" is used to describe the unpaid work of caring for children and
other family members.
12. For descriptions of these proposals and citations to the leading articles that
discuss them, see infra notes 26-38, 128-134, 170-185, 231-245, 246-280 and
accompanying text.
13. "Caregivers" are women or men who perform family labor. For a discussion of
alternative feminist views on public policy toward caregivers, see infra text accompanying
notes 22-25.
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in feminist theory. Further, taking seriously the feminist goal of assisting
caregivers poses a fundamental challenge to individual filing and other
prominent feminist tax proposals that focus primarily on reducing tax
rates on women's market earnings.
Second, proponents of tax law reforms have tended to overstate the
impact of incremental tax incentives and income transfers on women's
(and men's) attitudes and behavior. Tax law changes can supplement
family incomes and modestly increase women's labor force participation,
but these limited achievements-although they may be well worth hav-
ing-do not necessarily advance more ambitious feminist goals. Despite
proponents' claims, it is extremely difficult to use tax law rules to change
the division of family labor within the household, to improve women's
economic well-being, or to increase women's financial power within the
family. This constraint is not unique to tax law, but instead reflects the
limited capacity of legal rules governing financial entitlements to change
deeply entrenched social norms about gender roles.
Third, a better understanding of these issues suggests that some tax
law reforms are better able to achieve their underlying goals than are
others. Although individual filing is a standard feminist prescription for
tax law reform) a closer look suggests that some key feminist arguments
for individual filing are weaker than proponents have recognized. Argu-
ments for market work tax incentives for wives also rely on some particu-
larly contingent empirical assumptions about the effects of incentives on
behavior. In contrast, the feminist case for family allowances is somewhat
stronger than typically portrayed, and an expanded dependent care tax
creditI4 could both facilitate women's market work and modestly assist
some caregivers.
Finally, a crucial but often overlooked question is vvhether tax policy
is likely to be more or less effective in achieving feminist goals than alter-
native changes in other legal regimes, including family law, welfare pol-
icy, and labor-market regulation. A comparison of institutional capabili-
ties suggests that tax policy has comparative advantages over other legal
measures but also notable weaknesses, and that other legal regimes face
similar constraints in using financial incentives and entitlements to
change attitudes and behavior. The analysis also suggests, however, that
coordination between tax rules and other legal rules could draw on the
diverse strengths of different legal regimes to expand the institutional
options for feminist legal reform. I5
Although portions of this Article highlight the limited power of tax
policies to implement feminist goals, let me emphasize that the Article is
not antifeminist. I strongly sympathize with the feminist project of im-
proving women's circumstances through law, and the point of the Article
is not to deny the possibility of advancing feminist goals, but to insist on a
14. For a discussion of the DCTC, see infra text accompanying notes 231-245.
15. See infra Part II.
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more careful and complex analysis. Ultimately, a better understanding of
the normative and institutional issues at stake can enhance the credibility
of feminist tax proposals and can help focus attention and limited re-
sources on legal reforms with the greatest potential for achieving their
goals.
I. FIVE FEMINIST TAX PROPOSALS: COMPETING GoALS AND
INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXI'IY
This Part considers what several prominent tax proposals might do
to implement three central feminist goals. These three goals represent
the major objectives of feminist proposals for tax (and other legal) re-
forms intended to address the economic disadvantage for women that is
created by the gendered division of market and family labor. I6
The first goal is equal treatment, or the idea that men and women
should face the same legal rules so that they can make equally un-
distorted decisions. I7 "Equal treatment" is sometimes used to mean only
formal equality, or the idea that legal rules should use gender-neutral
language, but I use the term here in the still conventional but slightly
broader sense of requiring equal treatment of "similarly-situated"18 men
and women. I9 Proponents of equal treatment posit that women's free
16. These three goals do not correspond precisely to common categories of feminist
norms as delineated in feminist theory. See, e.g., Martha A Fineman, The Neutered
Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 39-43 (1995)
(distinguishing equality feminism, postegalitarian feminism, and dominance feminism);
Mary Becker, Strength in Diversity: Feminist Theoretical Approaches to Child Custody and
Same-Sex Relationships, 23 Stetson L. Rev. 701, 701-704 (1994) (offering four-part
classification of feminist theory into formal equality, MacKinnon's dominance approach,
West's hedonic approach, and Radin's pragmatic approach); Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism
and Legal Theory, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 826, 827-29 (1988) (reviewing Catharine A
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (1987)) (classifying feminist theory into "difference,"
"different voice," and "dominance" approaches); West, supra note 8, at 12, 68 (discussing
various approaches, such as liberal, cultural, or radical). Although these are useful analytic
categories for comparing feminist theoretical approaches, they do not always yield clear
policy directions: for example, would market work incentives or assistance to caregivers be
the best way to improve women's power, subjective happiness, or autonomy? This Article
begins by defining three common feminist policy goals and then evaluates the potential for
each kind of policy to advance underlying, substantive goals relating to autonomy, well-
being, happiness, and power.
17. See Becker et aI., supra note 10, at 51 (characterizing formal equality as "giv[ing]
women and men the same choices"); cf. Martha A Fineman, The Illusion of Equality: The
Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform 20-22 (1991) (contrasting rule equality, or
"sameness of treatment," with equality of result).
18. This formulation reveals an inherent ambiguity in the equal treatment goal.
Because it is not always obvious when men and women are similarly situated, it is not
necessarily clear when equal treatment is appropriate, and feminists have debated the issue
in a variety of contexts. See Fineman, supra note 17, at 21. The analysis below extends
these debates to taxation in describing alternative interpretations of equal treatment. See
infra text accompanying notes 135-136 and 188.
19. See Becker et al., supra note 10, at 51; Fineman, supra note 17, at 20-30. For a
similar extension of formal equality, see Becker, supra note 16, at 701. This distinction
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choices will maximize their autonomy and well-being, once legal barriers
to those choices are removed.20 Equal treatment claims in taxation often
focus on eliminating tax biases against women's market work, and advo-
cates argue that removing these distortions can help change traditional
gender roles and help women become economically self-sufficient.
The second goal is to encourage women's labor force participation.
Some feminists argue that equal treatment is insufficient to improve
women's autonomy, power, and economic well-being, and that a stronger
push toward the labor market is needed to overcome women's (and
men's) preferences for traditional gender roles, which leave women eco-
nomically disadvantaged. Some feminists contend that women's nomi-
nally free choices about market work and family labor are unduly influ-
enced by social conditioning that leads women and men to favor women's
family labor over market work, and that women's "true" preference would
be to work more, so that a market work incentive is appropriate.21
Others take no position on whether women's preferences are "real" but
simply argue that women would be economically better off and less de-
pendent on men if they worked more. The goal of encouraging women's
market work overlaps with the equal treatment goal, because eliminating
legal biases against women's market work could lead them to work more.
Advocates of equal treatment insist that the two goals are distinct, how-
ever, because the second goal would go beyond equal treatment to take
special measures to change women's preferences and gender roles.
Although the analysis of specific proposals below suggests that the line
between equal treatment and other feminist goals is not as crisp as this
account suggests, it is useful to begin with the conventional distinction.
The third goal is to assist caregivers directly through income support
and other economic aid. Some feminists argue that caregivers, who are
disproportionately women, perform socially important work and should
be compensated for that work. On this view, the proper solution to the
economic disadvantage of caregiving work is not to change women's be-
havior or preferences, but instead to help women as they are by improv-
ing the economic status of family labor.22 Some feminists see assistance
emerges clearly in the discussion of individual filing below. Proponents argue that
nominally gender-neutral rules in fact have a disparate impact on men and women, given
women's economic status as "secondary" earners.
20. See Fineman, supra note 17, at 20-30.
21. See Folbre, supra note 4, at 99; Rhode, supra note 10, at 165-67 (1989); Joan C.
Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 797, 829 (1989). See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129, 1138-39,
1147-57 (1986) (describing endogenous preferences produced by existing legal structures,
including "adaptive preferences," which reflect psychic accommodation of limited
opportunity sets).
22. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 161-64, 216-17, 230-33; Folbre, supra note 4, at
124, 258; Dkin, supra note 7, at 175-80 (advocating measures to support parenting and
encourage equal sharing by women and men). This argument is sometimes associated
with "cultural" feminism. See, e.g., West, supra note 8, at 13-29 (defining cultural
feminism). The term "cultural feminism" is troublesome, however, because it often
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to caregivers as primarily a transition policy, needed to protect older
homemakers but largely unnecessary for younger generations of
women.23 Other feminists argue that, even in the long run, women or
men should be able to choose to engage in the socially important work of
caregiving and should not suffer economic harm as a result of that
choice.24 They acknowledge that current policies, like welfare programs
and private child support rules, provide a degree of income support for
some caregivers but argue that current programs are inadequate or
stigmatizing.25
The analysis below shows how these three goals inevitably conflict
with one another. The analysis also looks behind these policy goals to
explore whether proposals that literally achieve equal treatment, en-
courage women's market work, or assist caregivers, can actually further
the underlying, substantive goals of enhancing women's autonomy, well-
being, and power.
This Part considers five specific tax proposals, which illustrate the
most prominent approaches to feminist tax reform. The discussion be-
gins by considering proposals for individual filing and reduced marginal
tax rates for wives, because these proposals exemplify the first two goals,
equal treatment and encouraging women's market work. The discussion
then shows how family allowances and an expanded DCTC offer different
compromises between the goals of encouraging market work and assist-
ing caregivers. Finally, the analysis considers several feminist proposals
for Social Security reform, which illustrate particularly clearly the trade-
offs among competing goals.
denotes controversial beliefs about women's psychology and moral reasoning that
feminists concerned about the economic plight of caregivers do not necessarily share.
There is no consensus among feminists on whether women's continuing responsibility for
family labor reflects biological, psychological, or culturally imposed differences between
the sexes. Nor is there agreement on whether women's current emotional commitment to
family labor should be celebrated or changed.
23. See generally Rhode, supra note 10, at 153-54 (describing needs of older
displaced homemakers in divorce reform); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A
Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 79-80 (1987)
(arguing that in short term, it is necessary to take measures to support women "who are
trapped in circumstances neither they nor their husbands anticipated, and that they
cannot now avoid").
24. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 230-33.
25. The second and third goals also overlap to some degree: some feminists argue
that the best way to assist caregivers is to facilitate the combination of market work and
family labor. See, e.g., Barbara Bergmann, The Economic Emergence of Women 302,
310-313 (1986). Not all feminists agree, however, and again it is useful for purposes of
analysis to treat the two goals separately in order to see the tensions and possible
accommodations between them.
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A. Individual Filing and the Case for Equal Treatment in Taxation
Under current law, married couples typically file joint tax returns,
which calculate joint tax liability based on a couple's aggregate income.26
Many scholars have argued that joint taxation inappropriately subjects
wives' market earnings to a high marginal tax rate. Although the joint
return applies a formally gender-neutral tax rate schedule to a couple's
aggregate income, wives are often viewed as "secondary" workers, because
they typically earn less than husbands and their jobs often are perceived
as more dispensable.27 The result under joint filing is that a married
woman's initial marginal tax rate is determined by her husband's earn-
ings. Single workers and married men face a marginal tax rate schedule
that starts at zero and rises gradually as earnings rise, but wives, as secon-
dary earners, face a marginal tax rate schedule that begins in the tax rate
bracket determined by their husband's earnings.28 A number of scholars
have objected to this differential in taxation and have recommended the
replacement ofjoint filing with a system of mandatory individual filing. 29
Under individual filing, husbands and wives would file separate tax re-
turns, and all workers-married or single, male or female-would pay
tax according to the same rate schedule. Thus, a wife would face a margi-
nal tax rate no greater than the rate applied to a married man or a single
worker with the same income.3o
26. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (1994). Married couples may file separate returns, but there is
rarely an advantage to doing so, and most couples file jointly. See IRS, U.S. Dep't of
Treasury, Pub. No. 1304, Individual Income Tax Returns 1992, at 35 (rev. 1995) (tbI.1.3)
(showing, for 1992, approximately 48 million joint returns and 2.4 million returns of
married individuals filing separately).
27. As wives earn a larger share of household income, however, their status as
"secondary" workers may be changing. See Maria Cancian et aI., Working Wives and
Family Income Inequality Among Married Couples, in Uneven Tides 195, 205-07
(Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1993).
28. See Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income
Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 Buff. L. Rev. 49, 52-54 (1971); Pamela B.
Gann, Abandoning Marital Status As a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tex.
L. Rev. 1,42 n.137 (1980); Harvey S. Rosen, Tax Illusion and the Labor Supply of Married
Women, 58 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 167, 167 (1976).
29. See Alicia H. Munnell, The Couple Versus the Individual Under the Federal
Personal Income Tax, in The Economics of Taxation 247, 263-65 (Henry j. Aaron &
Michaelj. Boskin eds., 1980); Blumberg, supra note 28, at 95; Gann, supra note 28, at 46;
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339, 371 (1994).
Although it would be possible to enact a system of optional separate filing, which would
permit couples to elect to file jointly or separately, the text focuses on mandatory
individual filing, which would be necessary to ensure the elimination of the secondary-
earner marginal tax rate bias.
30. In contrast to the account in the text, some analysts view joint filing as subjecting
husbands and wives to the same marginal tax rate, because a dollar of extra earnings by
either one would be taxed at the couple's marginal tax rate. See John Piggott & john
Whalley, The Tax Unit and Household Production 1-2 (National Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 4820, 1994) (suggesting that, in a system of individual filing
with progressive marginal tax rates, lower-earning secondary workers will pay tax at a lower
rate than primary earners). If the decision is whether a wife should begin to work, or go
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Individual filing would have distributional as well as incentive effects.
Individual filing would redistribute tax liability among couples at the
same income level, tending to raise the average tax rates of single-earner
couples and reduce the average tax rates of two-earner couples.31 This
effect is the inevitable product of removing the secondary-earner bias in a
system with progressive marginal tax rates. Under joint filing, a couple's
tax bill is determined by its total income, so that a single-earner couple
and a two-earner couple with equal total incomes pay the same tax liabil-
ity. Individual filing, in contrast, tends to impose higher taxes on single-
earner couples than on two-earner couples with the same total income,
when marginal tax rates are progressive, because the single earner's
higher wages are taxed at a higher marginal rate.S2
Because this Article is concerned with tax proposals that seek to
change the tax treatment of women's market work or family labor, it fo-
cuses on the secondary-earner rationale for individual filing, but another
important argument for individual filing is based on the distortion that
joint filing creates in marital choices.33 Joint filing creates a "marriage
penalty" for many two-earner couples (i.e., two-earner married couples
pay a higher total tax than two single individuals with the same earnings),
and some scholars are concerned that the differential taxation of married
and single workers may discourage marriage. Individual filing would
from part-time to full-time work, it seems likely that the change will be evaluated as if the
wife's first dollar of earnings is taxed at the couple's marginal tax rate, as in the standard
account. On the other hand, if the decision is whether a working wife or husband should
work a few more hours, the consequences will also be evaluated at the couple's marginal
tax rate. Thus, the standard account seems implicitly to rely on the proposition that
husbands' hours and wages are fixed and that wives' work is relatively discretionary.
31. Although proposals for individual filing are not always explicit on this point, and a
variety of distributional outcomes are possible depending on the new rate structure, to
keep the analysis simple I assume that individual filing would be structured so that it would
not shift tax burdens across income classes but only between two-earner and single-earner
couples in the same income class. Individual filing could also change the tax liability of
single individuals, if the individual rate schedule must be raised in order to make up
revenue lost by the move to individual filing. For an analysis of individual filing under the
1976 rate schedule, see Munnell, supra note 29, at 267-71. Munnell's plan shows an
increase in the taxes of single-earner couples, a decrease in the taxes of two-earner
couples, and no change in the taxes of individuals other than heads of households, whose
taxes would increase. (Munnell's plan loses revenue; a more realistic plan probably would
increase the basic rate schedule on individuals.) See ide
32. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan. L. Rev.
1389, 1395-97 (1975). Bittker's analysis focuses on marriage neutrality but can easily be
extended to show that it is impossible to have (1) equal taxation of equal-earning couples,
(2) equal marginal tax rate schedules for primary and secondary workers, and (3)
progressive marginal tax rates. One might argue that a single-earner couple should pay
higher taxes than a two-earner couple, because the latter must pay for childcare and other
additional expenses of working. Although this observation is surely correct, it is not a
particularly convincing rationale for individual filing. The appropriate response would be
to allow a deduction for the additional expenses.
33. See Munnell, supra note 29, at 263, 278; Gann, supra note 28, at 8-9.
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make tax liability invariant to marital statuS.34 Although the secondary-
earner bias and the marriage neutrality issue are often linked because
most individual filing proposals would address both, the two issues are
logically distinct,35 and this Article does not consider in detail the poten-
tial feminist arguments for or against marriage neutrality. In passing, it
may be useful to note that there are serious questions about both the
empirical significance of the marriage penalty as a deterrent to marriage
and the status of marriage neutrality as a feminist goal. Many advocates
of individual filing place great weight on legal nonintenerence with mari-
tal decisions, but the limited empirical evidence suggests that the "mar-
riage penalty" has a small impact, at most, on those decisions.sa Further,
although some feminists place a high value on removing impediments to
marital autonomy,S7 others might place considerably less value on
marriage.ss
1. "Tax Neutrality" and Equal Treatment. - Although not all argu-
ments for individual filing are feminist,39 a number of scholars have ex-
plicitly argued that individual filing would benefit women. They contend
that joint filing is simply an anachronism: higher marginal tax rates for
working wives may have been uncontroversial when the married-couple
family with a nonworking wife was typical.4o Today, however, market
work has become the new norm for many married women, who work in
34. See Munnell, supra note 29, at 265-67; Gann, supra note 28, at 32-46.
35. The secondary-earner bias arises because marginal tax rates on husbands and
wives (within couples) are perceived to be different; the marriage penalty (or bonus) arises
because average tax rates on married couples and single couples with the same earnings
pattern are different. In theory, we could eliminate the secondary-earner bias by having
individual filing for husbands and wives but preserve a marriage bonus (or penalty) by
having a lower (or higher) tax rate schedule for married individuals than for single ones.
36. See James Alm & Leslie A Whittington, Does the Income Tax Affect Marital
Decisions?, 48 Nat'l TaxJ. 565,571 (1995) (finding that "taxes affect at least some marital
decisions of at least some individuals, but . . . for many individuals taxes are largely
irrelevant"); David L. Sjoquist & Mary B. Walker, The Marriage Tax and the Rate and
Timing of Marriage, 48 Nat'l TaxJ. 547, 556 (1995) (finding that marriage tax does not
influence marriage rates but may lead some individuals to postpone marriage for short
periods).
37. See David L. Kirp et al., Gender Justice 186-90 (1986).
38. See generally Fineman, supra note 16, at 145-76 (criticizing traditional notions of
family centered on a heterosexual relationship between husband and wife rather than on
caretaking relationships).
39. For example, Lawrence Zelenak recognizes that questions of women's roles in
market work and family labor are highly contested both among feminists and in society at
large. He sees individual filing not as a policy to benefit women but instead as a way to
ensure that the government takes no position on the controversy. See Lawrence Zelenak,
Comments on Anne Alstott's "Tax Policy, Welfare Policy and Family Labor: Family
Allowances for Caregivers" 10-12 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
40. Joint filing tends to award a "marriage bonus" to single-earner couples, Le., a
reduction in total tax liability compared to the tax liability ofan unmarried couple with the
same earnings.
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order to maintain family incomes.41 These scholars argue that joint filing
inappropriately penalizes working wives and tends to perpetuate tradi-
tional gender roles by discouraging married women's market work.42
They contend that individual filing would eliminate current law's bias,
creating "tax neutrality" that would neither encourage nor discourage
married women's market work.43
An immediate problem is that the content of the tax neutrality norm
is not entirely clear. Although "neutrality" has a vaguely economic sound,
in fact the feminist tax neutrality argument for individual filing is best
understood as an equal treatment claim, rather than an argument about
neutrality or efficiency as used in the economic analysis of taxation.
In conventional (and more precise) economic terminology, tax rules
are said to be "neutral" if they do not alter the relative (pre-tax) eco-
nomic consequences of a set of choices faced by an individual. A tax
"distortion" arises if tax rules change the relative economic payoffs of al-
ternative choices. For example, the income tax distorts labor-supply
choices, because wages are taxed while the "imputed income" from lei-
sure or family labor is not.44 (In the interest of precision, I will call this
idea "decisional neutrality.")
Individual filing is not neutral in this sense. Individual filing would
not create complete decisional neutrality for married women's labor-
market choices because married women, like other workers, would con-
tinue to face the distortion created by the taxation of market earnings
and the exclusion of imputed income. Individual filing would, however,
mean that wives would face the same marginal tax rate schedule as other
workers.
Some feminist advocates of individual filing also invoke the goal of
efficiency. Although tax neutrality in this context may tend to promote
efficiency, the two goals are not identical. As conventionally defined, effi-
ciency in taxation requires minimizing total tax distortions on individu-
als' decisions, on the assumption that in the absence of taxation market
allocations would be efficient.45 Efficiency suggests that a change in tax
rules should be made if a greater distortion can be reduced or eliminated
by creating or exacerbating a smaller distortion, because the change will
41. See Cancian et al., supra note 27, at 196, 205-08.
42. See Munnell, supra note 29, at 247-53, 278; Blumberg, supra note 28, at 94-95;
Gann, supra note 28, at 39-46.
43. See Aline Quester, Women's Behavior and the Tax Code, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 665, 665
(1979); Laura Ann Davis, Note, A FeministJustification for the Adoption of an Individual
Filing System, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 197,236-38 (1988).
44. For a definition of imputed income, see Boris I. Bittker & MartinJ. McMahon,Jr.,
Federal Income Taxation of Individuals t 3.3 (2d ed. 1995). For a discussion of the impact
of the imputed income exclusion on women's work, see infra notes 242-244 and
accompanying text. The decisional neutrality norm implicitly presumes that choices made
in the absence of taxation would maximize welfare.
45. See HaIVey S. Rosen, Public Finance 303-23 (4th ed. 1995).
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reduce the aggregate welfare loss in the system.46 Because empirical stud-
ies suggest that married women's labor supply is particularly "elastic," or
responsive to marginal tax rates,47 the welfare loss from high marginal tax
rates on married women may be high. The efficiency argument is that
individual filing would increase aggregate welfare, because the larger
gain in wives' welfare would outweigh the smaller loss in husbands' and
single workers' welfare attributable to the general marginal tax rate in-
crease needed to finance a revenue neutral change. Although the effi-
ciency norm does not always coincide with feminist concerns, because it
seeks to maximize total utility rather than women's utility, in this case the
efficiency argument tends to dovetail with the feminist argument that the
tax law has a disproportionate impact on women's choices regarding mar-
ket work.
Individual filing may promote efficiency, but it arguably does not go
far enough. Optimal commodity taxation theory suggests that, if a tax
system is to raise a given amount of revenue, efficiency generally dictates
higher taxes on inelastic decisions and lower taxes on elastic decisions in
order to minimize total distortions.48 Because married women's labor-
supply decisions are elastic relative to those of other workers,49 optimal
commodity taxation may require going beyond equal taxation to create
even lower marginal tax rate schedules for married women than for other
groups. Edward McCaffery, for example, relies in part on optimal com-
modity taxation principles to advocate special low marginal tax rates for
married women.50 Although reasonable people may differ about just
how low the technically optimal marginal tax rate on wives would be,
there is no reason to think that individual filing, which equalizes marginal
tax rates on wives and other workers, is necessarily the most efficient
policy.51
Thus, although efficiency is related to tax neutrality, the two goals
are not coextensive. For an efficiency advocate, equalizing initial margi-
nal tax rate schedules for husbands and wives is not a goal in itself but
46. See ide This general statement may not hold where a new distortion helps correct
a preexisting distortion; this is the problem of the second-best. See ide at 314-15, 325-27.
47. For a discussion of the empirical literature on wives' labor supply, see infra notes
68-83 and accompanying text.
48. See Rosen, supra note 45, at 328-34.
49. But see infra text accompanying notes 70-75 (describing empirical evidence
suggesting that wives already at work have labor supply elasticities that are nearly as low as
those of men, while nonworking wives' participation decisions may be quite elastic).
50. See Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 Yale LJ. 595, 654-64 (1993). For a discussion
of McCaffery's proposal, see infra Part LB.
51. I am using "optimal" here in the technical sense used in optimal commodity tax
theory. Efficiency concerns may, of course, be trumped by distributional concerns. It
might be that distributional concerns combined with efficiency goals would lead us to
individual filing, but that is simply another way of stating the proposition in the text-that
some separate norm of equal taxation seems to underlie the "neutrality" case for individual
filing.
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only one possible approach to the goal of maximizing total utility.
Although the efficiency goal suggests that individual filing is a step in the
right direction, it does not justify the strong focus on equal marginal tax
rates for husbands and wives that is the hallmark of the feminist case for
individual filing.52
Ultimately, the feminist tax neutrality argument for individual filing
is best understood as a distinct argument for equal taxation of men's and
women's wages, rather than an argument for decisional neutrality or effi-
ciency. The equal taxation claim, in turn, is a rather straightfoIWard ap-
peal to the equal treatment goal.5S Here, the equals to be treated alike
are male and female wage-earners, and individual filing would do so by
ensuring that all workers face the same marginal tax rate schedule.
Framing the conventional argument for individual filing as an equal
treatment claim also helps clarify that, of the three feminist tax policy
goals, only equal treatment supports individual filing over alternative pol-
icies with any degree of finality. First, feminists who seek to encourage
women's market work might support individual filing, but only as a par-
tial step toward an ideal, rather than as a complete end in itself. On this
view, individual filing is just the beginning of a move toward unequal taxa-
tion through special tax incentives for women's market work.54 This per-
spective suggests that the desirability of individual filing turns on how
effectively it encourages women's market work, changes gender roles,
and improves women's economic well-being, and that individual filing
may be inferior to other policies, e.g., a DCTC or mandated family
leave.55
Second, the feminist goal of assisting caregivers also provides no
strong reason for preferring individual filing to alternative policies and
even suggests a rationale that favors joint filing. Individual filing would
cut average tax rates for some working women who are caregivers, but it
would also cut taxes for working women who are not caregivers, would
provide no benefits to homemakers or to single mothers and, as noted
above, would raise average tax rates on single-earner couples. Thus, indi-
52. This distinction emerges quite clearly in a recent paper by John Piggott &John
Whalley, which argues that individual filing would tend to remove one tax distortion-the
secondary-earner bias-but would create another distortion in the allocation of family
labor between husbands and wives. See Piggott & Whalley, supra note 30, at 1-2.
Although Piggott and Whalley are quite right that the latter distortion is a matter of
concern in traditional efficiency analysis, many feminists would applaud a tax "distortion"
that led men to take on even an inefficiently large share of household labor.
53. For example, Grace Blumberg's early, classic article (which does not rely on
neutrality language but which argues directly for equal taxation) contends that individual
filing is analogous to the antidiscrimination and equal pay laws of Title VII. See Blumberg,
supra note 28, at 95.
54. See infra Part LB.
55. For discussions of these policies, see infra text accompanying notes 231-245 and
326-341.
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vidual filing would help some caregivers but harm others,56 in order to
pursue a goal-equal marginal tax rates on husbands and wives-which,
on this view, is not particularly important. From this perspective, individ-
ual filing is clearly less desirable than policies that are better targeted to
caregivers, e.g., family allowances.
This point is worth emphasizing, because it suggests a potential femi-
nist defense of the joint filing system. The traditional case for individual
filing has characterizedjoint filing as clearly antifeminist because it raises
marginal tax rates on secondary earners. Once we take seriously the goal
of assisting caregivers, however, the other side of the feminist argument
emerges. On this view, higher marginal tax rates for secondary workers
are simply an inevitable by-product of an important feature of the tax
system-equal taxation of equal-earning couples-which is necessary to
avoid overtaxing single-earner couples. IS7
Once the equal taxation argument for individual filing is understood
as an equal treatment claim, its controversial nature becomes clear.
Although the equal treatment goal has motivated many significant femi-
nist legal achievements, feminists have increasingly challenged the impor-
tance, or more precisely, the sufficiency, of equal treatment.58 The equal
treatment goal basically accepts existing legal and social arrangements,
including the gendered division of family labor, provided that tax and
other legal rules treat men and women alike. Many feminists argue that
equal treatment of men and women does not sufficiently take into ac-
count underlying social inequalities that leave women situated very differ-
ently from men, and that more fundamental structural changes are nec-
56. Individual filing might harm caregivers in two ways. First, a proposal for
individual filing might raise taxes on single mothers if it is funded (in part) by repealing
head of household filing status or by raising tax rates across the board. Second, an
increase in taxes on single-earner couples could reduce the after-tax income available to
the caregiver in the family as well as to other family members. See infra text accompanYing
notes 104-122 for a discussion of the allocation of joint tax liabilities within the marital
household.
57. One could argue that the joint filing system actually undertaxes single-earner
couples because they receive a marriage bonus (a lower average tax rate than that paid by
an unmarried couple with the same earnings pattern), while two-earner couples incur a
marriage penalty. The problem with this rejoinder, however, is that equal-earning
unmarried couples pay unequal taxes, so that the marriage "bonus" and "penalty" are
needed simply to equalize the joint tax burden across couples. This explanation does not
provide a rationale for choosing between the two possible positions, but instead merely
illustrates that both are logically consistent points of view.
58. See generally Fineman, supra note 17, at 20-22 (arguing that "a growing minority
[of feminist legal scholars] has pointed out that achieving the objectives of equality
requires measures that extend beyond mere sameness of treatment; the rules should be
explicitly developed to achieve equality of result, with the historic and contemporary
disadvantages associated with gender given important consideration").
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essary to significantly improve women's autonomy, well-being, or
power.59
This general feminist critique of equal treatment can be extended to
the context of taxation. Although the equal taxation argument for indi-
vidual filing acknowledges women's socially determined status as secon-
dary workers, the critique would be that the equal taxation argument
does not go far enough in recognizing and redressing social and eco-
nomic inequalities. For example, feminists who seek to encourage
women's market work might argue that the secondary-earner bias created
by the joint filing system is only one of many legal, economic, and social
obstacles to women's market work. On this view, equalizing husbands'
and wives' marginal tax rates is-although a step in the right direction-
an inadequate response to a much deeper problem. Other feminists
would argue that women's responsibility for family labor leaves male and
female market workers so unequally situated that unequal taxation
(through special assistance for caregivers) is needed to achieve a more
substantive vision of economic equality.
These normative conflicts pose a significant challenge for the con-
ventional feminist case for individual filing. The equal taxation argu-
ment for individual filing is most coherent if understood as an equal
treatment claim, because only the equal treatment goal makes an un-
ambiguous case for individual filing over other policies. An advocate of
individual filing must either defend equal treatment against its feminist
critics or acknowledge that individual filing is at best only one option for
taking a limited step toward the more ambitious (and also controversial)
feminist goal of encouraging women's market work. The latter course
then requires a more sophisticated analysis of why-assuming, realisti-
cally, that resources for feminist tax reform are limited-individual filing
is preferable to other policies that could also encourage women's market
work.6o
2. The Uncertain Consequences ofIndividual Filing. - A second strand
of the feminist argument for individual filing also merits attention. Some
advocates of individual filing rely not only on the inherent propriety of
equal treatment, but also on two empirical predictions about the benefi-
cial consequences of equal taxation for women.61 First, they argue that
individual filing could help change gender roles by encouraging married
59. For critiques of equal treatment, see ide at 20-31; Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 32-45 (1987); Okin, supra note 7, at
16-17.
60. Part I.B considers tax policies that might be used to encourage women's market
work.
61. These consequentialist arguments are not strictly necessary to make a feminist
case for individual filing-or to make an efficiency case. For some feminists, equalizing
marginal tax rate schedules for husbands and wives may be a sufficient goal in itself,
regardless of consequences. Nevertheless, these arguments have commonly been made in
order to strengthen the feminist case for individual filing, and they deserve a closer look.
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women to work more (outside the home).62 Second, some proponents
claim that increasing married women's market work could also enhance
women's economic security and independence.63 Increasing women's
participation in the labor force could encourage women to invest more in
education and other human capital, leaving them better situated to pro-
vide for themselves and less dependent on men or on state income sup-
port. Women's market employment may also confer political and psycho-
logical benefits in a society that often measures achievement by reference
to market work.64
Although these arguments are intuitively plausible, a closer look sug-
gests that the projected effects of individual filing on women's and men's
behavior are overly optimistic, and that individual filing has only a limited
capacity to change gender roles or to increase married women's eco-
nomic well-being through market work.
a. Tax Rate Cuts and Wives' Labor Supply. - These predictions about
gender role change and women's economic well-being rest on the simple
premise that individual filing would increase married women's market
work by lowering their marginal tax rates. The real story is, however, con-
siderably more complicated. Individual filing would reduce marginal tax
rates for many, though not all, married women.65 The most significant
reductions in marginal rates are likely to be for wives who earn relatively
little but who either have high-earning husbands or whose earnings are
sufficient to push the couple out of a lower bracket into a higher one.66
62. See Gann, supra note 28, at 39-47.
63. For general statements about the value of market work for women, see Bergmann,
supra note 25, at 5; Kay, supra note 23, at 4; Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market:
A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1552 (1983).
64. See Bergmann, supra note 25, at 5; Rhode, supra note 10, at 174; Blumberg, supra
note 28, at 94-95; Matjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-
Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 Hastings LJ. 63, 64, 110 (1993). See
generallyJon Elster, Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?, in Democracy and
the Welfare State 53, 62-63 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988) (describing effects of work on self-
esteem).
65. It is not possible to tell, without a sophisticated model and good data, how many
wives would be affected by individual filing or how significant the marginal tax rate
reduction would be. In a recent study, Feenberg and Rosen estimate the marriage bonuses
and penalties under current law (Le., the difference between average tax rates on married
couples and average tax rates on the same couples if single) , but their study does not (and
was not intended to) simulate marginal tax rates under a system of individual filing, which
probably would not have the same rate structure as the current schedule for single
individuals. See Daniel R Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen, Recent Developments in the
Marriage Tax, 5-16 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 4705, 1994).
66. The marginal tax rate reduction depends on the extent to which joint filing
subjects married women's earnings to higher marginal tax rates determined by the
husband's earnings. The determination is complicated because married and single people
have different standard exemptions and because the new rate schedule for single
individuals would differ from the current rate schedule for single individuals. See supra
note 31. To take a simple example, a wife whose husband is in the lower tiers of the 15%
bracket and who herself earns (or could earn) little (but enough to exceed the zero
bracket created by the personal exemption and standard deduction) would probably
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The conventional prediction is that married women's labor supply will
increase significantly, and legal scholars routinely cite empirical studies
finding that married women's labor supply is more elastic than that of
married men or single workers (male or female).67 A better understand-
ing of the methodology of these studies, however, suggests that there is
more uncertainty than the apparent consensus indicates. Although econ-
omists are quite candid in acknowledging these issues, legal users of
econometric work are not always duly cautious in applying the end results
to policy analysis.
According to the standard analysis, economic theory cannot predict
whether marginal tax rate cuts will increase or decrease wives'68 labor
supply. The tax cut raises wives' after tax wage, and some may go to work
or increase their work hours in response to the higher wage (the "substi-
tution effect"). The increase in the after tax wage also creates a compet-
ing "income effect" that may discourage market ,york, because a woman
can earn the same after tax amount with less work. Thus, a tax incentive
does not necessarily affect actual behavior, and economic theory alone
cannot predict even the direction, let alone the magnitude, of the behav-
ioral change.69
The prediction that married women's labor supply will increase in
response to a tax cut is based on empirical studies. Although many em-
pirical studies find that married women's labor supply is particularly elas-
tic, or responsive to tax cuts or other changes in the net wage, the empiri-
cal evidence is uncertain in a number of ways. The basic difficulty is that
it is impossible to observe directly married women's response to lower tax
rates. Actual work behavior reflects a mix of causal factors, and what ap-
pears to be a response to tax changes could instead be attributable to a
wide variety of demographic, social, or other economic factors. With rare
exceptions, economists cannot conduct controlled experiments to isolate
the effects of tax rates on work.70 Instead, economists must use theory to
develop plausible models of married women's work behavior, use regres-
sion analysis to test how well the model "fits" available data sets, and then
remain in the 15% marginal bracket under individual filing. Depending on how the new
rate schedule is set and on the husband's earnings, a very high earning wife, whose
marginal tax rate is already high, might not receive any marginal tax rate reduction from
individual filing.
67. For a discussion of these empirical studies, see infra text accompanying notes
68-83.
68. This section focuses on married women because they are the group that would be
affected by individual filing and by McCaffery's proposals, described at infra Part I.B below.
69. See Anne L. A1stott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533,547-51 (1995).
70. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, social scientists conducted a number of
controlled experiments involving a negative income tax ("NIT") in order to test the
response of welfare recipients to changes in the terms ofassistance. The results of the NIT
experiments are still used today but have been criticized on methodological grounds. See
generally, Lessons from the Income Maintenance Experiments (Alicia H. Munnell ed.,
1986) (describing NIT experiments and critiques of experiments' methodology).
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use elasticity estimates to predict future behavior. The empirical results
are only as good as the theoretical model, statistical techniques, and data
sets used.71
Although these problems are endemic to much empirical work in
the social sciences, they have been particularly evident in empirical stud-
ies of the effects of taxes on married women's labor supply. A host of
methodological issues arises in determining women's labor-supply re-
sponse to the wage rate,72 and additional issues confront studies that at-
tempt to model the effects of taxes on the wage.73 For many years, empir-
ical studies concluded that married women's labor supply was
significantly more ~esponsive to wages and to tax changes than married
men's labor supply.74 Recently, however, several studies have argued that
previous empirical work finding high elasticities was flawed. According to
the new view, married women already at work have a labor supply elastic-
ity that is much closer to married men's, but nonworking women's labor-
supply elasticity is much higher than that of either of the former
groupS.75 These results suggest that working wives are not likely to in-
71. See Thomas A Mroz, The Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of Married Women's
Hours of Work to Economic and Statistical Assumptions, 55 Econometrica 765, 795
(1987); William C. Randolph & Diane L. Rogers, The Implications for Tax Policy of
Uncertainty About Labor-Supply and Savings Responses, 48 Nat'l TaxJ. 429, 433, 437-38
(1995); see also Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate
Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1905, 1921-26 (1987)
(reviewing labor supply studies and discussing methodological issues).
72. For a survey of many issues, see Mark R. Killingsworth & James J. Heckman,
Female Labor Supply: A Survey, in 1 Handbook of Labor Economics 103 (DrIey
Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986); James J. Heckman, What Has Been Learned
About Labor Supply in the Past Twenty Years?, 83 Am. Econ. Rev., May 1993, at 116,
116-20. Modeling issues include whether labor-supply decisions are made by individuals
acting alone or whether they are influenced by other family members' decisions, the
"heterogeneity" of jobs (Le., the fact that most individuals cannot choose from an
unlimited menu of work options but must choose among jobs with fixed characteristics
including hours and wages), and differences between static and dynamic models. See
Killingsworth & Heckman, supra, at 124-79. Using data to test theoretical models creates
other challenges. See Killingsworth & Heckman, supra, at 179-84. See generally
Heckman, supra, at 117-20 (discussing problems of estimation including estimation of
wages for nonworkers and errors in data sets); Joel Slemrod, Do Taxes Matter? Lessons
from the 1980s, 82 Am. Econ. Rev., May 1993, at 250,253 (noting that "empirical analysis
of cross-sectional (and any other) data is subject to bias because unobservable explanatory
variables may be correlated with included variables").
73. See Nada Eissa, Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 As a Natural Experiment 1-3 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 5023, 1995); Jerry A Hausman, Taxes and Labor Supply, in 1 Handbook of
Public Economics 213 (AianJ. Auerbach Be Martin Feldstein eels., 1985). Modeling issues
include the use of static, rather than dynamic or life cycle, models and the exclusion of
nonpecuniary attributes ofjobs. See ide at 223-25. For econometric issues, see ide at 248.
74. See Killingsworth Be Heckman, supra note 72, at 179.
75. See id., at 179; Mroz, supra note 71, at 795; Robert K. Triest, The Effect of Income
Taxation on Labor Supply in the United States, 25J. Hum. Resources 491,513 (1990). But
see Eissa, supra note 73, at 31 (finding that for high income wives, the participation
decision is only slightly more elastic than the hours decision). Mroz's study found that
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crease their work hours significantly in response to marginal tax rate cuts,
but that nonworkers may respond more strongly by beginning to work.
Even the new consensus is not entirely solid, however. Because the
determinants of married women's labor supply are so complex, econo-
mists acknowledge continuing questions about the validity of estimates of
married women's labor-supply elasticity, compared to the relatively high
degree of consensus about estimates of labor-supply elasticity for men.76
Finally, an additional obstacle not typically accounted for in economic
models is that tax incentives often are not well understood by their
targets. 77 Thus, although economic models posit that women's labor sup-
ply is a function of tax rates, wage rates and other factors, in the real
world married women may fail to respond to tax changes, particularly
complex ones that are difficult to understand.7s
The policy stakes here are fairly high. If current empirical studies
significantly overestimate married women's responsiveness to tax rate
changes, then most predictions about the social consequences of margi-
nal tax rate cuts for wives simply evaporate. The arguInent is not that
empirical studies are useless, but only that the high degree of uncertainty
in estimates of married women's labor supply compels caution and even
skepticism about the effects of individual filing and other tax rate reduc-
tions. 79 Given this uncertainty, perhaps the most reasonable approach is
to acknowledge these issues but to treat the available studies as the best
current evidence until a new consensus develops. The remainder of this
many prior estimates of female labor-supply elasticity were biased upwards, in some cases
because models ignored the correlation between work experience and women's "taste" for
market work. The result was that the models overstated wage elasticity results, because part
of the variation in work hours (mistakenly) attributed to the wage rate was in fact
attributable to a greater taste for work. See Mroz, supra note 71, at 774. See generally
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in Manual on Scientific
Evidence 415, 419-22 (Federal judicial Ctr. ed., 1994) (discussing methodological issues in
regression analysis, including spurious correlation).
76. See Mroz, supra note 71, at 795-96; Triest, supra note 75, at 512-13; see also
Killingsworth & Heckman, supra note 72, at 185 (emphasizing variability of estimates of
uncompensated labor elasticities and characterizing range of estimates as "dauntingly
large").
77. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 69, at 548 (describing potential gap in transmitting
the work incentives created by the earned income tax credit when recipients do not
understand terms of the program).
78. Recent estimates of the responsiveness of savings to tax rate changes provide a
cautionary tale. Through the early 1980s, many economists agreed that tax rates had a
significant influence on savings. More recently, however, a new consensus has emerged, as
many economists have concluded that income tax rates in fact have little effect on savings.
See Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth Transfer
Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 52 Tax L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996)
(manuscript at 22, on file with the Columbia Law Review); Slemrod, supra note 72, at
251-52.
79. Cf. Anthony B. Atkinson, Public Economics in Action 152-53 (1995) (arguing that
although we can learn something from empirical studies, "we certainly have to be cautious
about the idea that their findings can be incorporated routinely into the analysis of
policy").
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Article uses empirical studies of work effort and other behavior in this
way.
Even if we accept existing studies as the best current knowledge, it is
difficult to know exactly what they reveal. Recent studies offer a wide
range of predictions about the magnitude of the effect of tax rate cuts on
wives' work effort. For example, jerry Hausman's survey of the literature
presents a range of estimates, which suggest that a 1% reduction in mar-
ginal tax rates could translate into a decrease in wives' hours of market
work of 0.12% or an increase of as much as 1.88%.80 Hausman's own
estimate is that a 10% tax cut would increase wives' labor supply by 4.1 %,
and a 30% tax cut would increase wives' labor supply by 9.4%.81 These
rough estimates do not, of course, accurately convey the impact of indi-
vidual filing, which cuts marginal tax rates by different amounts for differ-
ent groups of women. Under individual filing, nonworking and low-
earning women married to high earners receive the largest marginal rate
reductions. Higher earning married women and those whose husbands
earn little receive smaller (or zero) marginal rate reductions. One simu-
lation predicted that optional individual filing would increase married
women's work effort by about 11 %-certainly not an inconsequential in-
crease, but perhaps not a terribly substantial one.82
These results raise more questions than they answer. For example,
the 11 % estimate does not mean that all women will work 11 % more but
instead that some women may go to work or work many more hours,
while others continue their present behavior.83 The data also cannot pre-
80. See Hausman, supra note 73, at 247 tb1.5.6 (uncompensated elasticities are
calculated by adding wage and income elasticities). Killingsworth and Heckman present a
range of estimates indicating that a 1% reduction in marginal tax rates could translate into
a 0.03% decline in wives' work hours or an increase of as much as 14%. See Killingsworth
& Heckman, supra note 72, at 185. All these estimates are for married women's total (or
uncompensated) labor-supply elasticity. Economists interested in efficiency focus on
compensated elasticities, which are relevant to measuring deadweight loss. See Rosen,
supra note 45, at 308-10. This discussion, in contrast, seeks to evaluate claims about the
aggregate change in wives' market work following individual filing, and so looks to
uncompensated elasticities. (Implicitly, the use of uncompensated elasticities assumes that
the revenue needed to finance the change is raised from other sources, e.g., single-earner
couples.) Compensated elasticities would be relevant in assessing the importance of the
efficiency arguments for individual filing or an expanded DCTC.
81. See Hausman, supra note 73, at 249; see also Mroz, supra note 71, at 766,790-91
(presenting range of estimates and rejecting most based on methodological flaws); Triest,
supra note 75, at 512 (estimating that income tax in aggregate reduces wives' hours of
work by as much as 30% or as little as 10%, compared to a hypothetical world with no
income tax).
82. See Daniel H. Feenberg & Harvey Rosen, Alternative Tax Treatments of the
Family: Simulation Methodology and Results, in Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax
Policy Analysis 24-31 tbIs.1.3 & 1.8 (Martin Feldman ed., 1983) (showing that under
system of optional individual filing average annual hours of work by wives increase from
732 to 815, an 11.3% increase).
83. Feenberg and Rosen present data showing the composition of increased work
effort by income class. See ide at 31 tb1.1.8.
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dict what kinds of jobs the women will get or the wages they will earn.
Thus, a better understanding of the empirical evidence on married
women and market work certainly does not defeat the case for individual
filing but does suggest caution in making broad social predictions based
on simple and unquantified readings of the economic evidence.
Finally, it is important to distinguish two quite separate points about
the impact of tax incentives on behavior. The first question is whether
behavioral reactions to a given incentive are likely to be responsive or
unresponsive to a tax cut of a particular size. This is the elasticity issue
considered above-how responsive is wives' labor supply to a 1% (or 10%
or 20%) marginal tax rate cut?-and that question is the focus of the
empirical uncertainty just discussed. The second and distinct point is
that, whether elasticities are large or small, modest incentives or income
transfers generally will have smaller effects than larger incentives or trans-
fers. Individual filing and the other tax proposals discussed here, includ-
ing reduced marginal tax rates for married women, family allowances,
and the DCTC, would make relatively modest changes in women's and
families' incomes, typically on the order of, at most, several thousand dol-
lars per year.84 Much larger incentives or transfers could, of course, have
greater effects on behavior and well-being,85 but this Article focuses on
relatively incremental tax proposals because they have been most often
discussed and because they are at least in the ball park of politically feasi-
ble changes.
b. Individual Filing, Gender Role Change, and Women's Economic Well-
Being. - The next problem is that even if marginal tax rate cuts do lead
married women to increase their market work, individual filing is likely to
have only a limited impact on gender roles or married women's eco-
nomic well-being. Although it is not particularly surprising that an incre-
mental policy has modest effects, a closer analysis shows that there are
significant obstacles to using marginal tax rate cuts to implement these
substantive goals.
Market Work and Gender Role Change. Individual filing may "change
gender roles" simply by encouraging married women to work more. If, as
some studies suggest, some wives want to work more, but their husbands
are opposed,86 the tax change could benefit these women by giving recal-
citrant husbands an economic reason to cooperate.
84. Cf. Feenberg & Rosen, supra note 65, at 21 tb1.3 (finding average marriage "tax"
of $9980 under current law for couples earning more than $200,000). These large
marriage penalties give some idea of the kind of average tax rate reduction individual filing
might create for two-earner couples, but the incentive effect should be measured in terms
of marginal, not average rates, and these data do not indicate marginal tax rate reductions.
See supra note 65.
85. A payment of, say, $40,000 per year to every working woman might indeed induce
larger numbers of women to go to work, although such a policy could also create a large
income effect that could lead women already at work to reduce their hours of work while
still collecting the subsidy.
86. See Philip Blumstein Be Pepper Schwartz, American Couples 118-25 (1983).
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Whether individual filing accomplishes gender role change in the
more fundamental sense of changing the division of family labor is much
less clear. In theory, lower marginal tax rates on married women and
higher tax rates on married men could induce husbands to share family
labor, as wives increase their market work and husbands decrease theirs,
but any prediction about the effect of incentives on gender roles is funda-
mentally speculative. Individual and household decisions about market
work and family labor are complex, and the effects on gender roles of
incremental changes in wives' work effort are even more complex and
less well understood.87 In addition, because married men's labor supply
is rather unresponsive to tax changes,88 husbands may not work much
less in response to the tax increase.
Although in some households women's increased market work may
encourage changes in the gendered division of labor, in others wives will
take on (or continue) the "double shift" of market work and family labor.
Recent experience suggests that even dramatic increases in women's la-
bor market participation do not necessarily lead men to increase their
share of family labor.89 The optimistic story is that gender role change
will accelerate as new generations of men and women grow up expecting
to share family labor. The pessimistic story, supported by some survey
evidence of younger generations, is that cultural expectations and the
inflexible conditions of full-time market work will make gender role
change a painfully slow process.90 The argument is not that women's
market work has not changed gender roles and expectations-it clearly
has-but only that there is little reason to expect that incremental in-
creases in married women's market work in response to tax incentives
would materially affect the long-term outcome.
87. For one example, see the discussion below of the uncertain impact of wives' work
on intrafamily income allocations infra text accompanYing notes 116-122.
88. See supra text accompanYing notes 65-85. In general, estimates suggest that the
uncompensated elasticity of working-age men's labor supply is very close to zero. See
Rosen, supra note 45, at 404.
89. Although there has been some movement toward more equal sharing, the
increase in men's family labor has lagged far behind the increase in women's market work.
See Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, The Economics of Women, Men, and Work
128-29 (1986). Some studies find that men have begun to take on a greater share of
responsibility for family labor but that women continue to bear a disproportionate burden.
See Goldscheider & Waite, supra note 1, at 11, 109; Juliet B. Schor, The Overworked
American 103-04 (1991).
90. See Fuchs, supra note 1, at 72 (noting that surveys of Stanford undergraduates
reveal that both male and female students expect that wives will take on twice as much
family labor as husbands); see also Miriam Lewin & Lilli M. Tragos, Has the Feminist
Movement Influenced Adolescent Sex Role Attitudes? A Reassessment After a Quarter
Century, 16 Sex Roles: A Journal of Research 125, 128-30 (1987) (describing survey
finding that adolescents' stereotyping of sex roles did not decline between 1956 and 1982,
although girls reported less dissatisfaction with being female). These sorts of surveys
provide only weak evidence-it may be, for example, that adolescents have excessively
stereotyped views that do not correspond to their adult behavior-but they do suggest the
inherent difficulty of changing entrenched attitudes.
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Market Work and Well-Being. A second problem is that the relation-
ship between market work and women's economic well-being is also ex-
tremely complex and may vary by class, by race, and by occupation. The
basic difficulty is that generic marginal tax rate cuts cannot address the
diverse needs of different groups of women. Although individual filing
obviously cannot solve all women's economic problems, it may not even
be a good first approach to addressing the most significant barriers to
improving women's economic well-being through market work.
First, it seems probable that individual filing is most likely to increase
market work among married women without children or those who have
or can get reliable childcare or jobs with flexible hours. A number of
scholars have noted the obstacles to women's market work created by a
lack of reliable and affordable childcare and by jobs that demand essen-
tially a full-time commitment.91 Marginal tax rate cuts alone cannot
change the terms of work that are incompatible with family labor respon-
sibilities,92 and so individual filing is likely to give the most effective help
to women who need it least. This "cream-skimming" effect is only to be
expected, because the most entrenched social and institutional barriers
are hardest to remove. Nevertheless, we should explicitly ask whether re-
sources are best devoted to this group or whether instead they might have
a greater impact if devoted to needier groups or to other policies that
might facilitate market work, e.g., childcare or maternity leave.93 Thus, it
is not only the modest size of the tax incentive that limits its effectiveness,
but also the presence of other social and economic constraints and the
limited power of tax incentives to change those conditions.
Second, the benefits of additional market work for women may vary
significantly by occupation and by earnings. Some studies suggest that
continuing participation in market work may increase women's earnings
so that they approach parity with men's.94 These aggregate results, how-
ever, may conceal significant differences in the distribution of higher
earnings. The benefits of uninterrupted work are likely to be signifi-
cantly greater for skilled careers (doctors, lawyers, nurses) than for un-
skilled jobs (waitresses, shop clerks, some secretaries). More generally,
studies of low-income workers suggest that persistence at low-wage work
may not materially improve earnings or enhance women's ability to
91. See Mary L. Heen, Welfare Refonn, Child Care Costs, and Taxes: Delivering
Increased Work-Related Child Care Benefits to Low-Income Families, 13 Yale L. & Pol'y
Rev. 173, 194-96 (1995); McCaffery, supra note 50, at 619-21; Williams, supra note 21, at
822-36.
92. But see infra Part I.B (discussing McCaffery's proposal to combine marginal tax
rate cuts for married women with Title VII reform, in order to address these structural
barriers).
93. See Jane Waldfogel, London Sch. Econ., Women Working for Less: A
Longitudinal Analysis of the Family Gap 44, 51 (Discussion Paper #WSP/93, 1993)
(concluding that maternity leave can significantly reduce wage gap between women with
children and other workers).
94. See ide
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achieve economic self-sufficiency.95 Thus, the market work incentive cre-
ated by individual filing could create long-term gains in professional sta-
tus and wages for higher-wage and skilled jobs but may have far less up-
side potential for married women qualified only for low-wage work.96
This problem is not limited to low-income women; even middle class mar-
ried women may be eligible only for low-wage jobs if they have foregone
education or work experience that would qualify them for better jobs.97
(This problem is also related to the first one: even better educated or
more experienced women may be constrained to take lower paying or
"dead end" jobs if their childcare responsibilities preclude long or unpre-
dictable hours or travel, for example.)
Third, the benefits of individual filing may vary significantly by class
and by race. The empirical studies described above suggest that marginal
tax rate cuts may be most effective in increasing the labor-force participa-
tion of nonworkers, and less effective in increasing the hours worked by
married women already at work. Individual filing tends to award the larg-
est marginal tax rate cuts to nonworkers married to high earners, and
thus may be effective in targeting marginal tax rate reductions to one of
the most responsive groupS.98 The gain in aggregate labor force participa-
tion, however, may be less attractive when we look at its distribution.
Data show that housewives tend to be white and upper or middle in-
come.99 Better data are needed to determine the exact distribution of
tax cuts from individual filing and their impact on the work effort of dif-
ferent classes of women, but advocates of individual filing ought to con-
sider the possibility that the largest tax incentives would accrue primarily
to white, middle and upper income housewives. loo Although these
95. See Kathryn J. Edin, The Myths of Dependence and Self-Sufficiency: Women,
Welfare, and Low-Wage Work, Focus, Fall/Winter 1995, at 4-6. Although studies that
focus on low-income single mothers cannot be directly applied to married women, the
basic finding calls into question the benefits of persistence at low-wage work.
96. For an argument that women are more likely than men to be employed in low-
wage, dead end jobs, where returns to education and experience are "close to zero," see
Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics 425-26 (5th ed. 1994);
see also Rhode, supra note 10, at 174 (noting that "[a]lthough at higher socioeconomic
levels a prolonged leave of absence presents fewer financial hardships, it also imposes
greater professional costs").
97. See Fuchs, supra note 1, at 43.
98. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanYing text.
99. See Cancian et al., supra note 27, at 199 (reporting that overall percentage of
white wives who work is somewhat smaller than percentage of black wives who work, that
white wives' market work declines faster as husbands' income rises, and that black wives'
labor-force participation rate varies less with husbands' income); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing
Housework, 84 Geo. LJ. 1571, 1610 n.163 (1996) (noting that white women are more
likely to be married than are black women).
100. The argument in the text considers the distribution of marginal tax rate cuts, not
average tax rate cuts. Although individual filing would concentrate marginal tax rate cuts
on upper income housewives, two-earner couples would see the largest average tax rate
reductions. In a recent article, Dorothy Brown argues that because black women have
higher labor-force participation rates than white women, and because black women tend
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women may be quite deserving of assistance, and many are at risk for
impoverishment upon divorce,101 the distribution of incentives may be
controversial among feminists. 102 There is no consensus among feminists
on the priority to be given to issues of gender and class. Some feminists
may favor even expensive policies that help primarily higher income
women, lOB but others might prefer policies that concentrate work incen-
tives and income support on other groups.
Although this discussion raises more questions than it answers, these
are exactly the kinds of issues that should be addressed by advocates of
individual filing who believe that removing tax distortions can materially
promote women's economic well-being. Individual filing may lead some
women to increase market work, but more work is not necessarily better,
at least ifwork is not an end in itself. We need to think about what kinds
of work women would take on and under what conditions, and which
groups of women are most likely to benefit.
3. Individual Filing and the Distribution ofIncome Within the Family. -
A final set of arguments for individual filing also relies on predictions
about the benefits of equal treatment for women. Advocates argue that
equal taxation of men's and women's earnings would better recognize
the reality of unequal income distribution within the family and could
even improve the situation by increasing wives' bargaining power. Once
again, however, a closer look shows that both arguments are overstated.
a. Individual Filing and "Ability to Pay." - As noted above, individual
filing would tend to impose lower average tax rates on two-earner couples
than on single-earner couples with the same total income. 104 The first
argument for individual filing is that the heavier taxation of single-earner
couples is entirely appropriate, because many husbands and wives control
to contribute a higher share of household income than white women, black taxpayers are
more likely to pay a "rnarriage penalty." See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/
Penalty in Black and White, in Taxing America (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 6, on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
101. For discussions of the economic impact of divorce, see, e.g., Fineman, supra note
17, at 17-75; Rhode, supra note 10, at 147-52. Lenore Weitzman's earlier study
documents the drop in women's and children's living standards that often follows divorce.
Although Weitzman's work has been criticized for attributing the situation to divorce law
reform, critics typically agree that women and children often are worse off economically
after divorce. See Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social
Consequences for Women and Children in America 337-54 (1985); see also Marsha
Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in Divorce
Reform at the Crossroads 75 (Herma H. Kay & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1991).
102. Although this issue may not concern those who view individual filing as a means
of correcting current biases in taxation, the distribution of incentives is quite relevant to
the case for individual filing as a work subsidy program.
103. See, e.g., Quester, supra note 43, at 674 (acknowledging that tax distortions in
work behavior have been largest for middle and upper class women but arguing that these
women are important role models).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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only what they earn. l05 On this view, a husband (or wife) who is the sole
wage earner controls a higher income and so should pay more tax than
the total tax paid by a two-earner couple with the same total income. In
other words, each individual's "ability to pay" taxes is best measured by
his or her own income, and not by joint marital income. In contrast,
joint filing incorrectly assumes that income is "pooled" or shared equally
within the marital household. l06
The problem with this argument is that its factual and normative
premises are too simple. An initial difficulty is that the meaning of "equal
sharing" or "pooling" is not always clear. Equal sharing presumably does
not require literaljoint decisionmaking on every issue but instead implies
some consensual arrangement for making decisions about spending and
saving. Whether any particular pattern of control reflects real consent or
coercive power may be difficult for husbands and wives or third party
obseIVers to ascertain. It has proved devilishly difficult to determine,
through empirical studies, the extent of actual sharing among married
couples. l07 As Marjorie Kornhauser points out, survey data are quite
tricky to interpret, because people (including members of the same
couple) may define sharing differently, and husbands and wives may have
different perceptions about the extent to which decisions are
consensual. 108
Available evidence suggests that couples vary significantly in their be-
havior. Some husbands and wives retain control over their own, separate
earnings, while others share their income, and still others vest control of
all funds, including the wife's earnings, in the husband.109 Kornhauser's
survey finds that roughly seventy percent of married couples share in-
105. See Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 84-91 (finding that couples do not universally
pool finances and that earning power influences financial control).
106. See ide at 96-98; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 354-58. But cf. Louis Kaplow,
Optimal Distribution and the Family, 98 Scandinavian J. Econ. 75, 76 (1996) (concluding
that under utilitarian welfare function, presence of unequal sharing of income may dictate
either greater or smaller allocation of resources to families).
107. There may be significant differences, for example, between wives' roles in
managing family income and their effective roles in decisionmaking. See Carolyn Vogler
&Jan Pahl, Money, Power, and Inequality Within Marriage, 1994 Soc. Rev. 263, 273, 277
(distinguishing financial management from strategic control and finding that male
management is associated with male control but that female or joint management is
associated with joint control).
108. See Jan Pahl, Money and Marriage 169 (1989) (noting that husbands generally
perceived more sharing than wives did); Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 80-86, 106
(arguing that survey data overestimate pooling, because couples think that they should
pool income, even if they in fact do not). Other kinds of data are also difficult to interpret.
Blumstein and Schwartz report couples' responses to questions asked in personal
interviews and also attempt third party observation of marital negotiations. Jan Pahl
reports couples' responses to questions asked in personal interviews. For explanations of
the difficulties in interpreting such data, see Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 86, at 131 &
n.13; Pahl, supra, at 60-62, 83-87.
109. For a review of the literature, see Viviana A Zelizer, The Social Meaning of
Money 36-70 (1993); MaIjorie Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership
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come to some extent. Whether that is a high or low percentage of shar-
ing depends on one's perspective. IIO Kornhauser argues that husbands,
as primary earners, tend to have greater effective control over income
even in couples who believe that they share. III On the other hand,
Lawrence Zelenak's discussion of the available studies concludes that
while husbands often have greater control over spending and savings de-
cisions than wives, substantial pooling does occur. II2
A second ambiguity is that couples may "pool" in one sense, but not
in another. Zelenak notes that even when spouses do not share control
over income, they typically share in consumption, if only because many
major consumption goods, like housing, are indivisible. IIs Zelenak's dis-
tinction is important because it suggests that both individual and joint in-
comes are imperfect measures of economic well-being. Joint filing would
tend to accurately measure material well-being but would overstate the
psychic well-being of a wife who has little control over consumption deci-
sions. In contrast, individual filing would permit two-earner couples who
do pool or at least share consumption to understate their material well-
being. In addition, individual filing would allow pooling couples with
unearned income to deliberately understate their economic well-being by
shifting unearned income to the spouse in the lower tax bracket. II4
From a feminist perspective, there is no single right answer to this contro-
versy. The abstract question of whether "control" or "consumption" is
more important in defining "ability to pay" is highly formalistic-and not
one to which feminist goals give any clear answer.
Finally, the argument based on ability to pay contains implicit, and
inconsistent, assumptions about the distribution of tax burdens and after-
tax income within the family. The argument for individual filing is that
husbands and wives control their own earnings, so that if each one is
taxed on that amount, he or she then has the appropriate amount left
after tax. The implication seems to be that in a system ofjoint filing, each
member of the couple would literally "pay" half of the joint tax, so that
the (lower earning) wife ends up with an unduly heavy tax burden. But
the basis for this assumption is not clear. If the couple believes that tax
Model of Marriage in Family and Tax Law Versus Intra-Household Allocations, 69 Temple
L. Rev. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 15-19, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
110. See Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 106; Zelenak, supra note 29, at 350-51.
Ill. See Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 86-91.
112. Zelenak ultimately supports individual filing but notes that it is a close call. See
Zelenak, supra note 29, at 358.
113. See ide at 351-58.
114. For discussions of these issues, see Munnell, supra note 29, at 271-77.
Administrative concerns should not be overstated, however: Canada and a number of
Western European countries have managed to implement individual filing, and although
virtually any regime permits some opportunistic income shifting, those countries have
apparently found the costs to be manageable. See generally Comparative Tax Systems:
Europe, Canada, and Japan (Joseph A Pechman ed., 1987) (describing different
approaches in several countries).
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liability should be apportioned between husband and wife according to
ability to pay, then why wouldn't they apply that norm even in a system of
joint filing, apportioning the joint tax burden between spouses according
to their incomes? If, however, the intrafamily norm is not ability to pay
but some other norm-for example, that husband and wife should each
pay fifty percent of any tax liability imposed on the couple-then why
wouldn't they follow the same procedure under individual filing as
well?115
Thus, for this argument to work, there must be something about in-
dividual filing that changes intrafamily norms about the distribution of
income between husbands and wives. The following subsection considers
that argument.
b. Individual Filing and Intra/amily Redistribution. - Some scholars
argue that individual filing could help redistribute income and power
within the family by increasing wives' after tax earnings.116 Individual
filing could raise wives' after tax income in two ways. Wives who respond
to marginal tax rate cuts by working more would earn more before taxes.
Even working wives who do not work more would see increased after tax
wages due to the marginal tax rate reduction.
The obvious practical problem is that wives' increased earnings may
not translate into greater control over family resources. A married
woman may reap little direct financial benefit from individual filing if the
dynamics of the family divest her of effective control over the additional
income. Although men's market earning power has been associated with
115. One could argue, instead, that under joint filing the wife will "pay" the tax
burden detennined by her higher marginal tax rate as secondary earner, but that
argument raises essentially the same questions. This version of the argument assumes that
(perceived) average tax rates within the couple will mirror perceived marginal tax rates
under the Code. The couple may instead split the joint (average) tax burden according to
an intrafamily nonn of ability to pay. If they do not do so, it is not clear why they will
necessarily begin to respect ability to pay under individual filing, instead of continuing to
allocate a heavier tax burden to the wife. The basic point is that the legal structure of the
tax code does not necessarily detennine allocations of resources within the family.
116. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 109, at 14-19 (arguing that available empirical
evidence on intrafamily allocations suggests that wage earners tend to retain control over
their own earnings). Kornhauser clearly argues that individual filing would recognize
existing patterns of intrafamily control, see ide at 30, and also seems to anticipate that
individual filing could improve the situation by increasing after tax earnings over which
the wife will retain control. She seems to expect that women would control the disposition
of additional disposable income attributable to tax credits awarded on an individual
return. See Kornhauser, supra note 64, at 110. Kornhauser also argues that individual
filing could "reinforc[e] a sense of independence and self-worth in both partners." Id.
Although some feminist predictions about the impact of individual filing on intrafamily
sharing may anticipate only symbolic gains, others clearly contemplate an actual
redistribution of resources within the family, explicitly making an argument that is implicit
in other scholarship. See Davis, supra note 43, at 237 (arguing that individual filing will
remove work disincentives and "put more money at [women's] disposal, and give women
control over how to spend the money they earn").
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men's greater power within the family, it is not clear that women can take
advantage of a similar dynamic by earning more. II7
Although some studies suggest that women who go to work can im-
prove their bargaining power within the family, the same studies also find
that a wife's earnings do not necessarily strengthen her bargaining
power.IIB Traditional notions of male control over finances may trump
wives' increased financial contribution. II9 In addition, the direction of
the causal relationship between wives' earnings and their power within
the family is not entirely clear. Although it is quite plausible that a wife's
market earnings could give her new confidence to insist on participating
in financial decisions, it may also be that wives who are especially assertive
to begin with, or who have husbands with more egalitarian views, are
more likely to work in the first place. 120
A variant of the bargaining power argument is the claim that married
women's earnings can enhance wives' ability to make a credible threat to
leave the marriage. Economic historians suggest that women's increased
market work and self-sufficiency may have contributed (along with other
complex causes) to the rising divorce rate over time,I2I and individual
filing might similarly enhance women's ability to make a credible "exit
threat." This strategic argument appeals both to historical trends and to
our taste for game theory, but must nevertheless confront several obsta-
cles. If individual filing creates only an incremental improvement in a
wife's earnings, the exit threat is only modestly enhanced. In addition,
for the enhanced exit threat to work, it must actually be used by wives and
117. Kornhauser provides a vivid example of a wife whose perceived "control" over
her own (substantial) earnings actually reflects significant deference to her husband's
wishes. Although the wife "controls" her own earnings, she must pay not only her share of
household expenses but also all child-related expenses. When those expenses exceed her
income, she must receive her husband's approval for extra expenditures. See Kornhauser,
supra note 109, at 18-19.
118. See Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 86, at 53-56; Zelizer, supra note 109, at 67;
see also Pahl, supra note 108, at 109, 174, 176 (finding that wives' earnings relative to
husbands' earnings are correlated with greater control over finances and that wives who
were dominant in household decisionmaking usually were employed).
119. See Blumstein & Schwartz, supra note 86, at 56; Pahl, supra note 108, at 174;
Zelizer, supra note 109, at 69. Pahl also suggests that even when women's earnings lead to
greater sharing of control over finances, the relative earnings of the spouses-and not the
simple fact ofa wife's emploYment-may still determine "overall control." See Pahl, supra
note 108, at 168.
120. See generally Pahl, supra note 108, at 121-23 (describing the complex variables,
including culture, psychology, and social factors like earnings and social class, which
combine to determine patterns of management and control of a couple's finances).
Another issue is how a tax cut is likely to be perceived by the couple. Would a tax
reduction due to individual filing be viewed as the wife's money or as family money? Does
it matter whether the tax benefit is received throughout the year, in the form of bigger
paychecks, or at the end of the year through a tax refund? Does the fact that the refund
check is made out to the wife enhance her control, or will dominant ideas about pooling
tum "her" money into "their" money?
121. See Bergmann, supra note 25, at 235-38; Folbre, supra note 4, at 205.
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must not be overcome by other bargaining power impediments. For ex-
ample, even if individual filing could increase wives' earnings substan-
tially, women's market earnings may remain low in absolute terms or rela-
tive to their husbands' earnings. In those cases, the exit threat remains
weak, because the wife could suffer economic hardship or a severe drop
in living standard. In addition, traditional attitudes about appropriate
gender roles may lead wives to hesitate to put a relationship at risk by
making economic threats.
Finally, advocates might argue that despite these practical difficul-
ties, individual filing would send a symbolic message about women's eco-
nomic independence. The effects of legal symbolism are particularly un-
certain, however, not just because symbolism is intangible, but also
because it is extraordinarily difficult to predict the impact of government-
sponsored metaphor on deeply entrenched notions about women's roles
in families. 122 Individual filing could even convey a negative message if it
is viewed, with hostility, as a special benefit for married women that is
financed by tax rate increases on married men and single individuals.
Part II.A.2 revisits the question of intrafamily redistribution to con-
sider what tax law changes might accomplish in connection with changes
in community property rules. 123 That analysis suggests that although in-
dividual filing might play a role in strengthening family law rules that
seek to enhance women's control over marital property, ironically, the
most effective approach would require measures that are at odds with the
goal of eliminating the secondary-worker bias.
4. Conclusions. - Feminist proposals for individual filing have a
long and distinguished academic lineage. Some of the earliest, ground-
breaking feminist scholarship in tax focused on the system ofjoint filing,
demonstrating that gender-neutral language does not guarantee gender-
neutral treatment, and more recent scholarship has elaborated that
theme. 124 Nevertheless, despite the historic and analytic importance of
these feminist proposals, some key feminist arguments for individual fil-
ing are significantly weaker-and more contested-than they have been
portrayed.
Individual filing is often offered as the answer to two separate,
though related, questions. The first question-and the one explicitly
considered in many articles advocating individual filing-focuses on the
binary choice between individual and joint filing and asks whether femi-
122. See generally Fineman, supra note 17, at 27-28 (discussing efforts to use
symbolism of equal treatment in family law); Michael Livingston, Risky Business:
Economics, Culture, and the Taxation of High-Risk Activities, 48 Tax L. Rev. 163, 166,
182-87 (1993) (exploring use of tax law as means of communicating cultural norms).
123. See infra notes 317-324 and accompanying text.
124. For earlier works discussing individual filing, see Blumberg, supra note 28; Gann,
supra note 28. For more recent proposals for individual filing, see Kornhauser, supra note
64, and EdwardJ. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCIA L. Rev. 983 (1993).
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nist arguments favor one regime over the other. The preceding analysis
clarifies some hidden normative conflicts, showing that the traditional
feminist case for individual filing implicitly reflects a preference for the
goals of equal treatment and encouraging women's market work over the
goal of assisting caregivers. Individual filing would implement equal taxa-
tion of men's and women's earnings, but at the cost of lowering the tax
burden on two-earner couples compared to equal-earning single-eamer
couples. Although feminist advocates of individual filing have recognized
this tradeoff, they have not clearly seen that the goal of assisting
caregivers suggests a feminist reason to support joint filing and equal taxa-
tion of equal-earning couples. In other words, taking seriously the goal of
assisting caregivers shows that there is no single "feminist" answer to the
filing unit issue, even in principle. Further, the analysis demonstrates
that conventional arguments have overstated the practical consequences
of individual filing for the division of family labor, women's economic
well-being, and intrafamily distributions-and, thus, have also overstated
the detrimental impact of joint filing today.125
The second, and broader, question is what priority, if any, individual
filing should be given in a feminist legal agenda. An advocate of equal
treatment would give individual filing top priority, but the preceding
analysis suggests that the equal treatment argument is rather weak for two
reasons. First, as just noted, empirical predictions about the effects of
individual filing have been overstated. In retrospect, optimistic feminist
predictions about the effects of individual filing on gender roles,
women's economic well-being, and intrafamily distributions may have
been most appealing during the ascendancy of equal treatment feminism
in the 1970s and early 1980s. Continuing experience with women's in-
creasing labor force participation has begun to call into question the ben-
efits of market work for women, as women have taken on new duties and
expectations without shedding the old ones-and it is no accident that
feminist theory in the intervening decades has increasingly looked be-
yond equal treatment.126 It is important not to overstate the case:
women's greater labor force participation has, over time, fundamentally
changed some important expectations about gender roles. The basic
point here, however, is that by this time, incremental increases in re-
sponse to individual filing probably have only very uncertain effects.
Second, although the case for individual filing might rest on sym-
bolic rather than practical effects, the purely symbolic impact of individ-
ual filing is likely to be rather minimal. The equal treatment goal has
been enormously important in accomplishing important change in other
125. I add "today" as an important caveat because I am considering only the case for
keeping or repealing the joint return now. The analysis has not addressed the historical
claim that the system of joint filing played a role over time in women's economic
subordination.
126. See Fineman, supra note 17, at 22.
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areas of law,127 but it is difficult to equate individual filing with funda-
mental civil rights protections for voting and education. The symbolism
of individual filing is likely to be far less visible and less well understood
than other legal reforms. Although scholarly proposals for individual fil-
ing use the rhetoric of equal treatment to good effect, average taxpayers
may not understand or attach any importance to the change. Individual
returns might be promoted as an official recognition of married women's
economic independence, but some couples will experience the change
only as an obligation to fill out two tax returns instead of one. In addi-
tion, the fact that one- and two-earner couples with equal earnings pay
different taxes under individual filing may make it particularly difficult to
defend the policy, in the public arena, as a symbolic step toward "equal-
ity." The point is not that equal treatment is inherently unimportant, but
only that there are significant questions about the current importance of
extending the equal treatment model to taxation through individual
filing.
Finally, although individual filing might be viewed as a first step in a
feminist legal agenda that seeks to encourage women's market work, the
traditional case for individual filing provides only a contingent endorse-
ment. If we assume, realistically, that resources for feminist policies are
limited and that individual filing is not the only available policy option,
then the case for individual filing as a market work incentive requires
further analysis to compare individual filing with other policy options-
e.g., other kinds of marginal tax rate cuts, an expanded DCTC, or family
leave. The next section considers the issues involved in designing a tax
policy to implement the goal of encouraging women's market work.
B. Encouraging Women's Market Work: Marginal Tax Rate Cuts for
Working Wives
This section uses a recent proposal by Edward McCaffery to illustrate
the normative and institutional complexity of creating tax rules to en-
courage women's market work.
In two recent articles, McCaffery makes an explicitly feminist argu-
ment for reducing marginal tax rates on wives.128 In the first article,
McCaffery proposes a special low or even negative tax rate schedule for
married women, financed by higher taxes on married men.129 In the
second article, McCaffery elaborates the case for the tax cut and adds a
second feature: repeal of the provisions of Title VII that require equal
127. See ide at 20-28.
128. McCaffery's proposal is one part of a long and complex analysis that is primarily
concerned with challenging the use of the "wage gap" between men's and women's
earnings to measure feminist progress, and with showing that government intetvention
might improve the functioning of the labor market. See McCaffery, supra note 50, at 599.
This Article does not address these claims.
129. See McCaffery, supra note 124, at 1035-53.
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pay for women and men. I30 McCaffery is deliberately noncommittal
about how the tax cut should be accomplished and suggests a number of
institutional options, including individual filing, perhaps with a special
low tax rate schedule for secondary earners. I31
McCaffery argues that taxing wives at lower rates than husbands
would be efficient, and that in this case efficiency promotes the feminist
goal of increasing women's welfare. The efficiency argument is based on
the optimal commodity tax principles described above: the intuition is
that we can raise a given amount of revenue with the smallest net utility
loss if we impose lower taxes on more elastic commodities. I32 Thus, be-
cause married women's labor supply is so elastic, the tax law can maxi-
mize welfare by taxing wives at lower rates than other workers. 133
McCaffery also argues that the combination of tax rate reductions and
repeal of the equal pay requirement in current antidiscrimination law
would expand women's employment choices by encouraging employers
to offer more high-quality part-time jobs. I34 He maintains that tax incen-
tives for market work are appropriate in order to overcome cumulative
economic and social biases, and that women would choose to work more
in the absence of legal and economic impediments.
1. Three Feminist Objections. - Like other feminist tax policy propos-
als, marginal tax rate cuts for wives are open to feminist objections, which
illustrate tensions among-and ambiguities within-the three feminist
goals.
First, the proposal seems to conflict with the goal of equal treatment.
Individual filing alone would be acceptable under the equal treatment
standard, but additional reductions in marginal tax rates for women pre-
sumably would not, because they would create "special treatment" for
women's earnings. I35 The proposal for repeal of Title VII's equal pay
requirement also seems to be in tension with the goal of equal treatment.
Here, however, the ambiguity of the equal treatment goal becomes
troublesome. If the logic of equal treatment is flexible enough to recog-
nize that statutes drafted in gender-neutral language (Le., the joint filing
rules) can disproportionately affect women, perhaps it is also elastic
enough to acknowledge that women may need "special" benefits in order
to overcome the legal, social, and economic conditions that tend to dis-
130. See McCaffery, supra note 50, at 663-64.
131. He also suggests a second-earner deduction, a reduction in the Social Security
payroll tax, or an expansion in the DCTC. See ide at 663. Part LD.l, below, considers the
case for an expanded DCTC as a work incentive for women.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
133. See McCaffery, supra note 50, at 657-59.
134. See ide at 665.
135. Although McCaffery's plan would be phrased in gender-neutral terms to provide
tax cuts for "secondary earners," see ide at 662-63, the logic of the equal treatment case for
individual filing suggests that an equal treatment analysis would take into account the fact
that wives are most likely to be secondary workers.
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courage their market work. 136 Under that more expansive reading, how-
ever, the equal treatment goal would simply collapse into the goal of en-
couraging women's market work.
Second, there is an inevitable conflict between the feminist goals of
encouraging women's market work and providing income support for
caregivers, and it emerges clearly in McCaffery's proposal. The basic con-
flict centers on whether women's current preferences about family labor
ought to be changed. As noted above, the case for market work incen-
tives typically includes a claim that women's current preference for family
labor either is the product of years of social indoctrination into tradi-
tional gender roles, or is simply disfunctional. 137 Feminists who favor aid
to caregivers, however, typically argue that women's current preferences
are valuable, and that commitment to caregiving work is a socially impor-
tant trait. 138
These views clearly are incompatible, and McCaffery's proposal takes
the first approach. Although McCaffery argues that his proposal would
expand women's choices and not enshrine any particular view about how
women ought to behave, he does assert that public policy should seek to
overcome the many legal and social biases that discourage married
women's market work. 139 He also flatly rejects the alternative of making
unconditional income transfers to women, arguing that simply re-
distributing income to women "could make things worse" by "plac[ing]
an added penalty on working" and perpetuating current discontinuities
in the market for women's labor. 14o
From the opposite side, feminists who see the devaluation of
women's family labor as the central obstacle to women's autonomy,
power, or happiness could oppose market work tax incentives. 141
Although tax incentives would not force any woman to go to work if she
prefers not to, they would increase the rewards of market work relative to
those of family labor. To the extent that married women's market work
decisions are made jointly with other family members who will benefit
from the extra family income, wives may face pressure to take advantage
136. McCaffery notes that the imputed-income exclusion and the joint tax return are
not the only legal rules that discourage women's market work; others include the Social
Security rules and the fringe benefit system. See McCaffery, supra note 124, at 996-1001,
1010-14.
137. See supra text accompanying note 21.
138. Feminists who seek only transitional support for caregivers in older generations
may have less difficulty with the norm of changing preferences for future generations. See
Kay, supra note 23, at 21-24.
139. See McCaffery, supra note 50, at 653-54; McCaffery, supra note 124, at 983-88.
140. McCaffery, supra note 50, at 652.
141. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 99, at 614-18 (arguing that "tax incentives
developed to encourage women's market participation ... will have only a marginal effect
on women's labor decisions ... and because many women do not view household labor as
oppressive . . . , encouraging market participation will not always operate to empower
women").
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of the incentive regime. Thus, although McCaffery's ultimate goal of ex-
panding women's employment options could benefit caregivers who
work, the objection would be that the mechanism for doing so relies too
much on changing women's behavior and preferences. Distributionally,
the proposal would reduce the average tax rates of some caregivers' fami-
lies (Le., two-earner couples) but raise taxes on others (i.e., single-earner
couples). Although McCaffery frames his proposal as a tax cut for
"women" paid for by higher taxes on "men," that overstates the case. A
system of individual filing can nominally set high tax rates for husbands
and low tax rates for wives, but the discussion of intrafamily distribution
above suggests that the aggregate tax burden on the couple is likely to
affect both the husband's and the wife's income and consumption. Thus,
McCaffery's proposal is more accurately described as a tax cut for two-
earner couples and a tax increase on single-earner couples.
Third, even feminists who want to encourage women's market work
might object to the pattern of incentives created by McCaffery's plan.
Although McCaffery suggests that any of several ways of cutting wives'
taxes would do for purposes of his proposal,142 the institutional details
matter. Different types of tax incentives target marginal and average tax
rate cuts to different groups of women, and virtually any market work tax
incentive will encourage some women to work while discouraging others.
Choosing among the alternatives requires explicitly normative decisions
that are not provided by the generic feminist goal of encouraging
women's market work.
To understand this point, it is useful to recall that any tax rate cut
has competing income and substitution effects. Although we typically
speak of marginal tax rate cuts as a "work incentive," in fact-as noted
above143-any tax cut has an income effect that discourages work and a
substitution effect that encourages it. Although empirical studies typi-
cally conclude that wives as a group will work more in response to tax
cuts, the aggregate figure obscures the effect on individuals: some
women will work more and others will work less. The important point
here is that different "work incentive" policies target income and substitu-
tion effects to different groups of women, and that once again there is no
automatic "feminist" answer that reveals the one correct pattern.
For example, one of McCaffery's institutional options is individual
filing, combined with a special, low marginal tax rate schedule for secon-
dary earners. Individual filing would reduce marginal tax rates for wives,
but not single women, and only for some wives. It would create the larg-
est marginal tax rate reduction for nonworking or very low-earning wives
of high-earning men but would provide little or no marginal tax rate re-
duction for others, including many wives whose earnings are relatively
142. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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similar to their husbands' earnings. l44 This pattern arises because indi-
vidual filing eliminates the secondary-earner distortion, and so provides
the largest marginal tax rate cuts to women who face the greatest
secondary-earner bias. McCaffery offers an efficiency rationale for this
pattern: recent studies suggest that the decision by nonworkers to go to
work is more elastic than the decision by current workers to increase their
hours of work, and optimal tax principles suggest concentrating tax rate
reductions on the most elastic choices. Although this is a coherent posi-
tion, it contains an implicit, and controversial, normative assumption that
increasing participation options for nonworkers, including high-income
women, is more important than providing work incentives to other
groups, including, say, single mothers or wives already at work.
There are also distributional questions involving the average tax rate
cuts awarded to different groups. For example, individual filing also
tends to create the largest average tax rate cuts for high-earning wives
married to high-earning husbands.145 Although McCaffery's proposal
quite clearly focuses on incentives and discounts distributional concerns,
some feminists might object to the distribution of benefits from the tax
cut. In an earlier article, McCaffery defends policies that encourage mar-
ket work by high-income women,146 but he later suggests that the margi-
144. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
145. This effect arises even in a system of individual filing that is revenue neutral and
that does not cut taxes for high-income households in the aggregate. The reason is that, as
noted above, individual filing in a tax system with progressive marginal tax rates tends to
increase taxes on single-earner couples but reduce them on two-earner couples. With a
progressive tax rate schedule, the disparity between the two kinds of couples is greater at
high income levels than at low income levels. A simple example illustrates the point.
Suppose that there are four couples, (A), (B), (C), and (D). High-income couples (A) and
(B) both have total incomes of $100,000, but couple (A) is a single-earner household, and
couple (B) is a two-earner household in which both husband and wife earn $50,000. Low-
income couples (C) and (D) both have a total income of $20,000, but couple (C) is a
single-earner household and couple (D) is a two-earner household in which both husband
and wife earn $10,000. Suppose that the initial system ofjoint filing imposes a marginal
tax rate of $0 on joint income up to $10,000, 25% on income between $10,000 and
$20,000, and 50% for income over $20,000. The joint filing system raises total revenue of
$90,000; couples (A) and (B) each pay tax of $42,500, and couples (C) and (D) each pay
$2500. Now suppose that individual filing is adopted, and the new system must raise the
same total revenue and must not increase or reduce taxes on high- or low-income couples
in the aggregate. There are many possible permutations, but consider just one: a new tax
rate schedule for each individual of 0% on the first $5000 of income, 20% on incomes
between $10,000 and $30,000, and 66.4% on incomes over $30,000. The new system will
still raise $90,000 in the aggregate, and high-income couples (A) and (B) will still pay
$45,000 in the aggregate, while low-income couples (C) and (D) will still pay $5000 in the
aggregate. But now couple (A) pays $50,450 while couple (B) pays $34,550-a difference
of $15,900. And couple (C) pays $3000 while couple (D) pays $2000-a difference of
$1000.
146. See McCaffery, supra note 124, at 1028-29 (arguing that "encouraging upper-
income women to stay home deprives women of powerful, and symbolically important, role
models"). A feminist might take either position; there is no consensus among feminists on
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nal tax rate cut might be restructured to concentrate benefits on the low-
est earners.
Another market work tax incentive, the earned income tax credit
("EITC"), illustrates a different institutional structure, which targets mar-
ginal and average tax rate cuts in a quite different pattern. The EITC is a
"refundable" tax credit for low-income workers, who use the credit to off-
set their income tax liability, and receive any unused credit as a cash "re-
fund."147 The EITC for a worker with two children is equal to 40% of
earnings up to $8890. To limit the credit to low-income workers, the
credit is phased out as earnings rise; the phaseout rate is in effect an
additional marginal tax rate of 21.06% on earnings between $11,610 and
$28,495, when the credit is fully phased out.148 (For married couples
who claim the EITC, the earnings amounts are determined on a joint
basis.149)
As I discuss at more length in a previous article, the structure of the
EITC creates potential work incentives for some workers and potential
disincentives for others.150 The EITC is an unambiguous work incentive
for nonworkers, but has mixed income and substitution effects even for
recipients who receive the 40% earnings subsidy. For slightly higher in-
come workers, the phaseout of the EITC creates a potential work dis-
incentive.151 Empirical studies suggest that the EITC encourages
nonworkers to enter the labor force but probably has no net effect on
work effort by EITC recipients already in the work force. 152 In addition,
the taxes raised to fund the EITC also may discourage work by other,
higher income taxpayers.
Is the EITC a good way of encouraging women's market work? Here
the tradeoffs become even more nuanced. Empirical studies suggest that
the priority to be given to issues of gender and class. See supra text accompanying note
103.
147. See I.R.C. §§ 6401 (b) (1), 6402(a) (1994).
148. See ide § 32(b); Rev. Proc. 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 446-47. The income amounts are
indexed for inflation; amounts in the text are for 1996.
149. See I.R.C. § 32(d).
150. See Alstott, supra note 69, at 548-53.
151. For nonworkers, the earnings subsidy creates a positive substitution effect-work
appears more attractive because the after tax wage is higher-and has no income effect,
because the person cannot receive the income without going to work. Workers who
receive the earnings subsidy, which is just a tax rate cut in the form of a negative tax,
encounter a negative income effect, because the transfer makes them feel richer, and a
positive substitution effect, because their after tax wage is higher. For workers in the
phaseout range, the EITC operates just like a traditional welfare program. The
introduction of a phaseout creates a negative income effect because higher earnings result
in the loss of a portion of the EITC, and a negative substitution effect because the after tax
wage is lower than before the introduction of the phaseout. See ide at 548-49.
152. For an excellent summary and analysis of recent studies, see Jane G. Gravelle,
Congressional Research Serv., The Earned Income Tax Credit: Effects on Work Effort
(1995), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Sept. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedtax library,
TNT file, 95 TNT 181-39.
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the EITC tends to encourage nonworking single mothers to enter the
labor force but probably discourages work effort by wives in married
couples that receive the EITC.153 (The latter effect arises because in a
system ofjoint filing, the EITC phaseout rate exacerbates the secondary-
earner bias. 154) The taxes raised to finance the EITC may also raise mar-
ginal tax rates for higher earning single women and married women (and
men) . Determining whether the EITC pattern is a good feminist tax pol-
icy requires normative judgments about the relative importance of work
for different groups of women. If we want to encourage labor-force par-
ticipation by the lowest income single mothers,155 the EITC is a good
idea, but if we are primarily concerned about wives and the secondary-
worker bias, it is less attractive, at least without a simultaneous move to
individual filing.
The point is not that we must choose between, say, the EITC and
individual filing, but instead that virtually any market work tax incentive
requires normative judgments about how to target potential incentives
and potential disincentives. We could adopt an array of tax incentives for
women's market work-say, individual filing with a reduced tax rate
schedule for married women, as well as a larger EITC-and still we would
discourage work by some women.156 Ultimately, the simple goal of en-
couraging women's market work provides no unique feminist answer,
and the details of institutional design determine which women gain and
which women lose.
2. Institutional Limitations. - Even if one embraces the objective of
encouraging married women's market work and decides on a particular
institutional structure to accomplish that goal, the discussion of individ-
ual filing above suggests serious questions about the capacity of marginal
tax rate cuts to achieve the underlying goals of changing gender roles,
women's economic well-being, or improving the flexibility of the labor
market.157 These are not necessarily McCaffery's goals: his proposal is
intended primarily to create a greater variety of part-time and flexible
work options,158 and he seems less concerned with increasing women's
economic security or with encouraging men to share family labor,
although he does predict that men will work less while women work
153. See id.
154. For a discussion of the secondary-earner bias in the EITC, see McCaffery, supra
note 124, at 995. The EITC can also have a negative income effect on nonworking
secondary earners, because the wife may work less or choose not to work because the EITC
increases her husband's earning power. See Gravelle, supra note 152.
155. See Gravelle, supra note 152.
156. Such a system would create higher marginal tax rates on two groups: (1) groups
whose marginal tax rate increases under individual filing-potentially including single
women or some wives in two-earner couples-and (2) women in the EITC phaseout range
(who were not in the phaseout range under the old system based on joint income).
157. See supra Parts I.A2 & 3.
158. See McCaffery, supra note 50, at 665.
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more.159 For other reformers inclined to see market work tax incentives
as a route to greater economic independence and security for women,
however, the problem remains that marginal tax rate cuts may do little to
change gender roles, to reduce the most significant barriers to women's
entry into the labor force, or to enhance their prospects for self-
sufficiency through market work.
Although larger tax rate cuts might do more than individual filing to
encourage market work by some women, the analysis above in Part I.A.2.b
suggests that it is not just the size of the tax cut that matters. A slightly
larger tax cut might encourage more women to work but still would con-
front the difficulty of altering attitudes about gender roles and structural
barriers to combining market work and family labor. These conditions
may change over time, and tax cuts for working women could help, but
any prediction is necessarily uncertain, and, realistically, proposals for in-
cremental change will have limited effects.
One key strength of McCaffery's plan is that it explicitly takes ac-
count of and attempts to remove structural barriers to women's market
work. McCaffery recognizes that current labor market arrangements re-
strict women's ability to work flexible hours or to obtain high quality part-
time work and argues that the solution is to repeal the equal pay require-
ment of Title VII.160 In combination with tax changes, he argues, the
new rules would encourage employers to create new institutional alterna-
tives, as men and women pressure employers for new flexible and part-
time options and employers seek to accommodate the needs of the new
pool of cheaper female labor. McCaffery predicts that women's wages
would drop after amendment of Title VII,161 but argues that allowing em-
ployers to pay women less would make "markets work better" by re-
warding employers who hire women and removing the incentive to segre-
gate women into separate job classifications to avoid the equal pay
rule.162 Lower marginal tax rates for married women, he argues, would
help make up the reduction in women's pay.163
Although McCaffery's proposal is an innovative attempt to use legal
reforms to restructure the labor market,l64 it illustrates the difficulty of
predicting and controlling the effects of such radical change. Repealing
the equal pay guarantee of Title VII would certainly deal a significant
blow to the civil rights of women-an important loss which, once surren-
dered, might not easily be recovered if the experiment fails. Moreover,
the potential gain in labor market flexibility rests on a highly contingent
159. See ide at 662, 665.
160. McCaffery's proposal would retain the prohibition against categorical or
irrational discrimination against women but would permit firms to make a rational case for
lower pay for women. See ide at 656.
161. See ide at 664-65.
162. Id. at 655.
163. See ide at 664-65.
164. See infra Part II for a discussion of other "combination" policies.
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series of incentives, and it is extremely difficult to predict whether the
plan would effect a net improvement in women's choices and well-being.
For example, for McCaffery's proposal to expand part-time and other
flexible work options, employers would have to value the new, cheaper
source of female labor sufficiently to make potentially costly alterations in
the structure of employment in order to attract more female workers into
the labor market. McCaffery's account suggests employers have so far
paid little attention to women's current demand for such arrange-
ments,165 and it is not clear that the new incentive structure would alter
the situation.
A darker scenario is that employers would reap windfall gains by cut-
ting women's wages while retaining current job arrangements, with full-
time work the norm and part-time work offered only for certain kinds of
work and typically with low pay and benefits. Although McCaffery antici-
pates that (married) male workers will also begin to demand part-time
work as they reduce their hours in response to higher marginal tax rates,
empirical evidence suggests that men may not significantly reduce their
market work in response to tax rate increases,166 so that the additional
pressure on employers from men that McCaffery anticipates may not ma-
terialize. Finally, the proposal could have disastrous consequences for
single women-including single mothers-if their wages fall after Title
VII repeal, because they would not share in the tax cut available to mar-
ried women.167 McCaffery argues that in the long run all women may
benefit from expanded choices and possibly even higher wages, if women
as a group become more committed to the labor force and pursue more
education.168 Nevertheless, McCaffery emphasizes "a certain tentative-
ness" to the proposal, and acknowledges that further behavioral studies
are needed.169
3. Conclusions. - Although McCaffery's proposal is a thoughtful at-
tempt to use tax incentives to improve women's lives, it illustrates the
strong normative positions and empirical assumptions that underlie pro-
posals for marginal tax rate cuts for wives. Market work tax incentives are
controversial even in feminist terms, because they are in tension with the
competing goals of equal treatment and assisting caregivers. The choice
of marginal tax rate cuts for wives also implies a controversial normative
165. See McCaffery, supra note 50, at 620.
166. See supra note 88. McCaffery argues that the proposal would, over time,
increase men's labor supply elasticity. See McCaffery, supra note 50, at 662.
167. See McCaffery, supra note 50, at 662-63 (describing marginal tax rate cuts
available to wives). McCaffery's main focus is on married women, and he does not offer a
clear prediction about the consequences of the proposal for single women. The article's
positive analysis notes that many single women are affected by the same labor market
dynamics as married women. See ide at 609, 623, 629, 631 n.127. The discussion of the
final proposal seems to anticipate that all women's wages will drop, see ide at 664-65, but
there is no description of the net effects for single women.
168. See ide at 665.
169. See ide at 656.
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judgment that encouraging work by nonworking wives is more important
than, e.g., targeting market work incentives and average tax rate cuts
more broadly to single mothers and lower income women as well. And
even if one is willing to make those normative tradeoffs, the same institu-
tional questions raised in connection with individual filing create doubt
about the capacity of marginal tax rate cuts to achieve underlying goals of
changing gender roles or improving women's economic well-being and
power within the family.
McCaffery's combination proposal also illustrates the difficulty of us-
ing tax reform and deregulation to make big changes in the structure of
market employment. The proposal requires taking a gamble on institu-
tions that do not seem well suited to achieving their goals. If the proposal
worked as intended, it would indeed mark a major expansion of women's
(and men's) choices about market work and family labor, but if the pro-
posal failed, it could significantly worsen the economic prospects of
women workers. Ultimately, the appeal of McCaffery's proposal depends
on one's taste for risk in policymaking, and I think that the stakes here
are simply too high.
There are other institutional options worth considering, however.
Part I.D suggests that an expanded DCTC could encourage some
women's market work while also accommodating, to some extent, the
goals of equal treatment and assisting caregivers. Part II.B. explores what
a modified program of family leave might do to expand flexible work-
place options for women.
C. Assisting Caregivers Through Family Allowances
This section considers family allowances, which illustrate one at-
tempt to use tax policy to implement the goal of assisting caregivers.
Family allowances, which are common in Western Europe and some
other countries,l70 would provide a fixed dollar payment per child to
every eligible family, including single parents, two-earner couples, and
single-earner couples. When a child's parents live apart, the family allow-
ance is typically paid to the custodial parent. When a child's parents live
together, many countries pay the family allowance directly to the mother
or (adopting gender-neutral language) to the "primary caregiver."l7l
Family allowance proposals typically anticipate a payment of at most a few
170. For a general description of family allowance programs in other countries, see
Sheila B. Kamerman & AlfredJ. Kahn, Social Policy and Children in the United States and
Europe, in The Vulnerable 351, 363-65 (John L. Palmer et al. eels., 1988).
171. See, e.g., Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act, 1992, ch. 4, § 144(3),
sched. 10 (Eng.) (payment to the wife); Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1, § 122.6, (5th Supp.
1985) amended by ch. 7, sch. VII, s. 12, 1994 S.C. 380 (Can.) (definition of "eligible
individual"). For a recent U.S. proposal, see National Comm'n on Children, Beyond
Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children and Families 94-95 (1991) (payment to
the "primary caretaker"). Constitutional precedent suggests that the gender-neutral
formulation would be necessary in the United States. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977) (striking down gender-based classifications in Social Security); Weinberger
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thousand dollars per year per child, which is not intended to provide
subsistence-level income but instead to supplement market earnings and
private child support payments.172
Family allowances nominally provide a per child payment that is the
same for every household, regardless of income, but the net distribu-
tional effect of the program depends on how it is financed-Le., on how
the tax rate structure changes to ensure that net revenue stays constant.
Depending on the structure of the taxes raised to fund the program, fam-
ily allowances might, for example, create a net transfer to all families with
children from all childless families and individuals or might create, in-
stead, a net transfer to poorer families with children from all other fami-
lies and individuals.!7! Although family allowance proposals do not al-
ways clearly specify how they are to be financed, they typically seem to
intend to redistribute income from higher to lower income classes as well
as between families with and without children.174
Although family allowances are an income transfer rather than
strictly a "tax" policy, the distinction between taxes and transfers is theo-
retically and practically tenuous, and a number of scholars have proposed
integrating family allowances into the tax system through a program of
"refundable" tax credits. 175 Current tax law provides some benefits for
families with children, but these tax provisions are not a substitute for a
program of family allowances and are not intended as such. For ex-
ample, the personal exemption for dependents provides larger benefits
to higher income households than to lower income households, and no
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (striking down Social Security Act's gender-based
classifications for survivor's benefits).
172. Advocates of family allowances who pursue this line of argument sometimes
point with approval to the Swedish model of family policy, which provides a combination
of income support for caregivers (e.g., family allowances) with policies that make it easier
for women who are caregivers to work in the market (e.g., paid parental leave, subsidized
day care and health insurance). See infra text accompanYing note 221.
173. A simple example illustrates the possibilities. Assume that there are only four
families: (A) richer with children, (B) richer and childless, (C) poorer with children, and
(D) poorer and childless. Assume that initially there are no taxes and no transfers.
Assume next that a family allowance is enacted to provide a transfer of $1000 each to
family (A) and family (C). Raising the taxes of family (B) and family (D) by $1000 each
creates a transfer from childless families to those with children, with no effect on the
distribution of income within the two income classes (richer and poorer). Alternatively,
funding the $2000 total cost by raising the taxes of family (B) by $1500 and the taxes of
family (D) by $500 creates a net transfer to families with children from childless families
and also a redistribution of income from richer to poorer. Other permutations are
possible.
174. See infra text accompanYing notes 178-179.
175. See, e.g., Gene Steuerle, Why I Favor Child Tax Credits or Allowances: Part 1:
Restoring the Value of the Dependent Exemption, 65 Tax Notes 629 (1994);]onathan B.
Forman, A Strategy for Middle Class Tax Relief to Help Families, Wash. Times, Sept. 20,
1994, at A19 (advocating refundable, per child tax credits).
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benefit at all to the lowest income or highest income families. 176 Re-
cently, President Clinton and Senator Dole have proposed different ver-
sions of a $500 per child tax credit.177 Although the proposed child tax
credit could lay the foundation for a tax-based family allowance, in each
case the credit is small and not available to the poorest or richest families.
Family allowances are commonly advocated as a means of improving
the well-being of children,178 alleviating poverty among single mother
households and other families with children,179 and reforming wel-
fare. 180 Although Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC")
provided, and the new program of federal block grants to statesl81 will
provide, some modest, income-tested assistance for families with chil-
dren, many advocates argue that family allowances would be superior.
Some proponents of family allowances seem to anticipate that a family
allowance would increase the generosity of total transfer payments made
to caregivers; others argue that even if family allowances substituted
dollar-for-dollar for current welfare benefits (instead of increasing them),
recipients could benefit in several ways from the substitution of a univer-
sal benefit for an income-tested one. First, the family allowance would
help alleviate the high marginal tax rates welfare recipients face; the fam-
ily allowance would provide a secure, though modest, income floor that
would not be reduced even as recipients earned more. Second, universal
family allowances might be able to assist the poor without the stigma asso-
176. See LR.C. § 151(d) (1994); see also Zelenak, supra note 29, at 400-01 (arguing
that combining personal exemptions and family allowances is defensible in principle,
because the two perform different functions).
177. For descriptions, see Ways and Means Releases: JCT Description of Dole Tax
Plan, Tax Notes Today, Aug. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96
TNT 157-45; Clinton, Dems to Stay Course on Economy, Eschew Sweeping Tax Cuts, Tax
Notes Today, July 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 96 TNT 142-5.
178. See Sheila B. Kamerman & AlfredJ. Kahn, Starting Right 43-51,67 (1995).
179. Analysts argue that Western European family allowances have successfully
reduced poverty among single mother households and other families with children. See,
e.g., Stephanie G. Gould & John L. Palmer, Outcomes, Interpretations, and Policy
Implications, in The Vulnerable, supra note 170, at 413, 420; Kamerman & Kahn, supra
note 170, at 351-65; Yin-Ling I. Wong et al., Single-Mother Families in Eight Countries:
Economic Status and Social Policy, 67 Soc. Servo Rev. 177 (1993); see also Daniel R. Meyer
et al., The Effects of Replacing Income Tax Deductions for Children with Children's
Allowances: A Microsimulation, 12J. Fam. Issues 467, 477 tbl.2 (1991) (finding that family
allowance of $1000 per child would have reduced poverty rates in 1989 by 14.6%).
180. The welfare reform argument centers on the elimination of the income test,
which-critics argue-discourages work and stigmatizes recipients. See Irwin Garfinkel &
Sara S. McLanahan, Single Mothers and Their Children: A New American Dilemma
169-72, 177-78, 178-80, 181-89 (1986); Gene Steuerle, Why I Favor Child Tax Credits or
Allowances: Part 3: Reducing Welfare's Penalties on Work and Marriage, 65 Tax Notes
919, 919-20 (1994); see also Meyer et al., supra note 179, at 479 tbl.3 (finding that
adoption of family allowance could modestly increase work effort by AFDC recipients, but
that total hours of work among AFDC recipients would remain quite small even after
change).
181. For a description of the new program, enacted in 1996, see infra text
accompanying notes 345-347.
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ciated with income-tested welfare benefits. Finally, removing the income
test would eliminate a considerable part of the complexity of income-
tested welfare programs, which burdens both administrators and recipi-
ents.182 Advocates also argue that universal family allowances are likely to
attract greater political and popular support than traditional, income-
tested welfare programs.183
Although these familiar arguments for family allowances are not ex-
clusively made by self-identified feminists, they clearly have a feminist
component, in the broad sense in which I am using the term here, be-
cause they seek to improve the economic well-being of single parents and
of welfare recipients (who are disproportionately women). Some schol-
ars have also made more explicitly "woman-centered" claims for family
allowances, arguing that they could improve the economic well-being of
both single and married mothers. 184 Advocates point out that family al-
lowances, which would be equally available to women who work in the
market and those who do not, would allow women to choose how to use
the additional income. Some women might use the additional income to
buy consumption goods, while others might use the extra money to re-
duce their market work hours, in effect "buying" more time at home for
leisure or childcare.185 (Note that this claim implicitly assumes that
women-rather than other members of the household-will control the
disposition of the family allowance, an assumption that is questioned in
Part I.C.2.c, below.)
1. Family Allowances and Conflicting Feminist Goals. - Like other femi-
nist tax proposals, family allowances are controversial even among femi-
nists. Family allowances seem relatively well designed to implement the
182. See, e.g., Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra note 180, at 188; Steuerle, supra note
180, at 919-20. For a description of AFDC's complex eligibility rules and market work
requirements, see House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., Overview of
Entitlement Programs: 1994 Green Book 324-31 (Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter 1994
Green Book]. Family allowances might supplement welfare benefits, providing additional
income support, or might simply replace welfare benefits dollar-for-dollar. In the latter
case, family allowances would provide no additional cash for welfare recipients but would
provide a secure income floor, which (assuming that the family allowance itself is not
income-tested) would not be reduced by additional earnings, as welfare benefits typically
are.
183. See Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra note 180, at 178. See generally Theda
Skocpol, Social Policy in the United States 267-69 (1995) (advocating a number of
universal programs for families including refundable tax credits).
184. See, e.g., Folbre, supra note 4, at 258; Fuchs, supra note 1, at 133-35; Annamay
T. Sheppard, Paying for Women's Work, in Family Law and Gender Bias: Comparative
Perspectives 1, 8-10 (Barbara Stark volume ed., 1992).
185. See Fuchs, supra note 1, at 135. This effect is not unique to family allowances, of
course. Any reduction in average tax rates would increase disposable income, which could
be used for childcare or other purchases. Implicitly, then, the feminist case for family
allowances turns on the distribution of equal benefits to all mothers, married or single,
working or at home. Individual filing, lower tax rate schedules, a DCTC, or an altered
EITC would distribute benefits only to working women, including some childless women,
and would provide unequal benefits to different income classes.
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goal of assisting caregivers because they are paid to all caregivers without
regard to their marital or market work statuS.186 Family allowances pro-
vide only a modest income supplement, rather than a subsistence-level
income. Feminists who equate family labor with full-time public employ-
ment might prefer even more generous income support for caregivers;187
for that group, a family allowance is probably a step in the right direction
but not a sufficient policy in itself. Other advocates of family allowances
who seek to aid caregivers clearly anticipate combining relatively modest
public support for caregivers with private child support and earnings
from market work.188
Family allowances probably conflict with the goal of equal treatment,
although once again the boundaries of equal treatment are nebulous. If
the equal treatment goal can be satisfied simply by gender-neutral phras-
ing that requires family allowances to be equally available to men and to
women, then family allowances paid to "primary caregivers" should pass
muster. If, however, we continue with the broader notion of equal treat-
ment that underlies the case for individual filing, there seems to be a
conflict. Once we recognize that women are more likely than men to be
primary caregivers, then family allowances are in effect a "special" pay-
ment to women, which could reinforce traditional gender roles by re-
warding women who act as primary caregivers. This logic parallels pre-
cisely the rationale of the equal treatment case for individual filing. The
argument in that context is that because women are usually secondary
workers, the tax disincentive for secondary workers discourages women's
market work. Here, the parallel argument would be that because women
are usually primary caregivers, the income transfer (or negative tax)
tends to encourage women to continue to be primary caregivers. This
logic suggests that family allowances are objectionable because they
would reinforce the traditional norm that women should be mothers and
devote their lives to childrearing. The equal treatment analysis also raises
a serious question about the payment of family allowances to only one
parent: although payment to women (as primary caregivers) may best
reflect the reality of caregiving work in many families, that rule could
deny benefits to men who take on significant, if not primary, responsibil-
ity for caregiving.
Family allowances also conflict with the goal of encouraging
women's market work. Family allowances are available to all caregivers,
whether they work in the market or not, and they are not income-tested;
thus, they have no substitution effect that either encourages family labor
186. Family allowances for children may be less attractive to feminists who see the goal
of assisting caregivers as primarily a transition policy for older generations, whose children
are now grown, and not as a continuing benefit for younger mothers.
187. See, e.g., Christine A Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal. L. Rev.
1279, 1301, 1330 (1987) (arguing that caregiving work should be compensated as full-time
employment) .
188. See Garfinkel & McLanahan, supra note 180, at 183.
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or discourages work. The income taxes raised to finance the family allow-
ance program may, however, discourage work by single and married
women, and the family allowances themselves have an income effect that
could discourage market work to some degree, as some women choose to
use the extra income to "buy" time for leisure or childcare.189 Although
standard economic analysis suggests that the extra income improves
women's welfare because they can follow their own preferences and use
the extra income as they choose,190 once again the goal of encouraging
market work presupposes that women's nominal preference for family
labor either is suspect and ought to be changed, or is simply dysfunc-
tional.191 On that view, family allowances are objectionable because they
could permit women to withdraw from the labor force or remain only
marginally committed.192 In the long run, after children are grown and
family allowances are gone, women would remain economically
vulnerable.193
2. Toward a Feminist Middle Ground. - Thus, family allowances ini-
tially appear to advance one feminist goal-assisting caregivers-at the
expense of achieving equal treatment and encouraging women's market
work. A closer look suggests, however, that this conflict is more apparent
than real in the case of family allowances. These strong conflicts between
competing goals do exist, but family allowances simply do not present
them. In fact, family allowances fall somewhere in the middle, doing
both less feminist good and less feminist harm than either advocates or
opponents predict.
a. Family Allowances, Gender Roles, and Work. - Despite the fears of
feminist opponents, family allowances are unlikely to significantly dis-
courage women's labor-force participation or to reinforce traditional gen-
der roles. Strong empirical predictions about the effects of family al-
lowances on market work are almost certainly overstated. Family
allowances would provide only a small income supplement and so would
require recipients to augment their income through market earnings or
other sources of income.194 Empirical studies (using conventional elas-
ticity estimates) suggest that family allowances are likely to create only a
189. The analysis in the text applies only to women or families who receive a net
income transfer, i.e., a family allowance that exceeds the taxes raised to finance the
program. As noted above, some families may pay a net tax. See supra note 173 and
accompanying text.
190. See Alstott, supra note 69, at 54-55.
191. See supra text accompanying note 21.
192. See, e.g., Sheppard, supra note 184, at 9.
193. Cf. Kay, supra note 23, at 80 (arguing that the law should not encourage
"economically disabling" choices by women). But see also Herma H. Kay, Beyond No-
Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, supra note
101, at 6, 31 [hereinafter Kay, Beyond No Fault] (arguing that divorce rules should
"safeguard those who do not maximize their separate interests, but instead engage in
unselfish, sharing behavior").
194. See Kamerman & Kahn, supra note 178, at 188.
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modest net reduction in woments labor supply (taking into account both
the "income effecttt of the family allowance itself and the work-
disincentive effects of the taxes raised to finance the program). Family
allowances might even increase work effort among welfare recipients by
reducing the high marginal tax rates that they typically face. 195
The harder question is whether reductions in woments market work,
of whatever magnitude, would actually reinforce traditional gender roles.
For the reasons suggested above, any prediction about the effects of legal
change on social attitudes is necessarily guesswork. Although some so-
cially conservative groups advocate family allowances in order to make it
easier for mothers to stay at home or to work less,196 there is no reason to
predict that family allowances will fulfill either social conservative hopes
or feminist fears. This, then, is the positive side of the limited impact of
tax incentives. The resistance of social behavior and attitudes to legal
change hinders the operation of affirmative legal incentives but also buff-
ers the potential negative consequences of new entitlements.
Of course, to some extent this limited impact is a function of the
small size of the family allowance, and more generous transfers could
have larger effects. For example, the combination of family allowances
with other forms of assistance to caregivers, such as welfare and child
support, might cumulatively have a greater impact on woments work ef-
fort. We should be careful, however, to distinguish between the effects
195. See Meyer et al., supra note 179, at 480 (finding that family allowance tax credit
of$1000 per year per child would result in only "small" labor supply changes for all groups
and that men and women not receiving AFDC would decrease work slightly, while women
on AFDC would increase work by a more significant percentage); see also Robert K. Triest,
The Efficiency Cost of Increased Progressivity, in Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality
137, 167-68 Goel Slemrod ed., 1994) (calculating efficiency costs of changes in the EITC,
the personal exemption, and a per person tax credit). Larger transfers might have larger
effects, of course, and concerns about the impact of income transfers on work are also
relevant to welfare policy and family law. The aggregate size and structure of transfers
provided by tax, welfare, and family law will determine whether women must work to
supplement their family allowance, or whether instead they can rely on public or private
transfers. Even in this context, however, concerns about the effects of welfare on work
effort are often exaggerated. Although marginal "tax" rates in AFDC were high and work
effort among AFDC recipients was much lower than that of single mothers generally,
studies suggest that benefit reduction rates played a relatively small role in reducing AFDC
recipients' work effort, and that childcare, job availability, and inadequate job skills were
more serious barriers to work. See Hilary Williamson Hoynes, Work, Welfare, and Family
Structure: What Have We Learned? 21 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 5644, 1996); Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin, Welfare, in Christopher
Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty, and the Underclass 204, 223-25 (1993);
Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, 30 J. Econ.
Literature 1, 17 (1992).
196. See, e.g., Reclaiming the Tax Code for American Families: Hearings Before the
House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Congo 51-60 (1991)
(statement of Gary L. Bauer, President, Family Research Council) (advocating an $1800
per child credit to encourage mothers of preschoolers to stay at home).
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on gender roles of incremental policies like family allowances and the
effects of larger income transfers for caregivers.
Some feminist advocates of family allowances argue that they could
actually create more egalitarian gender roles by encouraging men to
share family labor.197 This claim is also extremely contingent, however.
Recent experience suggests, for example, that men rarely take paternity
leave even when available, and studies suggest that men's labor supply is
relatively inelastic to tax changes. 19B Critics of the egalitarian argument
for family allowances might also point to the case of Sweden. Despite
Sweden's relatively generous, gender-neutral family policies, women con-
tinue to perform a disproportionate share of family labor. 199
b. Family Allowances and Women's Economic Well-Being. - Family al-
lowances may also do less to directly improve women's economic well-
being than some feminist advocates predict. To the extent that middle
and upper income families must pay higher taxes to help finance the
family allowance, the net cash transfer will be even smaller than its nomi-
nal amount.200 Even if the family allowance is structured to ensure a net
benefit to families with children at all income levels, an income transfer
of, say, $2000 per child is likely to have at best a modest impact on the
finances of a middle income family. Lower income families may see a
greater relative and absolute gain in income-$2000 to a family earning
$10,000 per year is a significant improvement. Welfare recipients, how-
ever, may initially see no net increase in benefits if, as in many proposals,
the family allowance reduces welfare benefits dollar-for-dollar.201 Thus,
the family allowance is likely to have the largest absolute benefits for
lower income families that do not receive welfare (or that increase their
earnings in response to the substitution of a non-income-tested family
allowance for income-tested welfare benefits). These distributional char-
acteristics do not, of course, defeat the case for family allowances, which
197. See Kirp et al., supra note 37, at 194.
198. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
199. See Patricia Spakes, A Feminist Approach to National Family Policy, in The
Reconstruction of Family Policy 23, 26-28 (Elaine A. Anderson & Richard C. Hula eels.,
1991) (arguing that Swedish women still earn less than men, are segregated into "caring"
professions, and "lack access to money, power, and the decision-making system"); Ann S.
Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender
Relations and Welfare States, 58 Am. Soc. Rev. 303, 313 (1993).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 173-174 (noting that, depending on how
family allowances are structured, they could either create net transfer from richer families
and childless taxpayers to poorer families or net transfer from all childless taxpayers to
families at all income levels).
201. If a family allowance reduces welfare benefits dollar-for-dollar, the family
allowance would not initially increase the total income of a welfare family receiving, say, a
welfare benefit of $6000 per year as that family would instead receive a family allowance of
say $2000 and a welfare benefit of $4000 per year. See, e.g., Meyer et aI., supra note 179, at
471 (describing simulated family allowance program). For welfare recipients, the net
benefit of the family allowance turns on the reduction of marginal "tax" rates on earnings,
because the family allowance is not reduced as earnings rise.
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could still be promoted as a policy aimed at the working poor. The lim-
ited distributional impact does, however, suggest caution in evaluating
claims that family allowances would benefit all recipients. How the net
benefit is distributed depends crucially on the financing structure.
A cash allowance may also do little to help women combine market
work and family labor if extra caSh does not translate easily into time. If
market work hours are largely fixed and not amenable to incremental
adjustments, the impact of the cash transfer on women's time allocation
is necessarily limited. The problem may be most severe in the short run,
when hours are least flexible, or in occupations with rigid work sched-
ules.202 The basic point is that labor market inflexibility may constrain
the effectiveness of cash transfers, just as it limits the benefits of market
work tax incentives.
Another problem relates to a question raised but not addressed
above-whether a family allowance paid to a household with children
really will benefit the woman (Le., the caregiver) in the household. The
feminist case for family allowances implicitly assumes that women will
control family allowances, but that assumption merits a closer look.
c. Intrafamily Redistribution, Revisited. - As noted above, family al-
lowances in other countries are typically paid to mothers or to "primary
caregivers."203 Feminist proposals for family allowances in this country
typically recommend payment to women (or primary caregivers);204 even
proposals that do not focus on the issue seem to anticipate that family
allowances would benefit women rather than "families" in genera1.205
The previous discussion of intrafamily redistribution206 suggests,
however, that payment to wives does not guarantee their control over
funds. A family allowance might be seen as the wife's family labor "wage"
which is hers to spend,207 but the money could just as plausibly be per-
ceived by the couple as an unearned windfall from the government.20B
Once again, the empirical evidence is highly uncertain,209 but the best
202. See Alstott, supra note 69, at 547 n.54.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 170-171.
204. See Pahl, supra note 108, at 154-55 (arguing that financial support to mothers in
form of family allowance "is likely to strengthen the position of women within the family
and to improve the standard of living of women and children, especially in households
where male earners do not share their income with non-earners"); Sheppard, supra note
184, at 10 (advocating caregivers' benefits to be paid directly to caregivers).
205. See Folbre, supra note 4, at 258.
206. See supra Part lAS.
207. Interviews with couples in the United Kingdom suggest that some wives view the
family allowance (child benefit) as "their money" or "their contribution" to the household.
See Pahl, supra note 108, at 70, 157-58, 161.
208. A parallel criticism of family allowance proposals intended to benefit children is
that payments to parents may not be spent for the benefit of their children. See Lawrence
Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 Tax L. Rev. 849, 889-90 (1994).
209. Jan Pah!'s interviews suggest that husbands and wives have different perceptions
about the significance of the family allowance in family finances. That finding might
suggest, for example, that women feel subjectively better off if they control the family
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educated guess is that family allowances would have at most a quite mod-
est effect on intrafamily distributions. As described above, family dynam-
ics may divest the wife of control over spending the family allowance.
Even if the wife can spend the family allowance as she chooses, the trans-
fer would be only a small percentage of total income for many families. 21o
Thus, the uncertainty of intrafamily distributions suggests that the
initial analysis of family allowances' impact on women's economic well-
being is too simple: it implicitly assumes that the money will be women's
to spend. That analysis is apt in the case of single mothers, but married
mothers or single mothers living with other adults may reap little direct
benefit if intrafamily distributions give others effective control over
spending decisions. This uncertainty also raises an interesting point
about the predicted impact of family allowances on women's labor sup-
ply: if women do not benefit directly from the income, they may also be
less influenced by the "income effect" that should permit them to reduce
their market work. On the other hand, the income effect on women's
labor supply may continue to operate at the household level. To take an
extreme example, even if only the husband feels better off, he may still
urge his wife, as secondary worker, to spend less time on market work and
more time on household production. .
Even if family allowances do not redistribute funds within the family,
they might increase married women's bargaining power, because the
transfer provides additional family income that would go with the wife (as
the custodial parent) should she leave the marriage.211 This is essentially
the "exit threat" argument considered above.212 As described there in
greater detail, the magnitude of the increase in the wife's bargaining
power is quite uncertain, in light of the modest size of family allowances
and the other social institutions that reinforce unequal bargaining power.
The exit threat argument also does not depend on the payment of family
allowances to married women. Most of the predicted bargaining power
allowance but that it may not significantly improve their financial position from their
husbands' perspective. See Pahl, supra note 108, at 157-58, 161. A recent study found
that paYing family allowances to wives can effect some change in family spending patterns,
suggesting indirectly that wives may control the use of the funds. See ShellyJ. Lundberg et
al., Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the V.K. Child Benefit
S, 10-18 (Aug. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(finding that changes in V.K. family allowance system that shifted income from husbands
to wives and increased transfers to wives resulted in increases in proportion of family
income spent on women's and children's clothing).
210. Pahl's interview data are interesting here; she suggests that wives whose spending
money is limited (either because they are poor or because they receive a fixed allowance
from their husbands) value' the family allowance relatively highly, even though it is quite
small in amount. See Pahl, supra note 108, at 157-58, 161.
211. See Fuchs, supra note 1, at 1BB-B5.
212. See supra text accompanYing note 121.
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enhancement could be accomplished by a system of family allowances
paid only to single mothers.213
Historically, the payment of family allowances to wives has been hotly
contested. In the 1940s, U.K. proponents of payment to mothers advo-
cated family allowances as an independent source of income for
caregivers, while opponents saw the payment to mothers as inconsistent
with traditional male financial responsibility.214 More recently, reforms
in the U.K. family allowance system have led some politicians to worry
about men's resentment of a transfer "from the wallet to the purse."215 It
is not entirely clear whether this controversy is primarily about symbolism
or about real control over funds. Family allowances paid to women might
be a symbolic step toward recognizing the value of caregiving,216 but the
impact of symbolism on attitudes is so difficult to evaluate that it provides
only a weak justification for large scale redistribution. And once again,
symbolism can backfire if family allowances appear to reinforce traditional
gender stereotypes (even if they have only a limited impact on actual
behavior).
Finally, although one might argue that paying benefits to primary
caregivers might do some good and very little harm, there is an associated
administrative cost. Although other countries have successfully imple-
mented the primary caregiver standard,217 implementing the new system
in the United States would require taxpayers and the government to
make difficult intrafamily determinations not presently made.218 Identi-
fying whether a husband or wife (or one of two unmarried parents living
together) is the primary caregiver may be difficult in cases where both
213. By increasing the income available to a wife upon divorce, a single mother's
allowance would bolster the credibility of her exit threat. The only additional impact on
the exit threat of paying the family allowance to married couples as well is that the
husband benefits from the family allowance during marriage and would lose the additional
income (which would go with the wife/caregiver) in the event of divorce.
214. See Susan Pedersen, Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State:
Britain and France, 1914-1945, at 345-51 (1993).
215. Pahl, supra note 108, at 162; see Lundberg et al., supra note 209, at 8.
216. See Bettina Cass, Redistribution to Children and to Mothers: A History of Child
Endowment and Family Allowances, in Women, Social Welfare and the State in Australia
54,83 (Cora V. Baldock & Bettina Cass eds., 1983); Pedersen, supra note 214, at 345-51.
217. See supra note 171 and accompanying text
218. Either the federal income tax or the Social Security system, or some combination
of the two, might be adapted to pay a universal, non-income-tested, family allowance. The
federal income tax system has relatively good data now on dependents and EITe
"qualifying children," and a "refundable" family allowance tax credit could use the refund
mechanism to make cash payments, just as in the EITC. Alternatively, the Social Security
system could handle the mechanics of payment, based perhaps on tax data or on birth
records and applications for taxpayer identification numbers. Paying family allowances to
the mother or primary caregiver raises administrative issues in either system, because
neither currently distinguishes between primary and secondary caregivers. Although the
Social Security rules provide payments to certain individuals with children in their care,
these rules do not require distinguishing between primary and secondary caregivers. See
42 U.S.C. § 402 (b) (1) (B) (1994).
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parents provide some care. Although presumptions could address the
issue, they are inevitably rough, and presumptions based on gender
might be constitutionally prohibited.219 State experience with the admin-
istration of the "primary caregiver" standard in child custody cases sug-
gests that the determination is fact intensive and difficult even in a system
intended to make individualized determinations, which the tax system is
ill-equipped to do.22o
3. Conclusions and a Word on the Costs of Compromise. - This analysis
suggests that family allowances could make a modest contribution to the
economic well-being of families with children, but that both feminist
hopes and feminist fears may be exaggerated. Ultimately, family al-
lowances represent a middle ground. They would provide a modest in-
come supplement-but not a generous income-for caregivers, but they
also would be unlikely to significantly discourage women's market work.
Although family allowances may not encourage men to take on greater
responsibility for family labor or directly improve the economic well-
being of married women, they also seem unlikely to significantly rein-
force traditional gender roles.
Thus, the strength of the feminist case for family allowances turns on
the desirability of finding a compromise among competing goals. Family
allowances suggest an approach that acknowledges feminist concerns
about the well-being of caregivers and promises incremental gains for low
income single mothers and families. Feminists who see equal treatment
or increasing women's market work as the only important goals are un-
likely to be impressed with the compromise and may oppose any income
transfer that might discourage market work. However, those who take
seriously the goal of assisting caregivers may be able to agree upon a mod-
est income supplement which could enhance women's limited earning
power without permitting complete withdrawal from the labor force.
There are, however, serious questions about the costs of compro-
mise. First, this sort of compromise has been attempted in other coun-
tries with mixed results. Sweden, the most prominent example, has an
array of programs (including family allowances, generous paid maternity
leave, and part-time work for parents) that assist parents in combining
market work and family labor. Some feminists note the advantages of the
Swedish example, arguing that it provides a variety of income support
programs for parents and promotes a high rate of female labor force par-
ticipation while making humane and realistic allowances for the compet-
ing demands of family labor.221 Other feminists disagree, however, not-
ing that a high percentage of Swedish women work only part-time, that
women's wages remain lower than men's, that there is a high degree of
219. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975).
220. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
221. See Nancy E. Dowd, Envisioning Work and Family: A Critical Perspective on
International Models, 26 Harv.J. On Legis. 311, 316-28 (1989).
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sex segregation in the workplace, and that women continue to be primar-
ily responsible for childrearing.222 International comparisons are tricky,
of course, because conditions are different, but the Swedish experience
offers one hypothetical prediction about the sort of results that family
allowances and similar compromise polices could produce. The difficult
feminist question-ultimately a normative, not an empirical, one-is
whether American women would, on balance, be better or worse off in
such a situation, with greater economic well-being for many poorer
women, expanded options for combining market work and family labor,
but continued gender role segregation and perhaps reduced opportuni-
ties to enter male-dominated jobs.
Second, family allowances and similar policies are potentially an eco-
nomically costly compromise. One familiar objection is that family al-
lowances would create large scale income redistribution that would bur-
den the economy and encourage childbearing. Although it is impossible
to dismiss these concerns, a brief review of the empirical literature shows
that these economic objections are less forbidding than they may first
appear. As noted above, empirical studies conclude that family al-
lowances are likely to have only a small net effect on aggregate work ef-
fort. 223 Further, although one often hears the more general claim that
Western Europe's generous social programs are the cause of economic
stagnation,224 there is no academic consensus to support that popular
perception. Existing studies reach mixed results in estimating the actual
macroeconomic burden created by social welfare programs,225 and
Anthony Atkinson concludes that such studies are "unlikely to yield con-
clusive evidence" because aggregate empirical evidence is inherently sub-
ject to question on several grounds.226 It may be that these studies are
simply too flawed to detect the effect, but once again, the pragmatic ap-
proach of accepting the studies as the best current evidence raises ques-
tions about popular perceptions of the costs of redistribution.
Critics also argue that family allowances could encourage population
growth. Although increasing fertility was once a popular goal of Western
222. See ide at 313 (noting that "policies have been ameliorative but not
transformative"); Jane Lewis &. Gertrude Astrom, Equality, Difference, and State Welfare:
Labor Market and Family Policies in Sweden, 18 Feminist Stud. 59, 61, 72-74 (1992)
(arguing that Swedish employment policies for women have not altered unequal division
of family labor and may have reinforced sex segregation in workplace).
223. See supra text accompanying note 195.
224. See, e.g., Anthony B. Atkinson, The Welfare State and Economic Performance,
48 Nat'l Tax J. 171, 171-78 (1995); Richard W. Stevenson, A Deficit Reins in Sweden's
Welfare State, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1995, at AI.
225. See Nicholas Barr, The Economics of the Welfare State 486-87 (1987); Rebecca
M. Blank &. Richard B. Freeman, Evaluating the Connection Between Social Protection
and Economic Flexibility, in Social Protection Versus Economic Flexibility 85-86 (Rebecca
M. Blank ed., 1994); Gould &. Palmer, supra note 179, at 429-81; Atkinson, supra note 224,
at 178-78, 196.
226. Atkinson, supra note 224, at 179-82.
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European family allowances,227 recent experience suggests that American
politicians today would strongly oppose pronatalist policies, particularly if
they would affect the poor; many recent proposals for welfare "reform"
would deny benefits for additional children born to welfare mothers.228
Although one suspects that concern about childbearing among the poor
is tinged with more than a little racism, there is also a legitimate concern,
which feminists and nonfeminists might share, about whether society
should be required to pay to support other people's (unlimited numbers
of) children. Although answering this often debated question is not pos-
sible in the space of this Article, it may be helpful to note that empirical
evidence, although imperfect as always, suggests that family allowances
are unlikely to have a large effect on fertility.229
It has proven virtually impossible to settle the big questions of how
redistributive taxes and transfers affect economic activity and private deci-
sionmaking about fertility and marriage. There are a number of possible
pragmatic responses to these concerns-and to political perceptions,
which are realistically more important than econometric predictions.
Family allowances might, for example, be phased in to meet revenue
goals and to allow an evaluation of incentive concerns, though at the cost,
of course, of postponing benefits.23o Part II.A.l also discusses proposals
for family allowances for single mothers.
227. See Kamerman & Kahn, supra note 178, at 370, 374. The pronatalist vision of
some European advocates of family allowances was never realized: family allowances and
other policies did not in fact raise birthrates. See Folbre, supra note 4, at 115; C. Alison
McIntosh, Recent Pronatalist Policies in Western Europe, in Below-Replacement Fertility
in Industrial Societies: Causes, Consequences, Policies 318,323 (Kingsley Davis et al. eds.,
1987). But see Thomas Biittner & Wolfgang Lutz, Estimating Fertility Responses to Policy
Measures in the German Democratic Republic, 16 Population Dev. Rev. 539, 539 (1990)
(finding positive relationship between fertility and explicit pronatalist policy introduced in
1976 in former East Germany).
228. See Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin, Do Poor Women Have a Right to Bear
Children?, Am. Prospect, Winter 1995, at 43,47; cf. BenJ. Wattenberg, The Birth Dearth
145-65 (1987) (advocating pronatalist tax policies in the United States).
229. Cf. Hoynes, supra note 195, at 24-25 (finding that the effect ofwelfare on out-of-
wedlock births and marital decisions is small); Douglas E. Hyatt & WilliamJ. Milne, Can
Public Policy Affect Fertility?, 17 Can. Pub. Pol'y 77, 78 (1991) (finding that government
programs altering childbearing costs have "small but positive" impact on fertility); Leslie A
Whittington, Taxes and the Family: The Impact of the Tax Exemption for Dependents on
Marital Fertility, 29 Demography 215, 223 (1992) (concluding that increase in personal
exemption may result in small increases in fertility but that effect may be one of timing
only).
230. Other revenue saving options include limiting family allowances to children
under age 13, repealing the personal exemption, and making the family allowance taxable.
A 1989 study suggested that repealing the personal exemption would fund a yearly $292
per child refundable tax credit; a more generous $1000 credit would cost $76 billion per
year, or a net cost of $49 billion more than the personal exemption cost in 1989. See
Meyer et al., supra note 179, at 473, 475; see also Kamerman & Kahn, supra note 178, at
189 (recommending $1000 per child tax credit, estimated to cost $40 billion in 1992,
assuming repeal of personal exemption for children). Updating these numbers for
inflation using the CPI-U (a very rough way of approximating a current revenue estimate,
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D. Revisiting the Issues: The Dependent Care Tax Credit and Feminist
Proposals for Social Security Reform
The preceding analysis examined feminist tax policy proposals that
seek to advance the three feminist goals of equal treatment, encouraging
women's market work, and assisting caregivers. The normative and insti-
tutional issues explored in that analysis set the stage for a briefer consid-
eration of two other important feminist tax proposals-an expanded
DCTC and Social Security reform.
1. The Dependent Care Tax Credit. - The DCTC is a tax credit equal
to 20% to 30% of the dependent care expenses incurred by a working
single parent or a two-earner couple.231 Eligible dependent care ex-
penses are capped, and the maximum annual DCTC is $720 for one child
and $1440 for two or more.232 The current DCTC can only offset income
tax due and so provides no benefits to workers whose incomes are too low
to have any income tax liability. A number of scholars have argued that
the DCTC should be made "refundable" so that even the lowest income
workers can benefit from the program.233
a. The DCTC As a Compromise Among Competing Goals. - There are
two familiar arguments for the DCTC, one based on equal treatment and
one based on the desirability of increasing women's market work. First,
many scholars have noted that the exclusion of "imputed income" from
the income tax base may distort women's labor supply decisions by mak-
ing market work less attractive than family labor.234 Although men too
can exclude imputed income, analysts worry that women, whose labor
supply is relatively elastic and who bear the primary responsibility for fam-
ily labor, are more likely to react strongly to the tax distortion. Taxing
imputed income from women's family labor would remove the distortion,
but most scholars have concluded that valuing imputed income is imprac-
but useful in ball park terms), a $1000 refundable tax credit would cost $90.8 billion
annually. See 1995 Statistical Abstract, supra note 1, at 492 tb1.761. Making the family
allowance taxable could reduce the cost by another $18 billion or so, assuming that the
benefits would be taxed at the current average tax rate for all income taxpayers of 13.5%.
See 14 IRS Stat. Income Bull. 10, fig.B (Spring 1995) (finding that in 1993 taxpayers paid
13.5% of their adjusted gross income in taxes). This cost reduction figure is probably too
high, however, because the average tax rate calculation excludes nontaxpayers.
231. See I.R.C. § 21 (a) (1994) (providing that 30% credit is reduced gradually to 20%
between $10,000 and $28,000 of adjusted gross income ("AGI")). The Code also provides
an exclusion for employer-provided dependent care assistance, which is available only to
workers whose employers offer a plan. See ide § 129. Between 1954 and 1976, the Code
provided a deduction rather than a credit. See Heen, supra note 91, at 212-14.
232. See I.R.C. § 21 (a), (c).
233. See, e.g., Heen, supra note 91, at 176 n.21 (citing variety of proposals for
refundability) .
234. See Gann, supra note 28, at 40-41; McCaffery, supra note 124, at 987, 1001;
Zelenak, supra note 29, at 372.
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tical.235 Instead, scholars have advocated a deduction for the costs of
purchased childcare, which they argue would restore decisional neutrality
in the choice between market work and family labor.236
This argument incorporates a kind of equal treatment claim, as well
as an argument for decisional neutrality.237 Creating complete decisional
neutrality between work and other activities for all workers would require
either taxing all imputed income, for men as well as for women and from
leisure as well as family labor, or else excluding all earnings from taxa-
tion. The typical argument for tax relief for dependent care expenses
does not seek such sweeping change but instead is concerned primarily
with the impact of the imputed-income rule on women's market work
choices. The argument is that women are more likely than men to incur
childcare expenses when they enter the labor force, so that a deduction
for childcare costs in effect restores parity between men's and women's
market work choices. A childcare deduction would tend to reduce the
imputed-income distortion but would not restore complete decisional
neutrality: women, like men, would continue to face a labor-leisure distor-
tion, and both would remain unable to deduct a variety of ordinary costs
of working.238
The DCTC is not a completely accurate response to the decisional
neutrality concern, which dictates a tax deduction rather than a tax
credit. A tax deduction (or, equivalently, an exclusion) in an appropriate
amount would allow women either to perform untaxed family labor
themselves or to earn an equivalent amount of untaxed earnings and to
pay someone else to perform the same tasks. A deduction, however, pro-
vides larger benefits to higher income taxpayers, who are in higher mar-
ginal tax brackets, while a credit provides equal amounts at all income
levels.239 The equal treatment and decisional neutrality rationales also
do not support refundability of the credit, because the imputed-income
distortion operates only when market earnings are also subject to income
tax.240 Thus, the DCTC roughly selVes the equal treatment objective
while meeting competing distributional goals.
235. See Munnell, supra note 29, at 263-65; Gann, supra note 28, at 36. But cf.
Staudt, supra note 99, at 1573-74,1624-27 (proposing to tax imputed income from family
labor).
236. See Munnell, supra note 29, at 252; Heen, supra note 91, at 209.
237. As noted in Part LB.1, above, the scope of the equal treatment goal is not clear
and might be interpreted in different ways. One could oppose a childcare deduction on
equal treatment grounds, arguing that because women are more likely than men to incur
childcare expenses, a nominally gender-neutral deduction would really be a "special"
benefit for women.
238. See Marvin A Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 93-100 (7th ed. 1994).
239. Before 1976, the dependent care allowance in the income tax was a deduction.
See Heen, supra note 91, at 212-14.
240. Low-income workers exempt from the income tax are generally subject to the
Social Security payroll tax, however, and so the equal treatment argument would support
refundability to the extent of payroll taxes paid.
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The second common argument for the DCTC is that childcare ex-
penses are a major obstacle to women's market work, and that the DCTC
is essentially a voucher through which the government can subsidize the
purchase of childcare.241 In implementing this goal, a credit or a deduc-
tion might be used, depending on the desired pattern of marginal and
average tax rate cuts, and a refundable credit would extend the assistance
to the lowest income workers. Like other "tax incentives" for women's
market work, the DCTC would encourage work for some women and dis-
courage work for others. Very generally, a refundable DCTC would pro-
vide an incentive for nonworkers to enter the labor force but would cre-
ate a complex pattern of competing income and substitution effects for
workers already employed outside the home.242 For example, workers
who already buy enough childcare to claim the maximum credit receive
essentially an unconditional income transfer-much like a family allow-
ance. Recent research suggests that the aggregate, net effect of the
DCTC is probably to modestly increase mothers' labor force
participation.243
These two arguments may suggest, somewhat misleadingly as I will
argue in a moment, that the case for the DCTC basically replicates the
case for individual filing. Like individual filing, the DCTC would both
promote equal treatment and mildly encourage market work, especially
by nonworkers. Just as in the case of individual filing, these modest gains
in women's labor market participation may not translate easily into gen-
der role change, improvements in women's economic well-being, or re-
distribution of power within the family.244
Although the analogy is accurate in part, the DCTC differs in two
important respects from individual filing. First, the DCTC is somewhat
more compatible with the feminist goal of assisting caregivers. Like indi-
vidual filing, an expanded DCTC would assist working caregivers at the
241. See Heen, supra note 91, at 204-06.
242. For a nonworker who must purchase childcare, the DCTC has only a (positive)
substitution effect: it reduces the cost of entering the workforce. There is no income
effect because a nonworker cannot claim the credit. For a worker who already purchases
some childcare in order to work, however, there are competing income and substitution
effects. She will receive the DCTC for the childcare she already buys; the income effect (or
feeling of being better off) tends to discourage work. At the same time, however, the
DCTC permits her to buy more childcare at 70% or 80% of its pre-tax cost (up to the
maximum amount of child care eligible for the DCTC). That subsidy reduces the marginal
cost of increasing hours of work, and so creates a positive substitution effect. Finally, the
phase-down of the DCTC between $10,000 and $28,000 of adjusted gross income creates a
negative income and substitution effect for earnings in that range.
243. See Rachel Connelly, The Effect of Child Care Costs on Married Women's Labor
Force Participation, 74 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 83, 90 (1992) (finding childcare subsidies have
positive impact on labor force participation, particularly of young mothers); cf. Mark C.
Berger & Dan A Black, Child Care Subsidies, Quality of Care, and the Labor Supply of
Low-Income Single Mothers, 74 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 635, 638 (1992) (finding that childcare
subsidies affect employment but not hours worked).
244. See supra text accompanYing notes 86-121.
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expense of others: although advocates of expanding the DCTC often do
not specify how the new benefit would be financed, preserving benefits
for working single mothers and two-eamer couples could require a tax
increase on single-eamer couples (as well as on childless taxpayers). On
the other hand, unlike individual filing, the DCTC is targeted specifically
to working caregivers, or more precisely, to single parents and two-earner
couples, and is available to single mothers as well as to wives. A refund-
able DCTC would also distribute average tax rate cuts to working
caregivers in all income classes.
Second, because the DCTC is linked to the purchase of market child-
care, it may be marginally more successful than a simple tax cut or in-
come transfer in transferring cash in a way that directly benefits women.
Any tax rate cut would provide additional cash that might be used for
childcare, but, as described above, the extra funds may not benefit
women directly if intrafamily dynamics divest them of control over the
funds. By linking the tax benefit directly to childcare expenses, the credit
could encourage the purchase of additional childcare in some cases.
When this incentive operates, and assuming that the wife wants to buy
more childcare, the DCTC provides something like an "in-kind" transfer
to women. On the other hand, for families that already purchase some
childcare but do not increase their purchases, the DCTC is in effect an-
other unconditional tax cut, basically a kind of family allowance for work-
ing mothers. Like a tax cut, the extra cash might or might not be spent
for the benefit of the wife.245 It is impossible to know, a priori, how many
families fall into each of these groups.
b. Conclusions. - This analysis suggests that one reason for the
DCTC's popularity among feminists is that it attempts to accommodate
all three feminist goals. A refundable DCTC would advance the goal of
equal treatment and create a modest work incentive for some women, but
also would transfer funds in a pattern targeted to working caregivers,
whether married or single, at all income levels. Although individual fil-
ing also has elements of both equal treatment and a market work incen-
tive, it is more strongly in tension with the goal of assisting caregivers and
may be marginally less effective in targeting benefits to women.
2. Feminist Proposals for Social Security Reform. - Feminist proposals
for Social Security246 reform also raise many of the same questions de-
scribed in preceding sections. Although these reforms have been dis-
245. The same would be true of an in-kind childcare benefit. Women in families that
would not otherwise purchase childcare (or that would purchase lower quality care) might
gain by the availability of publicly provided childcare. If, however, the free public care
simply replaces purchased care, the family now has available a new sum of cash equal to
the cost of the purchased care. How that cash would be distributed within the family is not
certain.
246. For simplicity, I focus on Old Age Insurance, largely ignoring Survivors' and
Disability Insurance and Medicare.
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cussed at length elsewhere,247 a brief discussion highlights the parallels
between income taxation and Social Security. Because Social Security is
an integrated system of taxation and income transfers, it illustrates the
relevant tradeoffs in a particularly crisp way, showing how reforms that
help some women can harm others.
Social Security provides cash benefits upon retirement to covered
workers and their dependents.248 Workers become eligible for Social
Security coverage by working in covered employment for a minimum pe-
riod and by paying Social Security payroll (FICA) taxes on wages. Social
Security benefits are calculated based on lifetime earnings, but the
formula for determining Social Security benefits is progressive, so that
Social Security benefits replace a higher proportion of total wages for low
earners than for high earners.249 Social Security also provides an addi-
tional "spousal benefit" equal to 50% of the benefit the covered worker
would receive if single. A spouse who is covered independently under the
system through her own FICA contributions does not receive both the
50% spousal benefit and her own independent benefit, but instead re-
ceives the larger of the two amounts.250 One consequence of the spousal
benefit rules is that a single-earner couple can receive larger total Social
Security benefits than a two-earner couple with the same total earnings
and payroll tax contributions.251
247. For two excellent articles on the treatment of women under the Social Security
system, see Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security,
and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 264,
276-85 (1989); Grace G. Blumberg, Adult Derivative Benefits in Social Security, 32 Stan. L.
Rev. 233 (1980).
248. For a description of Social Security, see 1994 Green Book, supra note 182, at
3-47.
249. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 Stan.
L. Rev. 1431, 1460 (1986) (noting that although "payout rates ... replace relatively large
percentages of average earnings for relatively low earners," the benefit structure "tends to
give larger benefits to people with larger preretirement incomes, who tend to be relatively
wealthy retirees").
250. See 1994 Green Book, supra note 182, at 15, tbl.l-6 (spousal benefit 50% of
primary insurance amount). Thus, a married couple receives a total retirement benefit
equal to the greater of (1) 150% of the higher earning spouse's independent benefit (Le.,
the benefit the spouse would receive if single) or (2) the sum of the two spouses'
independent benefits. Although men and women are equally eligible for spousal benefits,
wives tend to earn less than husbands and so account for the vast majority of spousal
benefit recipients. See Social Security Administration Annual Statistical Supplement to the
Social Security Bulletin 187-88, tb1.5A1 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Annual Statistical
Supplement].
251. In other words, 150% of the benefit for a single earner may exceed the greater of
(1) two independent benefits for two earners or (2) 150% of the primary insurance
amount for the higher earner in the two-earner couple. See Congressional Budget Office,
Congress of the United States, Earnings Sharing Options for the Social Security System xiii
(1986) [hereinafter CBO]. Consider a simple example. There are two couples, (A) and
(B). In couple (A), the husband's average monthly earnings were $1000 and the wife
earned $0; in couple (B), the husband's average earnings were $700 and the wife's were
$300. Suppose that a simple Social Security system replaces 75% of the first $300 of
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As a group, women receive larger Social Security benefits relative to
their payroll tax contributions than do men.252 Women are the principal
recipients of spousal benefits and thus by definition receive benefits that
exceed those to which wives would be entitled based on their own contri-
butions. Women also typically live longer than men and so collect bene-
fits longer. In addition, because women tend to earn less than men, they
gain more from the progressivity of the benefit formula. 253 At the same
time, however, elderly women's average Social Security benefits are
smaller than elderly men's,254 and elderly women remain significantly
poorer than elderly men, due to their dependence on husbands' in-
comes, their longer lives, and their lower lifetime earnings.255
a. Equal Treatment and the Spousal Benefit Rules. - One feminist cri-
tique of Social Security is that the system discourages married women's
market work.256 Married women must pay Social Security payroll taxes
on their full earnings, but the spousal benefit rules mean that J!lany work-
ing wives receive no additional benefit for the payroll taxes they pay. If a
wife's earnings are low enough relative to her husband's, she will in the
end collect only the spousal benefit, which she could claim even if she
had never worked outside the home.257
This argument is reminiscent of the equal treatment argument for
individual filing. Ifwe recognize that women are more likely than men to
earnings and 25% thereafter and also has a 50% spousal benefit rule. Under that system,
couple (A) receives a total benefit of $600 ($400 for the husband and $200 for the wife),
while couple (B) receives a total benefit of $550 ($325 for the husband and $225 for the
wife). There are two competing effects here: the single-earner couple tends to receive a
lower proportionate benefit because of the progressive replacement-rate schedule but also
receives a spousal benefit.
252. See Becker, supra note 247, at 278.
253. See W. Andrew Achenbaum, Social Security: Visions and Revisions 133 (1986);
Simon, supra note 249, at 1482.
254. See 1994 Annual Statistical Supplement, supra note 250, at 200 tbl.5.AI0
(showing that by end of 1993 women comprised 59% of Social Security beneficiaries
(20,987 of 35,307) but received only 52% of total benefits); Becker, supra note 247, at
277-78 (noting that women receive about 52% of Social Security benefits paid to elderly
but represent 60% of elderly Social Security beneficiaries).
255. See CBO, supra note 251, at xiii; see also Kirp et al., supra note 37, at 197
(pointing out that averaging zero-earnings years into lifetime average also hurts women,
whose family labor responsibilities may reduce number of years worked); Marianne A
Ferber, Women's Employment and the Social Security System, Soc. Security Bull., Fall
1993, at 33, 43.
256. See Richard V. Burkhauser, Earnings Sharing: Incremental and Fundamental
Reform, in A Challenge to Social Security 76-77 (Richard V. Burkhauser & Karen C.
Holden eds., 1982); RobertJ. Lampman & Maurice MacDonald, Concepts Underlying the
Current Controversy About Women's Social Security Benefits, in A Challenge to Social
Security, supra, at 21, 30.
257. See Becker, supra note 247, at 280. The number ofwives with "dual entitlement"
to benefits as retired workers and as spouses of retired workers has grown dramatically over
time. See 1994 Annual Statistical Supplement, supra note 250, at 201 tbl.5.A14 (showing
that in 1960, only 4.6% of women beneficiaries age 62 or older were dually entitled, while
in 1993, 25.1 % were dually entitled).
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be secondary workers, then the current system is biased against wives'
market work. For primary workers, the Social Security payroll tax is off-
set, at least in part, by an expectation of future benefits, which are posi-
tively correlated with earnings. For secondary workers who are likely to
receive the spousal benefit, however, the situation is quite different: for
them, the payroll tax is a true tax, because it confers no incremental fu-
ture benefits.
The goal of equal treatment suggests repealing the spousal benefit
entirely, so that primary and secondary workers would receive an equal
benefit from their payroll tax contributions.258 The revenue saved
through repeal of the spousal benefit could be used to reduce payroll
taxes or increase benefits across the board. The dilemma, of course, is
that equal treatment would help some women but hurt others. By defini-
tion, repealing the spousal benefit would reduce Social Security benefits
for many wives, particularly full-time caregivers and those with low earn-
ings.259 Without spousal benefits, a married woman would receive as
much as (but no more than) a single woman with the same earnings his-
tory.260 The resulting redistribution of Social Security benefits could re-
duce benefits for many wives, particularly those with low market earnings
or an intermittent or nonexistent work history.
Thus, there is a tension between achieving equal treatment in Social
Security and assisting caregivers (if we assume, realistically, that many
homemakers are also caregivers and that caregiving work tends to reduce
many women's lifetime earnings). This tension may recede a bit with
time because younger generations of women tend to have consistently
higher rates of labor force participation than older generations had.261
Even younger generations of women, however, do not duplicate men's
patterns of market work: women continue to encounter significant dis-
ruptions in their work patterns during childbearing years, and women's
lifetime earnings still are lower than men's.262
Repealing the spousal benefit might encourage women's market
work, which could in turn increase women's Social Security benefits.
Although repeal of the spousal benefit creates a potential work incentive
258. Repeal of the spousal benefit is analogous to the adoption of individual filing in
the income tax context each worker would pay payroll taxes only on her own earnings (as
under current law) and would also receive benefits based solely on her own contributions.
More precisely, the current Social Security rules use individual filing for purposes of
calculating payroll taxes but determine benefits on a joint basis. Repeal of the spousal
benefit would calculate both taxes and benefits using individual filing.
259. For a description and critique of a 1975 proposal to repeal spousal benefits, see
Blumberg, supra note 247, at 264-66.
260. Although the repeal of spousal benefits would initially reduce or leave
unchanged every married woman's benefits (because under current law they receive the
higher of their own coverage or the spousal benefit), the revenue saved by repealing the
additional benefits could be used to lower payroll taxes or increase benefits for workers.
261. See Ferber, supra note 255, at 34, 36-37.
262. See ide at 41-43.
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because it restores the connection between women's payroll tax contribu-
tions and their ultimate benefits, the practical significance of that work
incentive is hard to gauge. Social Security provides only a deferred re-
ward for women's market work. Women may fail to respond to market
work incentives in Social Security if they misunderstand the terms of the
program, discount the availability of Social Security benefits due to widely
publicized financial stresses on the system, or "myopically" discount their
future well-being.263
b. Assisting Caregivers Through Homemakers' Credits. - A second femi-
nist critique of Social Security is that it does too little to assist caregivers.
Although the spousal benefit rules are intended to ensure coverage for
women in "traditional" families, critics point out that spousal benefits are
derived from husbands' coverage and thus provide limited benefits for
divorced or never married women and women married to low earners.264
Some scholars propose replacing the spousal benefit with a system of
"homemakers' credits," which would provide independent Social Security
earnings credits for women (or men) primarily engaged in family la-
bor.265 Homemakers' credits would essentially impute to the caregiver a
deemed earnings amount, which would be added to her lifetime Social
Security earnings record. Repealing the spousal benefit would -ensure
that each worker received benefits based on her own earnings record,
while the additional homemakers' credits would ensure that caregivers
would be protected. Unlike the spousal benefit, homemakers' credits
would be fully independent of marital status, and thus equally available to
married, divorced, and never married women.266
Proposals for homemakers' credits raise a host of serious difficulties,
however. First, the proposal only reshapes rather than removes the con-
263. See also Edith U. Fierst, Discussion, in A Challenge to Social Security, supra note
256, at 66, 66-67 (discussing how women's market work decisions often are not affected by
possible changes in Social Security benefits).
264. A never married mother cannot receive a spousal benefit even if the father of her
children is covered. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b) (1), 416(b) (1994); see also Becker, supra
note 247, at 283 (arguing that the system links "old-age security for women (but not for
men) to continuation of the marriage bond until death"). A divorced woman receives a
spousal benefit only if she was married to a covered worker for ten years or more. See ide
§§ 402(b), 416(d). The spousal benefit system pays greater (absolute) benefits to women
married to high earners than to women married to low earners, even if they perform the
same caregiving work (although, once again, the progressivity of the benefit formula
generally helps low earners and their dependents). See Lampman & MacDonald, supra
note 256, at 30. For an analysis of the distributional effects of spousal benefits, see Karen
C. Holden, Supplemental OASI Benefits to Homemakers Through Current Spouse
Benefits, a Homemaker Credit, and Child-Care Drop-Out Years, in A Challenge to Social
Security, supra note 256, at 41, 44-5l.
265. The analysis in the text assumes that (1) the homemakers' credits are financed
by repeal of the spousal benefit, and (2) the repeal of the spousal benefit raises enough
revenue to fund the new benefit. There are other ways to finance such a proposal. See,
e.g., Staudt, supra note 99, at 1642 (recommending imposing payroll taxes on imputed
income from women's family labor).
266. See Holden, supra note 264, at 54.
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flict-created by the spousal benefit-between equal treatment and as-
sisting caregivers. Repeal of the spousal benefit would eliminate the
secondary-earner bias that current law creates, so that working wives
would no longer pay payroll taxes without receiving additional benefits.
Homemakers' credits, however, would recreate an incentive for wives to
stay out of the labor force by awarding a new class of benefits that are not
paid for (in the financial sense anyway).267 Second, critics point out that
the credits would help only those women who can afford to be full-time
housewives and would provide no benefit for women who work in the
market while also performing significant family labor.268 \Vhile women
who work in the market would pay payroll taxes beginning with the very
first dollar of their earnings, housewives would earn Social Security credit
without making any contribution at all.269 Although the current spousal
benefit has somewhat the same effect-by definition, it provides
"unearned" benefits to wives-the spousal benefit is available both to
(low-earning) working wives and to homemakers. Third, homemakers'
credits create a host of administrative difficulties, including identifying
women and men engaged in family labor and valuing family labor for
purposes of imputing earnings credits.27o Finally, it is not clear that
homemakers' credits would effect any dramatic improvement in home-
makers' retirement security, at least if the change is close to revenue neu-
tral. One empirical simulation found that the distribution of the benefits
of homemakers' credits would differ little from that of spousal benefits,
unless family labor were valued highly enough to increase the aggregate
benefits available to women.271
c. Earnings Sharing: Another Compromise Solution. - Another popular
Social Security reform proposal is earnings sharing, which seeks a com-
promise between the goals of equal treatment and assisting caregivers by
267. The spousal benefit discourages market work for women whose own earned
benefits would ultimately be less than the "free" spousal benefits, equal to 50% of their
husband's benefits. Homemakers' credits discourage market work for women whose own
earned benefits would be less than the benefits created by the "free" homemakers' credits.
268. The homemakers' credit proposal is arguably worse in this respect than the
current system of spousal benefits. Although the current system of spousal benefits assists
housewives, it also helps wives whose earnings are low relative to their husbands'. In
contrast, homemakers' credits help only those women who are full-time housewives.
269. Depending on the valuation of family labor, homemakers could receive a "free"
credit that exceeds actual earnings of many low-earning working women. See Holden,
supra note 264, at 58-59; see also Simon, supra note 249, at 1485 (arguing that
homemakers' credits would benefit wealthy homemakers with or without children, but
probably not working mothers). In addition, homemakers' credits would not guarantee a
benefit even equal to the spousal benefit, so some women could be worse off. See
Achenbaum, supra note 253, at 138.
270. See Achenbaum, supra note 253, at 138; Fierst, supra note 263, at 71; Holden,
supra note 264, at 54-55; see also Staudt, supra note 99, at 1620-24 (proposing imposition
of federal taxes on value of women's household labor and noting problems of
distinguishing family labor from leisure, quantifying value of services, and gauging
variability of quality and quantity of services performed).
271. See Holden, supra note 264, at 55-58.
1996] TAX POllCY AND FEMINISM 2065
removing the worst distortionary effects of spousal benefits while main-
taining or improving Social Security coverage for women engaged in fam-
ily labor.272 Although earnings sharing proposals differ in important de-
tails, in general they would repeal the spousal benefit and provide that a
husband and wife would each receive Social Security credit for half of the
couple's combined earnings, regardless of the distribution of earnings
between spouses.273 For example, suppose that in 1996 a husband earns
$100,000 and his wife is a full-time housewife. For 1996, the Social
Security system would record $50,000 of earnings credits for each spouse.
If the husband earns $60,000 and the wife earns $40,000, again each
spouse would receive $50,000 in earnings credits.
Earnings sharing implements a "partnership" model of marriage,
treating each spouse as making an equal economic contribution, whether
through market work or family labor.274 Proponents point to three ad-
vantages of this model. First, earnings sharing would improve the situa-
tion of two-earner couples. Under earnings sharing, couples with equal
aggregate incomes would receive equal total benefits; that change would
tend to benefit two-earner couples, who can receive smaller benefits than
single-earner couples under current law.275 Second, earnings sharing
would eliminate the secondary-earner bias that the current spousal bene-
fit rules create: both spouses would earn incremental credits for their
work, although credits would be shared fifty-fifty with the other spouse.276
Finally, earnings sharing could help divorced women by creating "porta-
ble" earnings credits that could ensure some independent Social Security
coverage for divorced women not now entitled to coverage.277
Although earnings sharing is an attractive compromise, it is not a
panacea. Without a politically difficult increase in aggregate Social
Security expenditures, larger benefits for some groups must come at the
expense of others. The major tradeoff is that earnings sharing plans that
are roughly revenue neutral would reduce benefits for single-earner
couples and survivors (usually widows) of such couples or for other
couples in which the wife does not have a significant work history.278
Even if these benefit reductions were seen as acceptable in the long run
272. See Blumberg, supra note 247, at 243-44 (arguing that Social Security rules
"fail[ ] to take into account the effect of women's dual roles on their participation in the
labor force," including women's shorter work lives, interrupted work lives, and lower
earnings).
273. For a detailed discussion of several different earnings sharing plans, see CBO,
supra note 251, at xvi-xviii; Blumberg, supra note 247, at 278-90.
274. See CBO, supra note 251, at 17-18.
275. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
276. See Becker, supra note 247, at 286-87.
277. See ide at 284.
278. See Becker, supra note 247, at 36-37; Ferber, supra note 255, at 44; see also
Achenbaum, supra note 253, at 139-40 (arguing that because earnings sharing would
reduce benefits for one-earner couples, guaranteeing survivors' benefits as large as those
under current law would require increasing taxes or cutting benefits); Simon, supra note
249, at 1483-84 (arguing that earnings sharing would "substantially redirect benefits away
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as the price of change, the question of transition is a difficult one. As
always, the tradeoff is between protecting expectations under the old re-
gime and slowing the evolution to a new system, but Social Security
changes are particularly sensitive because they can disappoint very long
term expectations (and a sense of entitlement), and have a serious im-
pact on elderly persons' economic security.279
d. Conclusions. - All of these proposals are enormously complex,
due to the intricate structure of Social Security and the fact that the ef-
fects of any particular reform depend critically on the details of financ-
ing, benefit levels, and transition rules.28o Although a full evaluation of
these proposals is beyond the scope of this Article, this discussion illus-
trates in another context the potential tensions among the three feminist
goals and the tradeoffs inherent in a compromise approach.
II. BEYOND TAXATION: A COMPARISON OF TAX AND OTHER LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE POTENTIAL OF LEGAL COORDINATION
Part I illustrates the inherent complexity of designing policies to im-
plement feminist goals. Designing a feminist tax policy requires explicit
choices among competing goals as well as careful attention to institu-
tional details, which have important consequences for the incentive and
distributional effects of any proposal. Further, policies that implement
equal treatment, encourage women's market work, or assist caregivers
may ultimately have only a limited impact on gender roles, women's eco-
nomic well-being, and the distribution of resources within the family. Vir-
tually any legal reform encounters institutional constraints of some kind,
however, and the important question is whether feminist tax proposals
are likely to be more or less effective than other legal reforms in achiev-
ing feminist goals. This Part briefly compares the institutional capabili-
ties of tax law with those of family law, labor-market regulation, and wel-
fare policy and suggests two conclusions. First, feminist reform proposals
in other legal regimes encounter tensions among feminist goals that are
analogous to those that arise in feminist tax proposals. However, differ-
ent legal regimes have sharply divergent capabilities, and tax law changes
have both comparative institutional advantages and weaknesses. Second,
coordination between tax policy and other legal regimes can expand the
available menu of policy options by drawing on the diverse strengths of
different legal regimes. Although legal hybrids cannot eliminate trade-
offs among feminist goals or dramatically alter the capacity of modest
from many of the neediest women" by reducing survivors' benefits for widows, which are
well targeted in terms of need).
279. Major earnings sharing proposals have devoted significant attention to issues of
transition. See CBO, supra note 251, at 21-24.
280. See generally CBO, supra note 251, app. Bat 110-13 (describing the difficulties
of simulating effects of earnings sharing proposals, including predicting future
demographic and economic trends and making assumptions about legal structure of
transition) .
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legal reforms to change social attitudes and practices related to gender,
they do provide another important avenue for using tax policy to advance
feminist objectives.
It is not surprising that some scholars have looked to the federal tax
system as a potentially attractive vehicle for implementing feminist goals.
Because the federal income tax system affects the economic circum-
stances of a large segment of the population,281 it offers an unparalleled
opportunity to create incentives and income transfers with a potentially
broad impact. Federal administration and automatic access to general
federal revenues also allow the federal income tax system to create uni-
form rules that apply across state boundaries, and to redistribute income
among all families, including the poorest.282 Federal tax benefits,
claimed by filing a tax return, also offer more privacy and dignity than
other forms of legal administration.283 These advantages create corre-
sponding constraints, however. Income tax administration, designed to
be relatively cheap and automatic, cannot easily accommodate case-by-
case factual determinations that might tailor benefits to individual cir-
cumstances.284 Tax rules can create "vouchers" for the purchase of goods
and services285 but cannot create direct, in-kind transfers, and tax admin-
istration cannot easily enforce any regulation that requires information
not provided by the current information reporting system.286
The remainder of this Part compares the capabilities and limitations
of tax policy with those of other legal regimes and uses several examples
to explore the potential for legal coordination.
A. Family Law
Family law rules have institutional characteristics that differ signifi-
cantly from those of the federal income tax system. Family law rules re-
281. In 1994, individual taxpayers filed almost 110 million tax returns. A large
number of those returns were jointly filed by married couples. See 15 IRS Stat. Income
Bull. 21 tbl.1 (Fall 1995).
282. In fiscal year 1996, $19.9 billion ofEITC total expenditures of $23.5 billion were
"refunded" to taxpayers with insufficient tax liability to absorb the credit. SeeJoint Comm.
on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1996-2000. (Comm.
Rep. Sept. 1, 1996), reprinted in JCT Forecasts Costs of Tax Expenditures, Tax Notes
Today, Sept. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, 95 TNT 174-11.
283. See Alstott, supra note 69, at 565.
284. See ide at 589. The classic article is Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives As a Device
for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government
Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 734-35 (1970) (arguing that tax expenditures should
be compared carefully with direct expenditures but that in general it is unlikely that tax
incentives will have clear advantages over direct programs).
285. The DCTC is a kind of voucher, which subsidizes the private purchase of
childcare. See supra text accompanying notes 231-233.
286. See Heen, supra note 91, at 203 (noting that tax system cannot effectively
regulate quality of childcare purchased with DCTC funds).
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distribute private resources, primarily at divorce,287 between spouses
(property and income division) or between parents (child support) and
have the greatest potential impact on middle-class and high-income
couples (who have sufficient property or income to be divided).288 De-
spite recent inroads made by federal legislation, family law remains
largely a matter of state law and often differs significantly across states,289
and family law rules typically are applied case-by-ease, based on the nego-
tiations of the parties and some judicial participation. How effective and
fair these individualized determinations are is a matter of considerable
dispute.29o
Despite these institutional differences, feminist proposals for family
law reform encounter conflicts among feminist goals that are analogous
to those created by tax reform proposals. Feminist scholarship on di-
vorce law reform, for example, demonstrates quite clearly the conflict be-
tween the goals of equal treatment and encouraging women's market
work on the one hand, and assisting caregivers on the other.291 There is
a large literature debating whether no-fault divorce and the equal divi-
sion of property upon divorce help or harm women, and whether current
rules should be amended to incorporate more generous alimony or prop-
erty settlements for wives who are also caregivers.292 Some feminists op-
pose special alimony or property division rules intended to benefit
women upon divorce because they could encourage couples entering
marriage to retain traditional gender roles, which could be "economically
disabling for women."293 Others contend that current divorce rules en-
courage strategic behavior by men at women's expense294 and are inade-
287. Although some community property statutes also attempt to define legal
entitlements in order to redistribute resources within an intact marriage, the efficacy of
those rules is questionable. See infra text accompanying notes 302-303.
288. See Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property 80-82 (1981).
289. Cf. Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1787, 1788-96
(noting trend toward larger federal role in family law and defending "state sovereignty over
family law" based on "communitarian model of state authority under the federal
Constitution") .
290. See, e.g., Kay, Beyond No Fault, supra note 193, at 12-13 (describing criticism of
judicial application of equitable distribution standard for property division); Becker, supra
note 16, at 722 (noting that West Virginia courts have applied "primary caretaker" custody
standard in way that fails "to adequately protect the emotional needs of children and their
primary caretakers" and describing standard as "too discretionary in light ofjudicial bias").
291. See generally June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage:
Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 Tu!. L. Rev. 953,992-1002
(1991) (describing variety of arguments relating to divorce reform and noting tension
between arguments for equal treatment upon divorce and arguments that call for policies
to protect women).
292. See Fineman, supra note 17, at 17-75; Kay, Beyond No Fault, supra note 193, at
31-35; Rhode, supra note 10, at 147-54.
293. Kay, supra note 23, at 80, 85.
294. See Carbone & Brinig, supra note 291, at 988.
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quate to safeguard the interests of women who devote their time to family
labor.295
The institutional characteristics of family law have made it difficult to
use family law reform to implement feminist goals of encouraging
women's market work and self-sufficiency, improving the economic well-
being of caregivers, and increasing women's control over family resources
during marriage. Consider three examples:
First, family law is an uncertain vehicle for encouraging women's
market work, largely because generic financial incentives may not be well
tailored to the task. Limiting alimony and other income support for di-
vorced women may increase their work effort,296 but because many
couples have only limited income and assets, incentives created by di-
vorce settlements relating to income and property are relevant only to
higher income classes.297 In theory, at least, family law might create tran-
sitional work incentives or training programs that are tailored to individ-
ual circumstances (e.g., "rehabilitative" alimony or educational assist-
ance). Although awards of rehabilitative alimony have increased relative
to permanent awards in recent years, relatively few women receive ali-
mony of any kind, and critics argue that judicial expectations about "re-
habilitation" often are unrealistic.29B Finally, whether work incentives for
divorced women also influence the behavior of married women is particu-
larly uncertain. Although the growing divorce rate has probably alerted
women to the possibility that they will have to support themselves, women
may discount the probability that they will be divorced or that they will
suffer hardship upon divorce.299 If married women (perhaps short-
sightedly) discount the likelihood of divorce in their own situation or lack
information about the likely economic outcome of divorce, potential
work incentives may fail to influence behavior in advance.
Second, the variability of state law, the uncertainty ofjudicial behav-
ior, and the constraints of state-level administration have made it difficult
to enhance the economic well-being of caregivers through child support
awards. Current law requires noncustodial parents, whether divorced or
never-married, to contribute to the support of their children, but critics
point out the wide divergence of state-law rules determining child sup-
port awards, the potential for arbitrariness in the judicial application of
295. See Becker et aI., supra note 10, at 517-18; Fineman, supra note 17, at 4.
296. Another potential work incentive, although unintended, arises from the high
rate of noncompliance with child support orders, which often leaves divorced women with
little income other than their own earnings. For data on noncompliance with child
support orders, see Irwin Garfinkel, Assuring Child Support 7-8 (1992).
297. See Glendon, supra note 288, at 80-82.
298. See Becker et aI., supra note 10, at 513.
299. See Lynn A Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above
Average, 17 L. & Hum. Behav. 439, 444-48 (1993) (reporting results from survey of
marriage license applicants and law students who had taken basic course in family law, and
finding that both groups had relatively accurate knowledge of societal divorce rates but
perceived their own chances of divorce to be much smaller).
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state standards, and the difficulty of enforcing child support rules, espe-
cially across state boundaries.30o And once again, the limited capacity of
poorer fathers to pay child support also limits the potential upside of
child support awards for the mothers of their children.
Finally, some family law scholars see community property laws as a
means of redistributing property and income within the family, but there
is no clear consensus on the relative merits of community property and
common law regimes. Although community property laws may
strengthen women's financial position at divorce compared to older, title-
based divisions of property, some argue that newer, equitable distribution
rules in common law states approximate community property, at least
upon divorce.30l There is also significant controversy about whether
community property laws can improve the fairness of property allocations
within an intact marital household. Advocates argue that recent reforms
giving wives more immediate rights to manage and control the disposi-
tion of community property can strengthen wives' bargaining power dur-
ing marriage,302 but skeptics argue that management rights are at best a
weak vehicle for improving wives' control over marital income and as-
sets.303 Even if there were a clear consensus on the value of community
property management rights, the variability of state laws is a considerable
obstacle to coordinated reform.
The remainder of this section offers two examples to illustrate how
coordination between family law and tax law might expand the institu-
tional capabilities of either regime standing alone.
1. Child Support Assurance. - Irwin Garfinkel's popular proposal for
a child support assurance system ("CSAS") suggests that legal coordina-
tion-including an enhanced role for the federal tax system-could im-
prove the economic status of single mothers.304 Garfinkel's proposal
combines some traditional functions of family law and welfare law to en-
hance the correspondence between child support awards and fathers'305
incomes, to improve the enforcement of child support awards, and to
300. See Garfinkel, supra note 296, at 29-31; Rhode, supra note 10, at 151-52.
301. See Ira M. Ellman et aI., Family Law 224-61 (1986).
302. For a cautious endorsement, see J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the
Community Estate During an Intact Marriage, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 99, 104 (1993)
(noting that nonlegal factors may be dominant consideration that determines intrafamily
allocations but arguing that legal rules "may have some effect" on management of funds).
303. For example, even if the law gives husbands and wives theoretically equal
management rights, third parties will often be entitled to continue to deal with only one
spouse. The result is that one spouse-often the husband, as titleholder-will in reality
maintain control. See Ira M. Ellman et aI., supra note 301, at 104-05; see also Oldham,
supra note 302, at 105-54 (surveYing state rules that determine degree of joint
management).
304. See Garfinkel, supra note 296, at 8-9.
305. Although the CSAS would be available to custodial parents of either gender, the
text (following Garfinkel's usage) refers to custodial parents who receive child support as
"mothers," and to noncustodial parents who pay child support as "fathers," because about
85% of single parents are female. See ide at 11.
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ensure a minimal level of support for all single mothers, regardless of the
level of fathers' income.306
Under the CSAS, child support payments by fathers would be calcu-
lated as a flat percentage of income and would be collected through the
federal income tax system.307 Single mothers would receive the greater
of either the child support actually collected from the father or a mini-
mum government-guaranteed payment which might range from $2000 to
$2500 per year. Any shortfall due to nonpayment by fathers would be
made up out of public revenues.SOB
Thus, the CSAS is a legal hybrid that uses a wholly traditional func-
tion of the tax law-tax collection-to enhance the performance of fam-
ily law rules.309 It also draws on public funds to create a guaranteed mini-
mum benefit for single mothers, using the linkage with private child
support payments to enhance the political acceptability of a kind of fam-
ily allowance for single mothers.310 Garfinkel's simulations suggest that
the CSAS with an assured minimum benefit of $2000 could reduce the
"poverty gap," or the difference between family income and poverty level
income, among single mothers by 5% in the short run and almost 17% in
the intermediate term.311 These estimates incorporate projections of dif-
ficulties in increasing child support awards or payment rates. A "perfect"
implementation of the CSAS would reduce the poverty gap by 30%.312
306. See ide at 45-46. Income withholding would be routine for all noncustodial
parents.
307. See ide at 47-48.
308. Some features of the CSAS have been enacted into law. Until 1996, AFDC rules
required recipients of AFDC to cooperate in establishing paternity. See 1994 Green Book,
supra note 182, at 336. Welfare legislation adopted in 1996 requires states to provide child
support enforcement services to recipients of the new block grant providing temporary
assistance to needy families. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 301, 110 Stat. 2105, 2199 (1996)
(Westlaw, US-PL database) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 654). The Family Support Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.), requires states to begin routine wage withholding of all new child support orders
entered after 1994. See 1994 Green Book, supra note 182, at 460. The 1996 legislation
also takes other measures to enhance the collection of child support, including the
creation of a national registry of newly hired employees. See Personal Reponsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, § 313(a)-(b), 110 Stat. at 2209-12 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ ·653a-654).
309. See Garfinkel, supra note 296, at 42-61.
310. The CSAS is similar, but not identical, to a family allowance. For single mothers
who now receive no child support and would receive the minimum benefit under the
CSAS, the program is a family allowance-a per child payment funded by general
revenues. The payment is reduced dollar-for-dollar with increased private child support
payments so that single mothers who receive sufficient private child support receive no
public assistance.
311. See Garfinkel, supra note 296, at 54 tb1.3.1.
312. See ide But see Elaine Sorensen & Sandra Clark, A Child-Support Assurance
Program: How Much Will It Reduce Child Poverty, and at What Cost?, 84 Am. Econ. Rev.,
May 1994, at 114, 117 (measuring effectiveness of CSAS based on number of children lifted
from poverty rather than by reductions in poverty gap and finding that even $3000 per
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Some feminists, however, may oppose the CSAS because of the
linkage between fathers' payments and children's support, illustrating
that there is significant controversy over how best to implement the goal
of assisting caregivers. Garfinkel's plan would provide benefits only to
single mothers who identify the father of their children. Martha Fineman
objects that the identification requirement could result in domestic vio-
lence by the fathers in retribution for identification.313 This particular
problem might be addressed by removing the requirement that mothers
identify fathers in order to receive the minimum payment. Although
Garfinkel strongly opposes that change because it could raise the costs of
the program and break the link between fathers' responsibilities and
mothers' incomes,314 there is a relatively straightfolWard policy tradeoff
between eliminating identification requirements and keeping the public
cost of the program IOW.315 Another feminist objection, however, is virtu-
ally impossible to address within the scope of Garfinkel's plan: some fem-
inists argue that any income support linked to fathers' payments is objec-
tionable because it reinforces both women's economic dependency
on men, and the message that fatherhood is largely a financial
transaction.316
2. Intrafamily Redistribution Through Family Law. - If one believes
that family law rules governing women's control over marital property
could achieve a degree of intrafamily redistribution during marriage, co-
ordination between tax policy and family law might be productive in en-
child benefit, with zero reduction of AFDC benefits, would reduce child poverty rate by
only 12.3%). The antipoverty benefits of the CSAS may be politically vulnerable, however,
if politicians adopt the private payment reforms and reject the public benefit component.
Wisconsin, for example, has implemented some of the collection-side reforms Garfinkel
recommends, but not the assured benefit. See Garfinkel, supra note 296, at 57-58.
313. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 212-13 (arguing that aspects of paternity
establishment process, which are mandatory for welfare recipients, are objectionable
because single mothers must either lose privacy or lose benefits, may be exposed to
violence and abuse, and may be subject to claims for visitation or custody by newly
identified fathers).
314. See Garfinkel, supra note 296, at 67-68 (acknowledging that paternity-
establishment process is "invasive" but arguing that requiring paternity establishment as
condition for eligibility for assured child support award is appropriate and will create "a
potentially powerful incentive" for mothers to cooperate).
315. For one effort to quantify that tradeoff: see Sorensen & Clark, supra note 312, at
117 tbl.l (showing higher revenue cost and higher poverty reduction rates of eliminating
requirement that single mother have child support award in order to collect assured
minimum benefit).
316. Martha Fineman argues that paternity establishment reforms mandated by the
Family Support Act of 1988 reinforce the ideology of fathers as "economic providers and
disciplinarians in patriarchal nuclear families." Fineman, supra note 16, at 113. The 1996
welfare legislation also requires recipients of block-grant funds to cooperate in paternity
establishment. The new law contains a "good cause" exception, but also a 25% reduction
in the grant for noncooperation. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, § 103(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2134 (1996) (Westlaw, US-PL
database) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608).
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couraging states to adopt uniform rules. History suggests that federal tax
rules can create a strong incentive for states to adopt community property
statutes. In 1930, Poe v. Seaborn allowed married couples in community
property states-but not in common law states-to reduce their income
taxes.317 The tax code at the time required spouses to file individual re-
turns, and Poe ruled that community property laws required each spouse
to report one-half of joint income. Given the progressive marginal tax
rate schedule, this income splitting result was highly advantageous, be-
cause it minimized the couple's total taxes. Largely in response to Poe,
several states adopted community property laws between 1930 and
1948.318 The trend might have continued, except that federal legislation
in 1948 adopted the joint return system, which extended the opportunity
for income splitting to residents of common law states.319
More recently, Pamela Gann has suggested that a system of individ-
ual filing might once again encourage states to adopt community prop-
erty laws.32o Potential benefits for women could be magnified if federal
tax recognition of state community property regimes were conditioned
on the adoption of state-law provisions to enhance women's control over
community property during marriage. It is important to note, however,
that resurrection of the full Poe incentive for community property statutes
would be at odds with the goal of eliminating the secondary-earner bias
discussed in Part I.A. The kind of income splitting mandated by Poe
would recreate a secondary-earner bias because a wife with no earnings of
her own would still report half her husband's earnings on her return. If a
nonworking wife decided to go to work, her earnings also would be split
between the two returns, but in the end would be taxed at a higher margi-
nal tax rate determined by her husband's earnings. We could modify the
Poe system to allow income splitting only for unearned income, but re-
stricting the benefit would reduce the incentive for states to adopt the
community property regime-because the change would then benefit
only those with significant income from capita1.321
Skeptics of community property's benefits for women argue that in-
dividual filing might be better used to enhance wives' property rights by
ignoring state community property laws and respecting nominal property
ownership for purposes of allocating investment income between
spouses. This rule would allow couples with income from capital to mini-
mize the marginal tax rate on the income by shifting legal title to the
property to the lower earning spouse. Advocates argue that tax reduction
conditioned on the transfer of legal title could benefit women-who are
317. 282 u.s. 101, 110-12 (1930).
318. See Gann, supra note 28, at 18 nn.67-68.
319. See ide at 18.
320. See ide at 59-60.
321. Any income splitting plan is most advantageous for single-earner, high-bracket
couples, but restricting the opportunity to unearned income confines the strategy to an
even smaller group.
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typically the lower earning spouses-by increasing their property hold-
ings.322 Just as in the case of community property laws, however, there
are questions about whether nominal legal title conveys effective control.
In addition, this sort of incentive has potential benefits only for women in
couples with income from property.323
Although these proposals are a thoughtful attempt to consider how
tax law might reinforce and magnify the effects of family law, there are
still serious questions about whether any of them would create significant
gains for women during marriage. Family law rules, which can give
women legal title to identifiable marital assets, may be significantly more
effective than tax law rules alone, which can at most determine only
which spouse's name is written on the check sent by the IRS. Neverthe-
less, the basic difficulty remains: in family law as in taxation, it is ex-
tremely difficult to predict whether changing legal title to assets or earn-
ings will have significant practical benefits for wives. As argued above,324
if wives are hesitant to enforce their rights during marriage, or if hus-
bands have other sources of financial or emotional leverage, changes in
legal entitlements may do little.
B. Labor-Market Regulation and Mandated Family Leave
Part I described the institutional complexity of using tax law changes
to encourage women's market work. Among the potential obstacles are
labor-market conditions that make it difficult for women to combine mar-
ket work and family labor.325 The Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA")326 takes a more direct approach to that problem by requiring
employers to permit employees to take unpaid leaves of up to twelve
weeks to care for family members. FMLA applies to employers with more
than fifty employees and provides job protection for employees returning
from leave.327
FMLA is not uncontroversial even among feminists, demonstrating
once again the normative and institutional complexity of designing pro-
grams to help women. Some feminists hail FMLA as an important means
of enhancing women's job security and reducing the earnings gap be-
322. See Davis, supra note 43, at 238-40.
323. A more far reaching incentive would legislatively overrule Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
Ill, 114-15 (1930), which held ineffective for tax purposes contracts purporting to assign
the earnings of one spouse to the other. See Gann, supra note 28, at 114-15. Overruling
Earl in an individual filing system would allow couples to minimize taxes by splitting
earned income, but only if the higher earning spouse gave the lower earner a contractual
right to the income, perhaps with additional statutory conditions requiring that the
contract have a certain duration and be irrevocable. Once again, however, full income
splitting would recreate the second-eamer bias, and whether changing legal title would
have significant practical benefits for women is extremely hard to predict.
324. See supra Part IA3.
325. See supra text accompanYing notes 91-102.
326. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
327. See ide
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tween mothers and other workers.328 Feminist critics ofFMLA raise three
principal objections, however. First, some argue that FMLA provides lit-
tle or no benefit to significant groups of women. They contend that un-
paid leaves are of little use to low- and middle-income women, and that a
benefit tied to long-term employment does nothing for women who are
unemployed, self-employed, or are part-time or intermittent workers.329
Second, others argue that FMLA could be counterproductive to the ex-
tent that employers respond to the mandate by reducing women's wages
or by discriminating against women of childbearing age, who are most
likely to take the leave.33o Finally, some critics contend that employment
benefits linked to family labor could even reinforce women's traditional
role as caregivers by making it easier for women to take time Off.331
Some of these objections to FMLA arise in part from its structure as
an employer mandate, which appears "costless" on the government's
books but in effect imposes a hidden "tax" on workers, and possibly em-
ployers as well, in the form of lower wages, unemployment, and higher
production costS.332 Employer mandates may also encourage noncompli-
ance or changes in the structure of the workforce, if employers misclassify
employees as independent contractors or rely on part-time workers, tem-
porary help, or overtime in order to avoid the costs of the mandate.333
FMLA's relief for small employers, although a perceived political neces-
328. See, e.g., Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the V.S. and
V.K: Can Maternity Leave Make a Difference? 13 (Oct. 1994) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding that job-protected maternity leave can
reduce "family gap" in wages for working mothers by increasing likelihood that they will
return to work after childbirth).
329. See, e.g., Nadine Taub, From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.V.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 381,398 (1984-85) (arguing that paid leave would ensure that "the
leave will be an option for everyone, not merely the well-to-do").
330. See Maria O. Hylton, "Parental" Leaves and Poor Women: PaYing the Price for
Time Off, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 475,493 (1991); Taub, supra note 330, at 401.
331. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 1, at 136 (criticizing employer mandates and arguing
that public funding "usually introduces less inequity and inefficiency" than mandates,
which distribute costs in an "arbitrary" way). But see Waldfogel, supra note 328, at 14
(arguing that average cost of FMlA per woman is likely to be small, and that employers
may gain from lower turnover and increased employee commitment). See generally Lewis
& Astrom, supra note 222, at 61,72-74 (1992) (arguing that Swedish employment policies
for women have not altered unequal division of family labor and may have reinforced sex
segregation in workplace). In addition, giving women more time for caregiving work
might not increase their leisure time but could insteadjust add to their domestic burden, if
family demands increase in response to the increase in women's available time. See
Spakes, supra note 199, at 38-39 (" [J] ob sharing and work at home, for example, too often
mean that women do more work in less time, get paid less, [and] receive fewer benefits.").
332. For general critiques of employer mandates, see Fuchs, supra note 1, at 136-37;
Michael Graetz &James Tobin, Players and Payers, N. Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1994, at A35.
333. For similar concerns in the context of employer mandates for health insurance,
see GAO Warns of Worker Status Fallout from Health Reform, Tax Notes Today, Aug. 5,
1994, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file, 94 TNT 153-39; Graetz's Testimony at
Senate Finance Committee Hearing, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT file, 94 TNT 51-51.
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sity, also offers opportunities for abuse and creates disparities in the treat-
ment both of employers and of employees of different firms.ss4
One interesting institutional question is whether there are alterna-
tive ways of structuring family leave and other flexible-employment ar-
rangements that could avoid some of these drawbacks. Tax policy plays
no explicit role in FMlA now but might playa larger role in a restruc-
tured system. Instead of the current "unfunded" mandate, family leave
might be financed by an explicit payroll tax or by general revenues, with
different efficiency and distributional consequences. Even an unpaid
leave program might use explicit tax financing to redistribute the costs of
employer compliance with the mandate.335 A funded mandate would re-
quire explicit tax increases but, by spreading the costs of the program
beyond employers and workers, could ameliorate some of the adverse ef-
fects of the employer mandate.336 Alternatively, tax incentives for family
leave, part-time work, or flex-time could encourage these arrangements
while spreading their cost to the taxpaying public.337
A tax-funded leave program or tax incentives for employers raise a
host of institutional design issues, which require further research. For
example, financing family leave through general revenues or creating tax
incentives for flexible work policies would require tax rate increases,
which create deadweight losses and potential work disincentives. Tax
funding does not eliminate the cost of the program, but simply allows a
more explicit method of assigning tax rate increases to different groups
of taxpayers.338 Any proposal to fund paid family leave raises difficult is-
sues regarding how large payments should be.339 An incentive program
also must confront, among other difficult issues, the familiar problem of
"buying the base": employer incentives may in many cases simply provide
a windfall to employers who already have or would have adopted their
334. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2) (B) (ii), (4) (A) (i) (1994) (exempting employers of fewer
than 50 workers). For criticism of the disparate burden employer mandates impose on
finns in different industries, see Fuchs, supra note 1, at 137.
335. For a general treatment of the efficiency and distributional differences between
government provided benefits and employer mandates, see Lawrence H. Summers, Some
Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am. Econ. Rev., May 1989, at 177, 177
(arguing that under certain conditions, mandates may have smaller efficiency costs but
may interfere with redistributive goals).
336. For example, employers might be less reluctant to hire women and to grant the
mandated leave. A funded leave program also might have smaller effects on women's
wages and unemployment.
337. President Bush proposed a family leave tax credit in 1992 as an alternative to his
expected veto of that year's family leave mandate legislation. See Bush Proposes Tax
Credit for Finns Providing Family Leave to Employees, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 17,
1992, at A-19.
338. See Summers, supra note 335, at 180-81 (discussing extent to which mandate
replicates economic features of a tax).
339. See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 1, at 134 (arguing that payments linked to wages are
regressive) .
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policies in any case.340 Finally, this Article has consistently raised ques-
tions about the effects of incentives on individuals' behavior, and the nat-
ural corollary question is whether incentives for businesses merit a differ-
ent conclusion. Businesses might be better informed than are
individuals, and businesses have been quite responsive to some tax incen-
tives in the past, but the design of an incentive program requires rules to
monitor compliance and prevent "gaming" behavior that allows a busi-
ness to qualify for the tax break without making the desired change.341
C. Welfare Policy
Like tax law and family law, welfare rules create income transfers and
potential behavioral incentives, but welfare rules reflect yet another dis-
tinct mix of institutional capabilities. The AFDC program, repealed in
1996, redistributed federal revenues using federal rules that created a
minimal degree of uniformity in administration, although states set bene-
fit levels, which varied widely, and controlled day-to-day administra-
tion.342 Because only the very poor qualified for AFDC benefits, the wel-
fare system encountered a limited subset of the population and provided
little assistance to the working poor.343 AFDC administration was bureau-
cratic, in theory combining some degree of case-by-case factual determi-
nations with highly routinized procedures, but in practice often falling
short of even these modest ideals.344
The new substitute for AFDC, the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families ("TANF") program, provides federal block grants to states to be
340. See Harriet B. Presser, Can We Make Time for Children? The Economy, Work
Schedules, and Children, 26 Demography 523,525-30, (1989). See generally MichaelJ.
Graetz, Mandating Employer Health Coverage, 60 Tax Notes 1765, 1766 (1993)
(describing problem of buying the base in context of proposed incentives for health
insurance) .
341. The example of the targeted jobs tax credit ("1JTC") is troubling in several
respects. The 1JTC provided a tax credit for employers who hired certain disadvantaged
workers. See I.R.C. § 51 (1994). The 1JTC expired on December 31, 1994, but has been
replaced, in slightly modified form, by the work opportunity credit. See ide § 51. For
criticism of the 1JTC, see, e.g., Testimony of Douglas Ross, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Employment and Training before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 104th Congo (1995), reprinted in Labor Department's Testimony on 1JTC at W &
M Oversight Panel Hearing, Tax Notes Today, May 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File, 95 TNT 91-47 (opposing reenactment of 1JTC, in part because the
credit was a "windfall" to employers of low-wage, high-turnover labor, and citing statistics
projecting that 92% of workers would have been hired even without 1JTC). Similar issues
might plague tax credits for part-time or flexible hours; unless carefully designed, the
"incentives" might be a windfall transfer to employers of part-time workers in, e.g., the fast
food and retail industries.
342. See 1994 Green Book, supra note 182, at 324-333.
343. See ide
344. See Mary J. Bane & David T. Ellwood, Welfare Realities 2-7 (1994). For an
anecdotal description, see Theresa Funiciello, TYranny of Kindness 24-53 (1993)
(describing "brutality" of welfare bureaucracy).
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used for assistance for low-income families.345 TANF both permits
greater state discre~on in setting the terms of assistance and imposes new
federal restrictions on state programs, including work participation re-
quirements and a time limit on benefits.346 Advocates of TANF argue
that it will facilitate productive experimentation at the state level, but crit-
ics fear that disparities in state benefit levels will grow and that states will
compete in a destructive "race to the bottom" that will further reduce
benefit levels.347 It is impossible to predict the structure of new state pro-
grams under TANF, but it seems likely that the new programs will retain
some of the basic institutional features of AFDC, including varying state
benefit levels and a focus on income-tested programs for the very poor.
Like tax policy and family law, welfare policy also encounters the
conflict between encouraging women's market work and assisting
caregivers. During the past few decades, proposals for reform of AFDC
have increasingly sought to reduce welfare use by encouraging recipients
(the majority of whom are single mothers) to work in the market.348
(This is not, of course, solely a "feminist" debate, but the issues neverthe-
less echo the conflict between feminist goals, and feminists might take
different positions on the appropriate policy.) Feminist critics argue that
work-related welfare reforms penalize caregivers and devalue caregiving
work.349 The debate over time limits in TANF revisits the familiar debate:
advocates argue that limiting benefits will increase work among welfare
recipients, but critics argue that greater work effort is unlikely to lead to
economic self-sufficiency and may consign many welfare recipients to ex-
tremely harsh living conditions.35o
Although debates over welfare policy are immensely complex, and a
full discussion is well beyond the scope of this Article, several proposals
345. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (Wesdaw, US-PL database).
346. See ide Section 103(a) (1) of the Act requires states participating in TANF to
meet numerical goals for work participation by welfare recipients, see ide § 103(a) (1), (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608) and imposes a 60 month lifetime limit on the receipt of
benefits, see ide
347. See R Kent Weaver, The Politics ofWelfare Reform, in Looking Before We Leap
91, 100-01 (R. Kent Weaver & William T. Dickens eds., 1995). See generally Paul E.
Peterson & Mark C. Rom, Welfare Magnets 15 (1990) (arguing that "states are more prone
than the federal government to provide inadequate benefits for both political and
economic reasons").
348. SeeJoel F. Handler, The Poverty of Welfare Reform 28-29 (1995). A variety of
welfare reforms over the years have sought to provide direct, in-kind support for market
work by welfare recipients (e.g.,job training and childcare), but experience with welfare-
to-work programs invites skepticism about their design, goals, and management. See ide at
56-88.
349. See, e.g., Martha A Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare
"Reform," 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 287, 290-94 (1996).
350. See Rebecca M. Blank et al., A Primer on Welfare Reform, in Looking Before We
Leap, supra note 347, at 27, 67-70.
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and programs illustrate the possibilities of using legal coordination to al-
ter the institutional features of welfare. Consider three examples:
First, family allowance proposals, discussed above in Part I.C, would
replace all or a portion of welfare benefits with a universal, or non-
income-tested transfer. The elimination of the income test would reduce
high marginal "tax" rates on welfare recipients by spreading the tax rate
increase among the general taxpaying population.351 The elimination of
the income test would also permit administration through the tax system,
which is thought to be easier, cheaper, and less stigmatizing.352 Most
family allowance proposals also would incorporate a nationwide, uniform
benefit financed by federal revenues. Although family allowances admin-
istered through the federal income tax system would make all three of
these institutional changes, the three characteristics are not inseparable,
and other permutations are possible. For example, some states have be-
gun to experiment with limited family allowance programs for welfare
recipients, administered through state welfare agencies; these programs
would not create federally standardized benefit levels or utilize tax-based
administration, but would reduce marginal tax rates on welfare
recipients.353
Second, the CSAS, described above in Part II.A.I, is another combi-
nation policy that is often promoted as welfare reform. The CSAS at-
tempts to replace at least a portion of welfare benefits with increased pri-
vate child support collections and also creates a minimum family
allowance for single mothers.354
Third, the EITC, described above in Part I.B, provides an alternative
income transfer for the working poor. Advocates argue that the EITC
encourages work, and that its tax-based administration eliminates the
stigma of traditional welfare.355 Studies suggest that the EITC can in-
crease labor force participation among the lowest income workers, partic-
ularly single mothers, although the net impact of the program on the
work effort of slightly higher income recipients is probably close to
zero.356
Of course, these proposals and programs create their own institu-
tional tradeoffs; the argument here is not that legal coordination can cre-
ate perfect institutions, but only that it can alter the traditional institu-
351. See supra text accompanying notes 181-183.
352. See Alstott, supra note 69, at 564-65. Although this Article focuses on family
allowances administered through the tax system, they could be administered through
other agencies, e.g., the Social Security Administration, possibly using tax data on family
composition. See supra note 218.
353. See Developing A Child Support Assurance Program: New York and Minnesota,
Focus, Spring 1996, at 38 (describing New York State's Child Assistance Program, which is
a means-tested program that has smaller benefits but much more generous benefits
disregards (and thus, lower marginal "tax" rates) than AFDC).
354. See supra Part II.A l.
355. See Alstott, supra note 69, at 533-44.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 150-152.
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tional characteristics of any particular legal regime. As described above,
family allowance proposals are expensive in revenue terms and are per-
ceived to be quite costly in real economic terms. The current popularity
of "devolution" of responsibility for welfare initiatives to the states makes
major federal family-allowance legislation in the near future rather im-
plausible. Nevertheless, state experiments are underway, and as noted
above, current proposals for federal child tax credits are potentially a lim-
ited step towards family allowances.357 Some general goals of the CSAS
have been incorporated in recent welfare legislation intended to increase
child support collections, but policyrnakers so far have not embraced the
minimum benefit that Garfinkel recommends.358 And finally, in recent
years the EITC has been widely criticized as a program "rife with
fraud."359 Although my prior work suggests that these claims misunder-
stand the inherent tradeoffs of using tax-based administration to run a
welfare-type program, the attacks may have undermined the historically
strong bipartisan appeal of the EITC.360
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that tax policy can take imp.ortant steps toward
increasing or reforming income support for women and families and eas-
ing the way for women's labor market participation, but that the task of
designing effective feminist tax policies is significantly more complex
than some proponents have understood. Like any feminist legal reform,
feminist tax proposals face difficult tradeoffs among competing goals,
and no solution will be uniformly acceptable to all. Feminist tax propos-
als also encounter the inherent difficulty of using incremental changes in
financial incentives and entitlements to influence patterns of behavior
that reflect deep-seated attitudes about gender roles.
The Article suggests four conclusions. First, the traditional equal
treatment rationale for individual filing is weaker than proponents have
conveyed. The purely symbolic impact of individual filing is likely to be
limited, and advocates have overstated the practical capacity of individual
filing to change gender roles, women's economic well-being, and
women's power within the family. Although individual filing might be
structured to reinforce family law rules giving wives greater legal control
over marital property, the most effective means of doing so would under-
mine the central goal of individual filing-eliminating the secondary-
earner bias.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 231-245.
358. See supra notes 308-312 and accompanying text.
359. See Anne L. Alstott, Comments on Samansky, "Tax Policy and the Obligation to
Support Children," 57 Ohio St. LJ. 381, 390-91 (1996); see also James Bovard, Clinton's
Biggest Welfare Fraud, Wall St.J., May 10,1994, atA18; Lisa Schiffren, America's Best-Kept
Welfare Secret, Am. Spectator, Apr. 1995, at 24.
360. See Alstott, supra note 359, at 390-91.
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Second, feminist tax proposals for encouraging women's market
work illustrate the importance of attention to institutional detail and the
inevitable compromises inherent in any work incentive plan. A basic
problem is that the feminist goal of "encouraging women's market work"
is ultimately too simple to give authoritative guidance for policy design.
Any marginal tax rate cut for women can literally accomplish that goal to
some degree, but there are significant normative and empirical questions
about which women's market work should be encouraged, what kinds of
policies are best able to overcome institutional barriers to women's mar-
ket work, and what increased market work can do to advance the underly-
ing objectives of enhancing choice and economic well-being. The femi-
nist case for marginal tax rate cuts for wives requires disregarding the
goal of assisting caregivers and rests on contingent empirical predictions
about the effects of women's increased market work on the structure of
the labor market. An expanded DCTC, in contrast, offers a popular com-
promise among the goals of equal treatment, encouraging women's mar-
ket work, and assisting caregivers. Although further research is necessary,
a modified program of family leave might also offer another approach to
helping women combine family labor and market work.
Third, family allowances-or a hybrid variant like the CSAS-illus-
trate the possibility of using tax policy to improve the economic security
of caregivers. The CSAS could modestly enhance the incomes of single
mothers, and family allowances could do the same for the incomes of
single mothers and families with children, although neither policy can do
much to reliably redistribute income within the marital household. The
modest size of the transfer would mitigate the potential conflict with the
goal of encouraging women's market work-at the cost, of course, of re-
ducing potential gains in the economic well-being of women and families
with children.
Finally, any effort to use tax policy to implement feminist goals can
usefully look beyond taxation to consider the possibilities for coordinat-
ing tax law change with reforms in other legal regimes. Legal coordina-
tion is not a panacea; it cannot resolve basic tensions among feminist
goals, and legal hybrids sometimes substitute new institutional complexi-
ties for older, more familiar ones. Nevertheless, tax policy has a potential
role to play in altering the distribution of the economic costs of regula-
tion, reinforcing the effects of other legal reforms, and improving the
collection and distribution of income transfers.
This Article suggests that a better understanding of the normative
and empirical complexity of policy design can enhance the feminist case
for legal reform. A more informed awareness of competing feminist
goals, of the differences among seemingly similar tax policies, and of the
diverse capabilities of tax and non-tax legal reforms, allows feminists to
make careful and informed choices about how best to implement a par-
ticular set of goals. Given the reality of scarce resources and the difficulty
of marshaling political support for feminist legal reform, we can ulti-
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mately do the most for women by concentrating on what tax law reforms
really can accomplish. A nuanced and realistic appraisal of the capabili-
ties of feminist tax and transfer policies can focus attention and resources
in ways that maximize the potential impact and can prevent feminists
from settling for overly simple proposals that promise much but deliver
relatively little.
